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ABSTRACT 
Aziz Jaber: On Genericity and Definiteness in Modern Standard Arabic 
(Under the direction of Mike Terry) 
 
The vast majority of formal analyses of the semantics of generics have been developed based 
on data from a small number of well-studied languages, most notably English, French, Italian, Dutch, 
and German. The main goal of this dissertation is to take steps towards the building of a fully formal 
analysis of genericity phenomenon in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), one of the least studied 
languages with respect to genericity, by grammatically describing and semantically analyzing 
manifestations of genericity in the language. Accurately accounting for the distribution of 
morphology within MSA generic sentences and the range of possible meanings of the sentences 
themselves is a crucial warrant for building reliable formal models. 
This dissertation argues that similar to English and other languages, MSA characterizing 
sentences require semantically indefinite NP subjects. In a departure from the view of the traditional 
Arabic grammarians, this dissertation argues against the classification of Arabic noun phrases as 
definite or indefinite based entirely on the presence or absence of the definite article al ‘the’, 
respectively.  Instead, building on the work of Lyons (1999) and others, it makes use of definiteness 
criteria which consist of the semantic concepts of familiarity, identifiability, and uniqueness of the 
intended referent.  Maintaining the traditional definiteness criterion leads one to the conclusion that 
characterizing sentences in Arabic use semantically definite NP subjects, a conclusion rejected here.  
Also addressed is the status of bare NPs in MSA characterizing sentences. It is argued that 
bare NPs can be used in generic sentences, although only if modified directly by an adjective or a
iv 
 
relative clause, or indirectly when occurring in construct state, a noun form common to many Semitic 
languages that is found in MSA.  Evidence is presented that these bare NPs are interpreted as 
indefinites.Verbless sentences in MSA can express habituality, a form of genericity. This dissertation 
proposes an account of the asymmetric distribution of copula ya-kuun in part on the availability of 
habitual readings to the sentences in which it is found. It is argued that ya-kuun only occurs in 
verbless sentences that are modified by adverbials and carry habitual meanings. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. The Overall Goal of the Dissertation 
Most formal analyses of the semantics of generics have been developed based on data 
from a small number of well-studied languages, most notably English, French, German, 
Italian, and Spanish. The main goal of this dissertation is to take steps towards a fully formal 
analysis of genericity in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA, henceforth), one of the least studied 
languages pertaining to this linguistic phenomenon, by grammatically describing and 
semantically analyzing manifestations of genericity in the language. MSA manifests some 
properties that are shared crosslinguistically and some language-specific features pertaining 
to the articulation and interpretation of genericity. This study aims to contribute to the 
crosslinguistic study of genericity initiated by Carlson (1989, 1995) and Dahl (1995), which 
focuses on how the distinction between generic and non-generic sentences is formally marked 
in the grammars of natural languages. This type of project is a necessary first step towards 
achieving the crosslinguistic insights that come from building formal models. Getting the 
distributional facts and data right precedes building up formal models which abstract away 
from actual data and distributional facts to arrive at abstract principles. Some of these 
principles are argued to be universal like the tripartite semantic structure of characterizing 
sentences (see Leslie 2008). Therefore, building these principles based on data and facts 
taken from a wide array of languages is crucial for the reliability of these principles. 
2. Main Issues of the Dissertation: An Overview 
Generics like the English sentences in (1) report regularities about the world, which 
establish generalizations about groups of individuals, objects, events, situations, or state of 
affairs.
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(1) a. Oranges contain vitamin C. 
b. Ducks lay eggs. 
c. Tigers are striped. 
d. Aziz drinks tea after dinner. 
 
The interaction between genericity and other semantic phenomena like definiteness has strong 
bearing on the investigation of genericity in MSA. A crucial difference between the two major sub-
phenomena of genericity is subsumed under the definiteness status of the NP upon which a 
generalization is reported. The first, D-genericity or reference to a kind, like the English example in 
(2), which is gleaned from the noun phrase when invested to refer to a kind or ‘genus’, restricts 
generic NPs to semantically definite NPs.  The second, I-genericity or the characterizing sentence, 
like the English example in (3), however, which is established by the entire sentence in which the 
predicate and the other constituents collaborate compositionally to express a generalization (Carlson 
1995, Cohen 1999, Greenberg 2003, Krifka et al. 1995, Pelletier 2010b, among many others), requires 
a semantically indefinite NP as its subject.  
(2) Dodos are extinct. 
(3) A mother loves her children. 
 
In (2) the kind-referring noun ‘dodos’ is semantically definite because it refers directly to a 
unique kind, not to any individual or a group of individual dodos. This is a basic characteristic of D-
genericity, in that NPs employed as kind-referring expressions are semantically definite, regardless of 
their grammatical in/definiteness; i.e., whether they are morpho-syntactically definite or indefinite in 
form. The sentence in (3) reports a generalization about mothers in general, not about a particular, 
semantically definite individual mother. This benchmark distinguishes a characterizing sentence from 
its non-generic counterpart. The semantic structure of a characterizing sentence limits the denotation 
of the NP subject upon which a generalization is reported to semantically indefinite referent; in the 
sense that it denotes variable individuals which satisfy the descriptive content of the noun. If the NP 
subject is tied to a particular individual; i.e., the NP is definite, the sentence would be non-generic, 
reporting an isolated fact about a particular individual at a specific time and place (Krifka et al. 1995). 
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 The traditional Arab grammarians’ view of determining in/definites based entirely on what 
turn out to be the inconsistent grammaticizations of this semantic contrast poses problems for the 
investigation of genericity, a phenomenon that interacts with the semantic in/definiteness of a noun 
phrase sregardless of its morphological in/definiteness status. A major goal of this dissertation is to 
propose more modern theoretically inspired criteria for determining in/definiteness in MSA that will, 
in turn, make possible a clearer view of the various manifestations of genericity in MSA. The 
resulting analysis is previewed in (2.1) below. 
2.1 Definiteness in MSA Revisited 
 Noun phrases in MSA, according to the traditional grammarians’ view, are classified into 
definites and indefinites based entirely on the presence/absence of the so-called definite article al 
‘the’. Noun phrases that contain al are definite, while those that do not are not (c.f. Al-saamirraaʔii 
2011; Al-ɣalaaliinii 1993; Fassi Fehri 2012; Hatoum 2007; Hoyt 2008). Moreover, indefinite NPs in 
subject position must be interpreted existentially. Consider (4).  
(4) a. ya-lʕab-u   al-walad-u fi  ʃ-ʃaariʕ 
            Pres-play-Nom  the-boy-Nom in the-street 
   (The boy is playing on the street). 
b. ya-lʕab-u   walad-u-n  fi  ʃ-ʃaariʕ 
     Pres-play-Nom a boy-Nom-N in the-street 
       (A boy is playing on the street) 
 
According to the traditional view of definiteness, each of the sentences in (4) reports an isolated state 
of affairs concerning a particular, existentially calculated individual boy. In (a) al-walad ‘the boy’ is 
definite by virtue of the presence of the definite article al. It denotes a particular definite boy known 
to the speaker and the hearer. The sentence says that a contextually salient unique individual boy is 
involved in a playing event at a particular time and place. The boy in (b), however, is indefinite; i.e., 
it does not refer to a familiar individual boy. This is due to the absence of the definite article al. 
Therefore, the sentence says that there is a boy who is playing on the street at the time of utterance. 
 The traditional view of identifying definites based on the presence of the definite article is 
problematic if one wants to investigate genericity, characterizing sentences in particular. If we accept 
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the traditional view of classifying in/definites, we end up with a problematic either or situation 
pertaining to characterizing sentences in MSA. Either MSA does not have characterizing sentences, 
or MSA’s characterizing sentences exhibit a strange property in that the subject NP upon which a 
generalization is made is semantically definite; i.e., it is tied to a particular individual. The first of 
these options is on the face of it untenable. Characterizing sentences are a widespread phenomenon 
that speakers of the language use all the time to report regularities true of variable individuals, events, 
situations, and states of affairs. Without such a device, it is unclear how speakers of a language could 
discuss basic facts about the world, convey the cominality of experiences, or develop science. The 
other possible outcome, that characterizing sentences in MSA make use of semantically definite 
subjects, although less startling is still problematic. A number of promising formal analyses of 
generic sentences assume that indefinites introduce logical variables into their semantic 
representations, and that these variables are either bound by a generic operator that has the structure 
of an adverb of quantification or are otherwise introduced into the restricor of their sentence’s 
quantificational structure (e.g. Cohen 1999; Greenberg 2003; Krifka et al. 1995; Pelletier 2010b). A 
very different type of anyalysis would be suggested for MSA sentences if the traditional view of 
definiteness is maintained.   
This dissertation, however, rejects the traditional view of determining in/definites based 
solely on the absence/presence of the definite article al. It builds on Lyons (1999) crucial distinction 
between semantic definiteness, which is established on concepts like familiarity, identifiability, and 
uniqueness, and grammatical definiteness. Grammatical definiteness is the morpho-syntactic 
encoding of semantic definiteness, in the case of MSA, the definite article al. This morphological 
marking is neither a necessary and suficient condition for determining definiteness in MSA. In fact, 
more often than not, al-Ns are found in indefinite environments, in the sense that an al-N does not 
denote a definite individual, but rather denotes any individual which satisfies the descriptive content 
of the NP. MSA definites, this dissertation assertes, must meet several criteria which incorporate 
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familiarity, identifiability, and uniqueness which are taken as pathways to successful 
reference to a particular individual on both the speaker’s part and the hearer’s part. Consider 
(5).  
(5) a. [Two students have noticed that their classmates treat their professor very respectfully; after 
class, one of them says the sentence below] 
          
  al-ʔustaað-u   ya-ħðˤaa  b-iħtiraam-i-n   kabiir 
 the-professor-Nom enjoy  with-respect-Gen-N great 
   (The professor enjoys high respect) 
 
b. [An employee in a university is talking to her office mate about her feelings that she does  
 not receive enough respect from students. She expresses her wish of becoming a professor  
 one day. She says the sentences below] 
   
             al-ʔustaað-u   ya-ħðˤaa  b-iħtiraam-i-n   kabiir 
 the-professor-Nom enjoy  with-respect-Gen-N great 
   (A professor enjoys high respect) 
 
The subject NP al-ʔustaað ‘the-professor’ in (a) is semantically definite because its referent is 
familiar to the interlocutors; both of them have been in his class and witnessed how much respect he 
received from his students. It is definite not in virtue of the presence of al solely, which functions 
here as a real definite marker, but rather based on the definiteness criteria, the referent is familiar. In 
(b), however, the same subject NP used in the same sentence, but in a different context, is 
semantically indefinite, though it is grammatically definite. al-ʔustaað ‘the-professor’ here denotes 
not a particular individual professor, but rather any individual to which the descriptive content of the 
NP applies. It denotes variable individual professors. This is the kind of denotation that fits the 
semantic structure of a characterizing sentence. 
 The distinction between definiteness as a semantic phenomenon and its inconsistent 
grammaticization has strong bearing on investigating manifestations of genericity in MSA. In 
particular, determining definites based on the definiteness criteria is crucial to investigating genericity 
in the NP system in MSA. This interaction is previewed below in (2.2). 
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2.2 Genericity in the NP System in MSA 
In MSA, noun phrases of different syntactic forms can be used in lexically characterizing 
sentences as long as these NPs are semantically indefinite, regardless of whether they are 
grammatically definite or not. Any al-N, singular, plural, countable, or uncountable, associated with 
Individual-level predicates, classified as denoting permanent, essential, definitional properties, can be 
used in a characterizing sentence if semantically indefinite. The traditional view of bare nouns 
restricts their denotation in subject position to existentially calculated individuals, therefore 
preventing them from being used in generic sentences. Contrary to this view, bare NPs, this 
dissertation argues, are allowed in characterizing sentences. Not only are bare NPs allowed in generic 
sentences, so are grammatically indefinite construct state phrases. Construct state is a type of 
annexation consisting of at least two members, most often nouns. The first is the possessed and the 
last is the possessee.  In fact, a characterizing sentence incorporating a bare subject NP not only 
expresses a generic reading, but also excludes the other episodic reading that its counterpart with al-N 
subject avails. Consider (6) below. 
(6) a. ʃaʤarat-u  z-zaytuun-i  tu-ʕtˤii   zayt-a-n  sˤiħħiyy 
    tree-Nom the-olive-Gen Pres-give oil-Acc-N healthy 
                (An olive tree gives healthy oil) 
 
           b. ʃaʤarat-u  zaytuun-i-n  tu-ʕtˤii   zayt-a-n  sˤiħħiyy 
    tree-Nom olive-Gen-N Pres-give oil-Acc-N healthy 
      (An olive tree gives healthy oil) 
 The sentence in (a) is ambiguous. It avails an episodic reading when a context that limits the 
denotation of the subject construct state ʃaʤarat-u z-zaytuun-i ‘the olive tree’ to a particular definite 
referent is provided. In this case, the sentence reports an isolated fact about a particular olive tree 
producing healthy oil. The other reading is generic. The sentence expresses a generalization about 
olive trees in general such that they produce healthy oil. The ambiguity that (a) entertains emerges 
from the subject construct state being grammatically definite. In this case, grammatically definite 
construct state nominal phrases behave similarly to grammatically definite simple NPs. The sentence 
in (b) uses grammatically indefinite construct state ʃaʤarat-u  zaytuun-i-n ‘an olive tree’. The 
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sentence expresses a generic reading as the only available reading. This is due to the indirect 
modification that holds between the construct state head ʃaʤarat-u ‘a tree’ and its complement 
zaytuun ‘olive’. This kind of modification changes the denotation of the nominal phrase from 
denoting individuals existentially to denoting variable individuals which satisfy the descriptive 
content of the noun phrase. An NP with this kind of denotation is allowed in a characterizing 
sentence. Being semantically indefinite restricts the compatibility of grammatically indefinite 
construct state phrases to characterizing sentences only, rather than particular sentences.  
 This indicates that bare NPs can be used in characterizing sentences when modified indirectly 
in a construct state, or directly, in a noun adjective phrase. All nominal forms, this dissertation argues, 
are allowed in generic sentences. This shows that MSA maps to other natural languages that put no 
restrictions on the noun forms used in generic sentences (Krifka et al. 1995).   
 Reference to a kind genericity in MSA manifests itself in semantically definite NPs that 
denote not particular individuals but kinds. Singular and plural nouns can be used in the language as 
generic NPs. However, the language under examination, as well as other natural languages, restricts 
kind-referring NPs to nouns which denote well-established kinds. Many languages like English 
entertain this semantic condition. In the literature of reference to kind genericity (e.g. Krifka et al. 
1995), adverbial phrases like biʃakl-i-n ʕaam ‘in general’ are used as a diagnostic test to distinguish 
generic NPs which denote well-established kinds from NPs denoting objects. Nominal phrases 
compatible with these adverbs are defined as object-referring, and those incompatible are kind-
referring. Consider below. 
(7) a. al-ʔusuud-u   mina  θ-θadiyyaat  
  the-lions-Nom  from the-mammals 
               (Lions are mammals) 
 
     b.?bi-ʃakl-i-n   ʕaam  al-ʔusuud-u   mina  θ-θadiyyaat 
 in-form-Gen-N  general  t he-lions-Nom  from the-mammals 
  (In general, lions are mammals) 
 
(8) a. ?sayyaarat-u  l-ʔuʤrat-i  sˤafraaʔ  
       car-Nom the-fare-Gen yellow 
   (A/The taxi is yellow)          (bad on kind-referring reading) 
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          b. bi-ʃakl-i-n    ʕaam   sayyaarat-u   l-ʔuʤrat-i sˤafraaʔ     
    in-form-Gen-N   general     car-Nom        the-fare-Gen   yellow 
   (A/The taxi is yellow)               (good on object-referring reading) 
Another major manifestation of genericity in MSA is the so-called verbless sentence, a type 
of sentence which contains a copula, but no other verb.  The syntactic distribution of the copula in 
these sentences is asymmetric. This dissertation provides a semantic account for this asymmetry 
based on a generic/nongeneric distinction. This account is previewed in (2.3) below. 
2.3 The Verbless Sentence: Generic vs. Nongeneric Distinction 
The nonmodal present tense verbless sentence in MSA shows a clear manifestation of 
genericity in the language. It exhibits a syntactic asymmetry in that the copula ya-kuun ‘Pres-be’ is 
obligatorily unexpressed in some sentences (9), obligatorily expressed in others (10), and optionally 
expressed in other environments (11)
1
. 
(9) a. Ø/*ya-kuunu al-ʤaww-u             ʤamiil      
                  Pres-be    the-weather-nom    nice 
               (The weather is nice) 
 
           b. Ø/*ya-kuun  alkab-u  ðakiyy 
        Pres-be the-dog-Nom intelligent 
   (The dog is intelligent) 
 
(10) a. ya-kuunu/*∅   xaalid-u-n naaʔim-a-n  min  l-ʕiʃaaʔ-i    ʔilaa   l-faʤr 
              Pres-be/∅        Khalid-Nom-N asleep-Acc-N from   the-evening-Gen  to       the-dawn 
                (Khalid is asleep from evening to dawn) 
 
          b. ya-kuunu/*∅   yazan-u  masruur-a-n  fii  nihaayaat-i  l-ʔusbuuʕ 
    Pre-be/∅ Yazan-Nom happy-Nom-N in ends-Gen the-week 
    (Yazan is happy in the weekends) 
 
(11) a. Ø/ya-kuunu l-ʤaww-u              ʤamiil-u/a-n   fi r-rabiiʕ    
                Pres-be    the-weather-nom   nice-Nom/Acc-N in the-spring   
       (The weather is nice in spring) 
 
     b. Ø/ya-kuunu    asˤ-sˤiyaam-u   sˤaʕb-u/a-n   fi  sˤ-sˤayf 
             Pres-be        the-fasting-Nom  hard-Nom/Acc-N in the-summer 
     (Fasting is hard in summer)  
                                                          
1
 This study investigates verbless sentences where the copula is phonologically (un)expressed regardless of 
whether the copula is in the underlying structure or not. This issue is subject to much debate, and has no 
direct influence on the treatment proposed here based on a generic-non-generic meaning distinction. 
However, the semantic analysis proposed in this dissertation might give some insights with respect to this 
syntactic controversy. 
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This dissertation proposes that the puzzling distribution of the verbal copula ya-kuun in verbless 
sentences can be captured by the generalization in (12), which is based on a generic/nongeneric 
distinction. 
(12)  The distribution of copula ya-kuun in the present tense verbless sentence 
 
a. Copula yakuun must be licensed by a spatio/temporal adverbial.  
b. Present tense verbless sentences with such an adverbial come in two kinds: 
 
1. Copula yakuun is optional, with a generic-nongeneric meaning difference based on      
the choice of the predicate and the definiteness status of the copula subject.  
 
2. Copula yakuun is required based on the choice of the predicate and its interaction with 
the adverbial. 
 
c. The presence of a spatio/temporal adverbial does not guarantee the presence of yakuun. 
 
d. Present tense verbless sentences without adverbial licensors, and therefore without 
copula   yakuun can receive varied generic/nongeneric interpretations based on the 
predicate used as copula complement and the nominal form used as copula subject. 
 
The copula ya-kuun could be treated as a habitual marker; hence being compatible with 
verbless sentences that have time/place referential adverbials. These adverbials provide a set of 
eventualities for the habitual operator to quantify over.
 2
 The lack of such adverbials block a habitual 
reading of the sentence, and this explains why copula ya-kuun cannot surface in this environment. 
Sentences where ya-kuun can optionally surface vary in their interpretation based on the 
presence/absence of the copula. Sentences with expressed copula entertain a generic interpretation 
only. Whereas, their minimally contrasting sentences with null copula are ambiguous between 
generic/non-generic interpretations according to the context which helps determining the associated 
al-Ns as semantically definite or indefinite. The former is compatible with an episodic reading, and 
the latter with a generic reading. Sentences where an expressed copula ya-kuun is required entertain a 
generic interpretation only.  The incompatibility of the predicate and the adverbial used excludes the 
episodic reading of such sentences. Therefore, the presence of copula ya-kuun marks the only generic 
                                                          
2
 It is hard to tell whether the eventualities are contributed by the adverbial adjuncts or the copula itself. 
However, a tentative suggestion that the copula, not the adverbial adjuncts, provides these eventualities will 
be proposed based on some observations. 
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reading that such sentences avail, where phonologically absent copula renders such sentences odd, if 
not completely unacceptable. 
3. Organization of the Dissertation 
The reminder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 will present an overview 
of genericity as a linguistic phenomenon in natural languages. An elaborated distinction between 
genericity as a linguistic tool to express generalizations about the world and episodicity which covers 
sentences used to express accidental, isolated facts, state of affairs, events, or situations true of 
particular individuals or objects will be a main goal of this chapter. The long-established distinction 
between the two types of genericity, reference to kind and characterizing sentences will be examined. 
An elaborated distinction of generics as opposed to explicitly quantified sentences will be probed. 
The two broadly defined camps which dominate approaches to generics analyses - the inductivist 
view and the rule-and-regulations view, as articulated in Carlson (1995) - will be investigated. The 
semantics of GEN (generic operator) assumed in the semantic structure of characterizing sentences 
will be investigated. It will be argued that a modal interpretation similar to Kratzer’s (1981) is 
sufficient to interpret characterizing sentences since it fully accounts for the exception tolerance that 
characterizing sentences entertain as opposed to quantified sentences.  
Chapter 3 will revisit definiteness in MSA. In this chapter, it will be shown that the 
traditional view of determining in/definites based exclusively on the presence/absence of the definite 
article al ‘the’ is problematic and unuseful to genericity investigation.  Definiteness is a semantic 
concept. A definite nominal expression is such that its referent is a particular, identified individual to 
both interlocutors. It gains this privilege of being identified through a variety of linguistic or 
extralinguistic contexts: the referent is contextually unique; it is familiar through shared background; 
it can be identified and singled out; or it has been mentioned before in a previous sentence. In all 
these cases, both interlocutors are able to single out and successfully refer to an individual or object in 
the outside world without running the risk of confusing it with another individual to which the 
descriptive content of the linguistic expression applies.  The semantic concepts - familiarity, 
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identifiability, or uniqueness - upon which definiteness is established will be taken as criteria 
to definitenesss in MSA.  This does not mean ignoring the grammatical marking of 
definiteness represented by the article al, but rather approaching nouns prefixed with it with 
suspicion, as this article is no longer a pure, exclusive marker of definiteness.  
Chapter 4 will investigate the variety of noun phrases in MSA with special focus on 
those which are allowed/disallowed in generic sentences. Bare, mass, definite, and referential 
NPs will be scrutinized in episodic and generic environments to see whether the language 
uses any of these constructions to formally mark generic or episodic readings. It will be 
shown that all nominal forms in MSA can be used in generic sentences as well as episodic 
sentences. This, in turn, shows that the language does not dedicate a specific nominal form to 
mark genericity or episodicity. The interaction between semantic definiteness and 
characterizing sentences will also be investigated. It will be shown that characterizing 
sentences in MSA are ubiquitous, and that they have a semantic structure similar to that of 
characterizing sentences in other natural languages.  The second of these conclusions could 
not be reached if the analysis were to accept the traditional view of definiteness in MSA. 
Reference to a kind will be investigated. Both definite singular and definite plural nouns will 
be shown compatible with kind level predicates, and thus both constructions appear 
equivalent in their use as kind-referring NPs. The construct state and its compatibility with 
generic sentences will be probed in this chapter. 
The goal of chapter 5 is to address a long-observed syntactic asymmetry within the 
non-modal present tense verbless sentence in MSA. Within this structure, the copula ya-kuun 
‘Pres-be’ is obligatorily absent in some contexts, obligatorily overt in others, and optionally 
overt in still other contexts. This chapter aims to explain this asymmetry in terms of the 
generic/nongeneric interpretation of the sentence. The claim is that sentences that require a 
phonologically null copula vary in their interpretation based on the predicate used and the 
definiteness status of the subject NP. These sentences do not make use of temporal adverbials 
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that are necessary for such sentences to receive habitual interpretations. Sentences which optionally 
allow overt copula, however, can be classified according to the phonological status of the copula: 
sentences with expressed copula can only be interpreted generically, while those with unexpressed 
copula are ambiguous between both readings according to the context. Sentences in which the copula 
is obligatorily expressed avail a generic reading only. This generalization is extended to cover the 
negative verbless sentence where two negative particles, laysa and laa ‘not’, appear in 
complementary distribution. The latter is compatible with verbless sentences with a generic reading 
only. The former, however, is compatible with sentences where copula ya-kuun is unexpressed.
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CHAPTER 2: GENERICITY: AN OVERVIEW 
1. Introduction  
Generic sentences, as the term suggests, express generalizations about the world. They are 
used to convey regularities that hold for an individual, group of individuals, or across members of a 
certain kind. They do so in an intriguing way. As pointed out by Leslie (2007) speakers of natural 
languages, English, for example, intuitively judge a sentence like ‘dolphins give birth to live young’ 
as true, and ‘dolphins are females’ as false. This judgment is puzzling because it holds despite the fact 
that the former reports a generalization true of less than a quarter of dolphins - only adult fertilized 
female dolphins can give birth to live young - whereas the latter expresses a generalization true of at 
least half of dolphins. What adds to the oddness of such puzzling judgments is that the set of dolphins 
which give birth and the set of dolphins which are female are in a subset/superset relation; thus a 
dolphin which gives birth to live young is necessarily a female dolphin. This and other aspects of 
their behavior have made generics  a lively and interesting topic, intriguing enough to constantly 
trigger new insights, claims, arguments, and counterarguments in order to construct a full account of 
their intricacies.  
The main purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of genericity as a linguistic 
phenomenon in natural language. The essence of genericity as a linguistic tool to express 
generalizations, and the long-established distinction between the two types of genericity, reference to 
kind generics and characterizing sentences, are investigated in section two. An elaborated distinction 
between generics as opposed to both episodics - sentences that express accidental, isolated episodes, 
events, or facts - and explicitly quantified sentences is investigated in sections three and four, 
respectively.  Section five will examine and evaluate the two broadly defined camps which dominate 
approaches to generics analyses; namely, the inductivist view (Lawler 1973), and the rule-and-
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regulations view, as articulated in Carlson (1995). Most theories of generics postulate a logical form 
with a silent generic operator GEN in characterizing sentences. However, they differ tremendously in 
the type of semantics each theory proposes to this operator. This chapter will briefly review the 
dominant methods introduced in the literature to capture the semantics of GEN; in particular, the 
modal interpretation of Kratzer (1981) will be given special focus as the most promosing approach.   
2. What is Genericity? 
Generics are an integral tool in the linguistic arsenal of natural language speakers that enables 
them to express much of their commonsense beliefs about the world. They are widely used as 
important reasoning apparatus to express generalizations about everyday affairs, scientific 
understanding, and natural laws and regulations. Although difficult to characterize in precise formal 
terms, generic sentences, as exemplified in (1), are pervasive and widely used by speakers to express 
generalizations for which exceptions exist. Generic propositions are distinguished from their episodic 
counterparts (2) in that they do not attribute an accidental property to a particular individual or a 
group of individuals; neither do they report isolated events, situations, or states. Rather, generics 
report a generalization or regularity over groups of individuals, objects, events, situations, or state of 
affairs. In their seminal work, Krifka et al. (1995:2) define generic sentences as statements that denote 
“propositions which do not express specific episodes or isolated facts, but instead report a kind of 
general property, that is, report a regularity which summarizes a group of particular episodes or 
facts.” It is said that generics often isolate themselves from any restrictions over the number of 
individuals, the time line, or specific situations or events (Cohen 1999). In a nutshell, generics, unlike 
their episodic counterparts, are almost unqualified in these respects.  
(1) a. Cats meow. 
        b. A vulture eats meat. 
        c. Graduate students study hard for exams. 
 
(2) a. Cats are mewing. 
          b. A vulture ate meat yesterday. 
          c. Graduate students studied hard for exams last spring. 
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The propositions in (1) abstract away from relating a certain property to a particular 
individual or group of individuals on a particular location and time, and report a regularity that 
summarizes  groups of particular episodic instances or facts. For instance, (1.a) reports some kind of 
property attributed to cats in general. It captures a generalization based on properties of specific 
members of the set of cats. Similarly, (1.b) does not describe a specific individual vulture, but rather 
reports a property ascribed to vultures in general. The proposition in (1.c) also does not seem to 
describe a particular group of graduate students; it expresses a statement about graduate students in 
general. This generalization, however, is based on a regularity of recurrence of a plurality of events. 
The proposition in (1.c) can be roughly interpreted as follows: “generally speaking, situations which 
have graduate students and exams in them are such that graduate students study hard for exams in 
these situations.” 
The propositions in (2), however, describe specific episodes or state of affairs. The NPs in (2) 
are interpreted existentially since they denote particular individuals or groups of individuals. 
Similarly, the predicates report accidental, isolated facts or state of affairs. The proposition in (2.a), 
for instance, describes an accidental event of meowing attributed to particular cat individuals at a 
particular place and time. Like (2.a), the proposition in (2.b) relates a specific property about a 
particular vulture that happened to eat meat at a specific time and location. Similarly, (2.c) does not 
seem to report a generalization about graduate students in general; instead, the proposition describes 
an isolated fact about some graduate students who were involved in a particular situation of studying 
hard last spring.  These sentences receive what is called an existential interpretation. A helpful 
diagnostic for the existential interpretation of a sentence is that the sentence may be paraphrased with 
some or the existential operator there with little or no change in meaning; hence the terminology 
‘existential reading’ (Leslie 2007). This kind of sentence can felicitously fit in an existential frame 
like ‘There is X Ying)’ or ‘Some X Y’, where X stands for any subject referent, and Y stands for the 
predicate attributed to the subject. The sentences in (2) fit in both frames, and can be rephrased with 
some or there with slight change in meaning (3). However, inserting any of the sentences in (1) in the 
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‘There frame’ renders that sentence unacceptable, whereas inserting it in the ‘Some frame’ radically 
changes the sentence from a generic sentence to an existentially quantified one, and hence a 
significant change in meaning (4). 
(3) a. There is a/Some cat Ø/is mewing. 
        b. There is a/Some vulture that/Ø ate meat yesterday. 
 c. There are/Some graduate students who/Ø studied hard for exams last spring. 
 
(4) a. *There are/Some cats mew. 
        b. *There is a/Some vulture eats meat. 
        c. *There are/Some graduate students who/Ø study hard for exams. 
 
Genericity covers two basic sub-phenomena, which are distinct and related at the same time: 
Reference to a kind (D-generics), and characterizing sentences (I-generics). They are investigated in 
(2.1) below. 
3. The Two Basic Types of Genericity  
The distinction between two types of genericity was first proposed in Krifka (1987). There he 
distinguished D-generic sentences and I-generic sentences. The former are statements about kinds; in 
such sentences, an NP is used to refer directly or indirectly to an abstract kind or genus, rather than to 
an individual or a group of individuals of a certain kind. Genericity here is ascribed to the noun 
phrase. The latter, I-generic sentences, in contrast, are statements about instances of kinds
3
. In this 
type of generic sentences, genericity is represented as a feature of the sentence as a whole, where 
genericity is not attributable to any subpart of the sentence - the subject noun phrase or the verb 
phrase. This type of genericity is rather realized as an interaction between these two constituents 
(Pelletier 2010b). It is worth mentioning that these two types can co-occur in one generic sentence, 
which is used to describe a regularity that holds across members of a certain kind, usually through 
predicating this regularity directly to the kind. An example for this case is given in Pelletier (2010b): 
‘The polar bear is a white animal’ is a characterizing sentence with a generic NP subject, in which the 
property ‘whiteness’ is predicated directly to the Polar Bear kind.  
                                                          
3
These two terms are treated as equivalent to the more recent terms reference to kind generics and 
characterizing sentences, respectively. Following Krifka et al. (1995) the more recent terms will be used 
invariably throughout the dissertation.  
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D-generic stands for ‘definite generic’, and I-generic for ‘indefinite generic’. These names 
are intended to suggest that usually the NP employed to refer to a kind is a definite NP; whereas 
indefinite NPs typically occur in generic statements about specimens of kinds. Link (1995) claims 
that D-generic sentences incorporate “Proper Kind Predication”; that is, a D-generic sentence serves 
to express a singular statement about a particular kind. I-generic sentences, however, express 
“Derived Kind Predication”; that is, an I-generic sentence is used to express a generalization about a 
certain object or group of objects of a certain kind. 
This distinction between different types of genericity has been adopted by many scholars 
working in formal semantics and the philosophy of language (Carlson 1995, Cohen 1996, Greenberg 
2003, Krifka 1987, Krifka et al. 1995, Pelletier 2010b, among many others). D-generics are 
sometimes called Reference to Kind generics, and I-generics, Characterizing Sentences (Krifka et al. 
1995). The sentences in (5) and (6) are examples of each class of sentence. 
(5) D-Generics (Reference to Kind Generics)  
 
a. The Dodo is extinct. 
b. Cats are widespread. 
c. Water is common. 
d. Dinosaurs died out long time ago. 
e. The Wright brothers invented the airplane. 
f. Man reached the moon in 1969. 
 
(6) I-Generics (Characterizing Sentences) 
 
a.  Ahmad walks to school in the morning. 
b. Water freezes at zero Celsius. 
c. A tiger eats meat. 
d. A copier copies 100 copies per minute. 
e. Dinosaurs ate kelp. 
f. Humans are mammals. 
 
Each reference to kind generic in (5) contains an NP that refers directly to an abstract kind or 
genus, rather than to a particular individual or object. In such sentences, we are assured that the 
predicates apply directly to the kind, not to members of the kind. This is evident since predicates like 
‘extinct’ and ’widespread’, are not applicable to individuals; no individual can be extinct or 
widespread, only kinds or species can. This holds also for ‘invent’; no object item can be invented; 
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the type or the kind of that item can only be invented.  Thus, all the NPs in the above example 
sentences refer to kinds, not to members of kinds. In both Carlson (1977) and Krifka et al. (1995) this 
kind of NPs are dubbed generic NPs as opposed to object-referring NPs, and the kind of predications 
associated with them generic predications, as opposed to object predications. The sentences in (6), 
however, express propositions thought to be generically true not in virtue of the NP only, but the 
sentence as a whole. Sentence (6.a), for example, expresses a regularity of situations in which Ahmad 
walks to school in the morning. In (6.b), however, the regularity reported expresses a fact about 
situations where water is present, and the temperature reaches zero degrees Celsius, water freezes.  
The sentences in (5) support our intuition that grammatically definite NPs do not exhaust the 
range of linguistic objects that can apparently be kind-denoting. Bare plural NPs and mass nouns 
behave like definite NPs in this respect. Indefinite and quantified NPs can also serve to accomplish a 
specific type of kind reference known as “taxonomic kind reference” (Krifka et al. 1995). The data in 
(5) also show that kind-referring NPs are not restricted to the subject position of the sentence; they 
can occupy the object position as well. The data in (7) provide more examples of the range of generic 
constructions. 
(7) a. The lion has a bushy tail.     Definite NP 
b. Flies are common.      Bare Plural (BP) 
c. Water is necessary for life.       Mass noun   
d. A large cat, namely the tiger, is in danger of extinction.   Indefinite NP 
e. Several metals are precious.     Quantified NP 
f. Gulf countries’ economies are dependent on oil.   Object position. 
g. William Shockley invented the transistor.   Object position 
 
An interesting question that semanticists have been pondering over for a while relates to the 
kind of relation that holds between a kind and the members of that kind. Put differently, what is the 
semantic relation between an individual NP and a generic or kind-denoting NP? Carlson (1977) 
proposes two types of individuals, objects and kinds. The former realizes the latter. Individual people, 
for example, exemplify Mankind kind, and individual dinosaurs exemplify the Dinosaur kind. 
However, another related question might arise: How does a member of a kind receive a property 
applied to the kind as a whole? A plausible answer might be that since an individual is a member of a 
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certain kind, this puts it in a position where it is eligible to inherit a property shared by all members of 
a kind unless it has a certain anomaly that makes it an exception to that property. This way of 
thinking is supported by the long-observed fact that reference to a kind can be accomplished by 
referring to a single, particular object of a kind. Pelletier (2010b) argues that such indirect reference 
to a kind can be attained through two different ways. 
(8) Representative Object Interpretation     (taken from Pelletiere 2010b:6) 
 
a. In Alaska we filmed the grizzly. 
b. Look Children: this is the reticulated giraffe. 
c. Quiet!!-- The lion is roaming about! 
 
Although the reference in the sentences in (8) is made to particular objects, which suggests 
that the predication is relevant to that object; it is evident that the three sentences express kind-
referring generics, and the NPs employed are generic NPs, rather than individual NPs.  Pelletier 
(2010b) observes that in the sentences in (8), only one object must be relevant, and yet this seems 
enough to make a truth about the whole kind. Another way of referring to a kind indirectly using a 
specimen of that kind is given in (9). 
(9) Avant-garde Interpretation      
 
a. Man set foot on the moon in 1969.                        (taken from Pelletiere 2010b:7) 
b. The potato was first cultivated in South America. 
 
Our intuition about the sentences in (9) is that although both sentences express reference to a 
kind genericity, particular members of the kinds were involved in the event. More precisely, it is true 
that in (9.a) one particular man, namely Neil Armstrong, first set foot on the moon in 1969; similarly, 
in (9.b) particular potatoes were first cultivated in South America. The significance of this is that 
these sentences are true of the kinds Man and Potato, respectively, because of actions relevant to 
some first particular instances of these kinds.  The name ‘avant-garde’ indicates that this kind 
reference is essentially temporal.    
Unlike characterizing sentences, whose underlying semantic structure is believed by many 
semanticists to incorporate a tripartite quantificational structure that contains a covert generic 
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operator, a restrictor, and a matrix; reference to kind generics are represented in most theories of 
genericity as involving no quantification, but instead a property is directly predicated to the kind as an 
entity (Greenberg 2003). Carlson (2010) argues that adopting a quantificational approach to the 
semantics of reference to kind generics yields the wrong truth conditions. The subject according to 
this account is treated as a predicate, rather than a referring expression. More precisely, on this 
account a sentence like the one in (10a) can be mistakenly represented as (10.b)
4
: 
(10) a. The dodo is extinct  ≠ b. *Qx [x is a dodo] [x is extinct] 
 
The formula in (10.b) gives the wrong truth conditions of the sentence in (10.a).  The formula 
says that there is some “Q pattern of substitutions” (Carlson 2010: 19) of individuals for the x that 
will make [dodo(x) → be-extinct(x)] true. The formula fails to give the right truth conditions for 
(10a.) because if something is extinct, there is intuitively no x that would satisfy this condition. This 
analysis conflicts with our intuition simply because an individual dodo cannot be extinct; only the 
species or the kind can be extinct. It seems more plausible to treat the subject dodo in (10.a) as a fully 
referential expression denoting a kind of thing, namely Dodo. Thus, this sentence can be better 
represented by another formula that treats the noun phrase subject as a kind-referring expression (See 
Carlson 1977). 
(11)   Extinct (d)   (where d represents the kind Dodo) 
 
This proposed semantics of kind-referring NPs complies with the proposal in Krifka et al. 
(1995) that kind-referring NPs can be semantically analyzed as proper names in terms of their 
function. Both are definite referring terms, which pick out a contextually unique individual in the case 
of the proper name, and a unique kind entity in the case of the generic NP. 
The other type of genericity is characterizing sentences. As mentioned above, characterizing 
sentences - unlike reference to kind generics - predicate properties of their subjects that can hold of 
                                                          
4
 Unlike the example I cite here which is a clear reference to a kind sentence, hence completely infelicitous on 
a quantificational account, the example cited in Carlson (2010) is a characterizing sentence with a generic 
subject NP, ‘Cats have fur’. This example of Carlson might be analyzed quantificationally, for those adopting 
the quantificational approach, but Carlson rejects analyzing it on this approach for a number of reasons 
presented in the study. 
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particular members (6). In addition to this, characterizing sentences impose no limitation on the type 
of NP they take (7).  This feature explains why Krifka et al. (1995) analyze this type of genericity as 
“sui generis type of sentence” (P.8). It is widely believed that generic sentences are stative sentences 
since a stative sentence expresses a property that the referent possesses; whereas a dynamic or 
eventive sentence, which has a predicate with a situation argument bound by existential closure, 
reports an event in which the referent is involved (Krifka et al. 1995).  
A significant distinction in characterizing sentences is emphasized in Krifka et al. (1995). 
This concerns “habitual” and “lexical” sentences. The former, they argue, entertains a verbal 
predicate that is morphologically related to an episodic predicate commonly used to form episodic 
sentences, while the latter most often does not exhibit this property. While lexical characterizing 
sentences generalize over characteristic properties of individuals, habitual sentences generalize over 
episodes of events. It seems intuitive, therefore, that lexical characterizing sentences employ stative 
verbs like know, cost, weigh, love, hate, etc., which are “inherently independent of situations” (P.36). 
Habitual sentences, however, incorporate dynamic verbs that lose their dynamicity, and change into 
stative verbs by the effect of an operator, like the adverb usually, which is different from the 
existential closure operator. Canonical examples of dynamic verbs are eat, run, walk, play, and the 
like. Consider the sentences in (12&13) 
(12)  Lexical Characterizing Sentences                       Diagnostics: 
 
a. Sugar dissolves in water.   - No quantifying adverb insertion 
b. Mark knows German.   - Stative verbs 
c. Cats have fur.    - can incorporate “used to” 
d. Lucy likes meat.    - Quantification is over individuals 
 
(13)  Habitual Sentences     Diagnostics 
        
a. Lucy barks when frightened.  - Compatibel with quantifying adverbs, usually, … 
b. Mark speaks German at home.  - Dynamic verbs 
c. Cats eat raw meat.    - can incorporate “used to” 
d. Jill smokes a cigar after dinner.  - Quantification is over situations/events 
 
The sentences in (13) can be rephrased by sentences with quantified adverbs like typically 
with only a slight change in meaning resulted.  (13.d), for instance, can be paraphrased as Jill 
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typically smokes a cigar after dinner. However, inserting typically in any of the sentences in (12) 
renders it unacceptable and semantically odd; this is because the verbal predicates used in these 
sentences are not morphologically related to predicates that can be used to express episodic events. 
For example, (12.d) is a lexical characterizing sentence because it contains a non-episodic verb like, 
which cannot occur in an episodic sentence; *Lucy is liking meat is ungrammatical.  
However, both subtypes of characterizing sentences have some properties in common. In 
both subtypes, the insertion of used to retains genericity and the use of progressive blocks it. Consider 
the sentences in (14). 
(14) a. Bill eats meat. 
b. Bill used to eat meat.  (genericity retained) 
c. Bill likes meat. 
d. Bill used to like meat.  (genericity retained) 
e. Bill is eating meat.  (genericity is blocked) 
f. *Bill is liking meat.     (ungrammatical) 
 
It is worth mentioning that reference to kind generics and characterizing sentences share a 
distinctive salient property. Kind-referring NPs abstract away from particular instances of the kind, 
and characterizing sentences abstract away from particular episodes. Thus, it seems plausible and 
intuitive that the two types of generics can occur together in the same sentence. In this case, the 
sentence is used to describe a regularity that holds across members of a certain kind. This can be 
usually attained by predicating this regularity directly of the kind (Pelletier 2010b). The data in (15) 
lay this point out. 
(15) a. Snakes are reptiles. 
b. The lion is ferocious. 
c. Polar bears are white. 
d. Birds fly. 
e. Gold is a precious metal. 
 
The sentences in (15) are true characterizing sentences. They generalize over characteristic 
properties of their subject referents. However, these properties do not hold of a particular individual 
or group of individuals; they hold of kinds. In (a), for example, the characteristic property of being 
reptile is attributed to the kind Snakes, not to any individual snake(s). Similarly, (b) expresses a 
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generalization about the kind Lion by predicating the property ferocious to the Lion. The rest of the 
sentences behave in the same fashion. 
4. Generic vs. Episodic Readings 
The line separating generic/nongeneric readings of a sentence is not always easy to draw. In 
fact, the majority of sentences are ambiguous with respect to the kind of interpretation they express, 
although the more salient interpretation can often be gleaned through context and other pragmatic 
machinery. The data in (16) illustrate this point. 
(16) a. Bill smoked cigarettes. 
 b. A dog barks. 
     c. Jill will eat meat. 
 
The sentences in (16) are ambiguous between generic/episodic readings. Each sentence 
exhibits both a generic interpretation and a particular interpretation. On a more salient reading, the 
proposition in (16.a) can be construed as describing an accidental property of smoking cigarettes 
attributed to Bill, which happened at a particular time prior to the time of utterance. This is the 
episodic reading of the sentence. However, the sentence exhibits another less salient reading which 
expresses a generalization based upon a group of particular events of smoking cigarettes in the past, 
and this habitual regularity is attributed to Bill. An accurate paraphrase of the generic reading of 
(16.a) can be given by incorporating the phrase used to ‘Bill used to smoke cigarettes’. The ambiguity 
in (16.b) does not unfold as clearly as in (16.a). It might seem that (16.b) can only be interpreted as 
expressing a generic reading. However, the episodic reading can be attained if the predicate barks is 
taken to express the so-called ‘reportive present’ (Krifka et al. 1995). Similarly, (16.c) seems to report 
a particular fact about Jill - that on a time after the utterance time Jill will be involved in an eating 
event, and meat will be eaten by Jill in that particular event. This is the more salient episodic reading. 
However, what if Jill is raised in a strict vegetarian family and her parents noticed that Jill does not 
seem to take the family’s dietary conventions and values very seriously. One of her parents could 
utter the sentence in (16.c) expressing a dispositional interpretation of the sentence, which can be 
paraphrased as ‘Jill will not object to eating meat’. 
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However, an interesting question related to the source of this pervasive ambiguity with 
respect to generic/episodic readings might arise. A plausible, simple answer might be that sentences, 
particularly those presented with no explicit context, present such a challenge for native speakers 
because genericity is hardly marked formally in natural language; and if marked, the marking is 
usually inconsistent. Put more precisely, most formal encodings of genericity in natural language are 
necessary but not sufficient. Carlson (1989:3) emphasizes this point about a specimen of the 
languages he surveyed in his typological endeavor pertaining to the formal markings of genericity in 
natural languages. In his words, “English and most other commonly accessible European and Asian 
languages have no consistent formal expression of genericity.”   
Seeking a perspicuous differentiation between generic/episodic readings of a sentence, Krifka 
et al. (1995) summarized a set of diagnostic tests proposed by a number of semanticists in the 
literature that would help disambiguate such sentences and determine whether a sentence expresses a 
generic or episodic interpretation.  A non-exhaustive list of five tests is introduced. Some of these 
tests are intended to determine whether the sentence expresses characteristic genericity, and others are 
supposed to determine whether the NP incorporated is generic, denoting a kind, or non-generic, 
denoting an individual or a group of individuals. The first test, which has been mentioned previously, 
uses adverbs of frequency like typically or usually. The claim is that if one of these adverbs is inserted 
in a sentence, and the new sentence exhibits only a slight change in meaning, the original sentence is 
generic, and is episodic otherwise. The data in (17-20) flesh this claim out. 
(17) a. A vulture eats meat. 
          b. A vulture typically eats meat. 
 
(18) a. Yazan drinks tea for breakfast. 
b. Yazan usually drinks tea for breakfast. 
 
(19) a. A vulture ate meat on top of a tree. 
          b. A vulture typically ate meat on top of a tree. 
(20) a. Yazan drank tea for breakfast yesterday. 
b.*Yazan usually drank tea for breakfast yesterday. 
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In (17&18) the insertion of typically and usually, respectively, brings a slight change in 
meaning, although as Krifka et al. claim the original sentences express  strong, law-like 
generalizations; whereas their quantified counterparts express  weak generalizations that might not 
sound law-like. This slight change in the strength of the generalization might be attributed to the 
explicit stating of exceptions to the rules given in the sentences.  In the case of (19), however, the 
incorporation of the adverb typically causes a significant change in meaning. While the original 
sentence describes a specific event of eating meat true of a particular vulture at a particular place and 
time, its quantified counterpart reports a regularity of eating meat events. Put differently, the original 
sentence is episodic, but the resulting one is generic, precisely habitual. The following formal 
representations proposed by Krifka et al. (1995) are intended to capture the difference. 
(21) a. ∃ [s, x, y, z;] (s contains x, y & z; z is top of a tree; x is a vulture & x ate y on z in s; y is                                                
meat) 
 
a'. Generic [s, x, y, z;] (s contains x, y & z; z is top of a tree; x is a vulture & x ate y on z in                
s; y is meat) 
5
 
 
The pair in (20), however, presents a huge change not only in terms of meaning, but also in the 
acceptability of the quantified sentence, which is rendered ungrammatical. 
The second test is designed to clearly distinguish two kinds of referring NPs; namely, the 
kind-referring NP and the object-referring NP. The former is assumed to denote an abstract kind or 
‘genus’. The latter, however, denotes an individual or groups of individuals of a kind.  The test draws 
upon a number of predicates like invent, extinct, die out, thought to semantically-select kind-referring 
NPs only. The moral is that if an NP fits in the argument position of one of these kind-level 
predicates, this NP is proved to be kind-referring, and is object-referring otherwise. The data in (22) 
instantiate this claim. 
(22) a. The Pied Raven died out in 1948. 
     b. The Great Auk is extinct.  
     c. Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone in 1876.   
 
                                                          
5
 No specific semantics of Generic operator is assumed here; what this operator is supposed to do is to 
function as an indicator of genericity. See section 6 for a discussion of the semantics of the generic operator. 
25 
 
Close scrutiny of the NPs in (22) reveals that none of them denotes an individual or an object; 
rather all NPs refer to an abstract kind or ‘genus’. The Pied Raven in (22.a), for instance, denotes the 
genus Corvus corax varius morpha leucophaeus, and similarly the Great Auk and the telephone 
denote the kinds Pinguinus impennis and Telephonium, respectively. This analysis can be bolstered 
by the fact that the above predicates do not s-select specimens of the same kinds above. Consider the 
data in (23). 
(23) a.* This embalmed pied raven died out in 1948. 
          b.* A great auk is extinct.  (Acceptable on a taxonomic reading only) 
          c. * Alexander Graham Bell invented a telephone in 1876.   
 
However, the propositions in (22) would remain semantically true and grammatically acceptable if 
the scientific kind names of the Pied Raven, the Great Auk, and the Telephone are substituted.  
(24) a. Corvus corax varius morpha leucophaeus died out in 1948. 
          b. Pinguinus impennis is extinct.  
          c. Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephonium in 1876.  
  
 Third test is proposed in Krifka et al (1995) to differentiate between kind-referring NPs and 
object-referring NPs. However, this test relies heavily on the semantics of these NPs rather than on 
their grammatical distribution pertaining to kind-level predicates’ selection. The test shows that not 
any nominal constituent can form a kind- referring NP; only those which enjoy a strong semantic 
connection with a “well-established kind” can be taken as kind-denoting NPs. Other nominal 
expressions which lack this semantic privilege are rendered object-referring NPs. Carlson (1977b) 
cited a pair of sentences that he attributed to Barbara Partee, which show a clear contrast between the 
two incorporated NPs pertaining to their semantic connection to a well-established kind. 
Incorporating NP Coke bottles, which is proved an established kind, renders a sentence, like (25.a) 
felicitous, while associating a non-well-established NP green bottles renders its minimally-contrasting 
counterpart (25.b) semantically odd on generic reading. 
(25) a. The Coke bottle has a narrow neck. 
b.? The green bottle has a narrow neck. 
 
26 
 
The fourth diagnostic test distinguishes characterizing sentences, habitual sentences in 
particular, from episodic sentences. According to this test, generic sentences are typically stative, in 
that they express regularities; episodic sentences, however, are non-stative or dynamic since they 
report particular events or situations. Thus if a language exhibits a certain linguistic construction that 
is incompatible with stative predicates (e.g. *Mike is knowing French), this construction would 
typically exclude the generic reading of habitual sentences and give rise to an episodic reading 
instead. English, for instance, has the progressive form which seems felicitous with an episodic 
reading only; a reading that reports a particular event. The sentences in (26) have generic readings 
which their minimally contrasting counterparts (27) lack. This indicates that transforming a generic 
sentence into the progressive entails bleaching its original genericity. 
(26) a. The Jordanian eats mansaf at a wedding feast.   (generic) 
        b. Jordanians eat mansaf at a wedding feast.   (generic) 
     c. A Jordanian eats mansaf at a wedding feast.    (generic) 
(27) a. The Jordanian is eating mansaf at a wedding feast.  (episodic) 
     b. Jordanians are eating mansaf at a wedding feast.   (episodic) 
     c. A Jordanian is eating mansaf at a wedding feast.   (episodic) 
A final test is also designed to help distinguish characterizing sentences from episodic ones. 
According to this test, Krifka et al. claim, generic sentences are characterized by expressing essential 
or normative properties; however, particular sentences express inessential and accidental properties. 
The classification of properties as essential or accidental draws upon the referent of the NP argument. 
For example, being popular is an essential property of a Hollywood star, but the same property is 
inessential or not normative for students or a poem, for instance. Put more precisely, a sentence is 
classified generic if the NP and the predicate fit in the slots of the following formula: If A then B, 
where A stands for the NP and B stands for the property predicated. This formula states that to be an 
A is to have B as a property. In set-theoretic semantics where a predicate is taken to denote a set of 
objects or individuals to which the property denoted by the predicate applies, this formula can be 
stated as if A then A is a subset of B, denoted by (A, (A ⊆ B)). The propositions in (28) can only be 
interpreted as characterizing sentences with kind-referring NPs; while their minimally contrasting 
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counterparts (29) seem infelicitous on a generic reading with kind-referring NPs. The reason for this 
asymmetry lies in the semantics of the property predicated in each sentence, whether it is normative 
or accidental. 
(28) a. The lion is ferocious. 
          b. Lions are ferocious. 
          c. A lion is ferocious.   
(29) a. The lion is smart. 
          b. Lions are smart. 
          c.? A lion is smart. 
The assumption made here is that the property ferocious is essential to lions. The three 
propositions in (28) express a normative generalization. The generalization can be placed in an 
explicitly normative frame: ‘To be a lion is to be ferocious’ is true. The property smart is assumed 
inessential and accidental to lions. Therefore, the generalization expressed in (29) is descriptive, and 
the propositions are judged bad on a generic interpretation.  (29.c), in particular, which can only be 
interpreted as a characterizing sentence is bad, as opposed to (28.c), which appears to be acceptable as 
a characterizing sentence. The only difference between this pair of sentences is the connection 
between the predicate and the referent of the subject argument NP, whether it is a principal 
connection or an accidental one. An explicitly normative frame of the generalization expressed in (29) 
renders the sentence false: ‘To be a lion is to be smart’ does not seem to be true.  
5. Generics vs. Explicitly Quantified Sentences  
Most natural languages exhibit two ways of expressing a generalization or a general 
statement. The first employs explicit universal quantification where an overt universal quantifier like 
all or every is incorporated. The other way available is using characterizing sentences in which no 
overt quantifier is used. An example taken from Link (1995:359) lays this out. 
(30) a. All planets of the solar system revolve about the sun on an elliptic orbit. 
        b. Man-made satellites revolve about the earth on an elliptic orbit. 
(30.a) is naturally interpreted as each member of the closed set of solar system planets, which 
contains nine planets, is such that that planet revolves around the sun in an elliptical orbit. (30.b), 
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however, is not interpreted as quantifying over a closed set of man-made satellite objects similar to 
(30.a). Croft (1986) dubbed the former Closed Class Quantification (CCQ), and the latter Open Class 
Quantification (OCQ). A major difference between the two structures is that characterizing sentences 
seem inappropriate to express closed class quantification, while quantified sentences typically express 
closed class quantification, and may be used to express open class quantification too. According to 
Link (1995), this asymmetry can be accommodated if we observe the fact that universal quantification 
like (30.a) expresses an “actual universal truth,” while the generalization in (30.b) extends to every 
potential man-made satellite object that satisfies the property expressed in the predicate. 
One of the most salient features of generic sentences that isolate them from their quantified 
counterparts is being exception-tolerant. In a generic sentence like ‘An orange contains vitamin C’, 
there is a room for some genetically-modified oranges which do not contain vitamin C.  However, its 
universally quantified counterpart ‘Every orange contains vitamin C’, does not tolerate such an 
exception. In fact, if one orange in the set of oranges contains no vitamin C, the proposition will be 
false. This can be explicated if we observe that the latter puts a restriction on the number of 
individuals in the Restrictor which hold the property attributed in the Scope. In the above example the 
quantifier ‘every’ requires that for the sentence to be true, all members of the Restrictor - the set of 
oranges, have the property in the Scope - to contain vitamin C. The generic sentence does not seem to 
behave in the same fashion. More precisely, it does not put a limitation on the Restrictor in terms of 
quantity. This major discrepancy between the two structures manifests itself in the quantified 
sentence being more amenable to formal semantic analysis than the generic sentence which appears 
more complex and vague.  In set-theoretic semantics, for instance, the quantified sentence above can 
be rigorously represented by the formula in (31), while its generic counterpart requires much more 
investigation to figure out the truth conditions which capture the sentence’s exception tolerance. 
(31) Every orange contains vitamin C  = 1(is true), iff {x| x ia an orange} ⊆ {y| y contains vitamin C} 
 
Informally, for the sentence in (31) to be true, the set of all things that are oranges has to be a subset 
of the set of all objects which have Vitamin C. 
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Another pivotal characteristic of generic sentences that sets them apart from explicitly 
quantified sentences is that they are quantificationally vague.  Carlson (1977) emphasizes that 
generics are not quantificational statements. They are not about how many or how much, in the same 
way as quantified sentences. A quantified sentence like ‘some/most/all trees lose their leaves 
seasonally’, can be an appropriate response to a question like ‘How many trees lose their leaves 
seasonally?’ However, it seems unsuitable to respond to the above questions as ‘trees lose their leaves 
seasonally’.  Unlike quantified sentences which exhibit clear and explicit quantificational variability 
established by the quantifier, the quantificational variability of generic sentences appears to be vague 
and fluctuating. More precisely, generic sentences, Carlson argues, fluctuate in their truth conditions 
as the predicate varies. If there is a null quantifier associated with the generic sentence, its 
quantificational force varies with the meaning of the predicate. In order to determine the meaning of 
the assumed null quantifier in generic sentences, Carlson notes, we need to have knowledge of the 
particular predicate; “no other quantifier in English behaves even remotely in a similar fashion” (P. 
44).  
The vagueness of the purported quantificational meaning of generic sentences is multifaceted. 
The first facet touches on the issue of how many individuals holding of the predicated property are 
enough for the generic sentence to be true. Consider the examples below (taken from Katz and 
Zamparelli 2005). 
(32) a. Snakes are reptiles.      All snakes 
        b. Telephone books are thick books.     Those of large modern cities 
           c. Mammals give birth to live young.     Only adult fertilized females 
           d. Shoplifters are prosecuted in criminal courts.    Most are not even caught 
           e. Mosquitoes carry the paramecium that causes yellow fever.  Very few do 
           f. White sharks attack bathers.      Only a tiny minority 
 A quick look at the data in (32) clearly shows the fluctuation of the truth conditions of the sentences 
on par with the variability of the meanings of the predicates used. Sentences (32.a-f) are all true. 
However, what makes them true? (a) holds for all snakes, (b) for perhaps less than half of telephone 
books, (c) for most female mammals ( less than half the total number of mammals), (d) for few 
30 
 
shoplifters, (e) for less than one percent of mosquitoes, and (f) for very few white sharks. The truth of 
explicitly quantified sentences, however, does not appear to vary according to a variation in the 
predicate meaning. It is the quantifier, which is always given a unique interpretation, that sets the 
semantic structure of the quantified sentence, and truth values are assigned accordingly.  
If the semantic structure of generic sentences were similar to quantified sentences - in 
particular if generic sentences have a null quantifier with a unique interpretation - we would judge the 
sentences in (33) true because most of the individuals denoted by the NP in the restrictor hold the 
property predicated in the scope; nevertheless all the sentences are judged false. 
(33) a.? Students in Yarmouk University are female.  Most are female students. 
b.? Seeds do not germinate.                                      Most don’t (Katz and Zamparelli 2005) 
c.? Lions do not have bushy tails.     Most don’t; all Females& young lions 
d.? Prime numbers are odd.                             An infinity minus two (Katz and Zamparelli 2005) 
e.? Bees do not lay eggs.                                          All don’t except the queen. 
f.? People are over three years old.                        The majority are (Cohen 2006) 
The intuition we get from the data in (33) is that generic sentences, unlike explicitly 
quantified sentences, do not constitute the truth of the generalizations they express based on the size 
of individuals holding the predicated property. This characteristic exemplifies the intricacy of generic 
sentences compared to their quantified counterparts pertaining to stating and calculating their truth 
conditions. A hypothesis that assumes a semantic structure of generic sentences  similar to that of 
quantified sentences except for the overt quantifier must face the difficult task of reconciling our 
intuitions about sentences like (32) with the proposal that all of these sentences contain the same null 
quantifier. Consequently, it needs to account for the diversity of readings exhibited in (32) based on 
the same null quantifier proposal. 
 Another facet of the vagueness and complexity of generic sentences is related to the issue of 
determining the relevant set of individuals over which the generic sentence quantifies. This reflects 
the exception tolerance with which generic sentences are characterized. Any model that investigates 
the semantics of generic sentences has to account clearly for this distinctive characteristic and capture 
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the relevant set of individuals that the predicated property is attributed to, hence abstracting away 
from the exceptions. The examples in (34) lay this point out. 
(34) a. Turtles lay eggs.                                        Only adult fertilized females 
           b. Lions have bushy tails.       Only male adults 
           c. Mosquitoes suck blood.      Only adult females 
           d. Mammals nurse their young.      Only adult mother females  
Another side of the vagueness of generic sentences, which is taken as a major difference 
between these sentences and the quantified ones, is the so-called the Port-Royal Puzzle. This puzzle 
was first introduced in the Port-Royal Logic first published in 1662 (Arnauld 1964). Let us consider 
sentence (35). 
(35) The Flemish are good painters.        (Arnauld, 1964) 
 
For the generic sentence (35) to be true there must be individuals in the restrictor who hold the 
property in the nuclear scope, and hence rendering the sentence true. The puzzle that a sentence like 
(35) presents can be verbalized as follows: ‘since the sentence in (35) is true in virtue of some 
Flemish individuals being good painters, the sentence in (36) should also be true since there have to 
be at least as many Flemish painters as there are Flemish good painters. In fact, it is evident that (36) 
is false, and this proves the discrepancy between generic sentences which are not monotonically 
increasing and explicitly quantified ones in which such a puzzling situation is not attained with any 
quantifier. Quantified sentences (37), unlike generic sentences, are monotonically increasing. 
(36) a. Flemish are good painters.          (does not entail) 
          b. ? Flemish are painters. 
(37) a. Most/All/Some Flemish are good painters.    (entails) 
          b. Most/All/Some Flemish are painters. 
According to Arnauld (1964) such a sentence is to be understood as ‘ The Flemish painters are good 
painters’, and that attributing the property to the whole class of Flemish people renders the sentence 
false. 
32 
 
In sum, although characterizing sentences and quantified sentences entertain the same 
tripartite quantificational structure, both phenomena are crucially different
6
. Quantified sentences 
appear to give a unique characterization to the quantifier that would in turn tell us the portion of 
individuals in the restrictor which holds the property in the scope. Generic sentences, however, do not 
behave in a similar fashion. The generic operator of a generic sentence, if any, could not be a null 
quantifier with a unique force; it has to be able to accommodate all the above vagueness and 
variability of truth conditions that generic sentences exhibit, (see section 6 for a discussion of the 
generic operator). 
6. Generics: Inductivist Approach vs. Realist Approach 
The vagueness of generics as opposed to explicitly quantified sentences, for example, has 
lead many semanticists and language philosophers to dig into the truth conditions according to which 
such problematic propositions obtain their truth values. The drive for this is the fact that in formal 
semantics meaning is construed from “an externalist truth-conditional view” (Pelletier 2010a: xiv). 
Two approaches have been devised to tackle the truth conditions of generics; namely, the inductive or 
quantificational approach, and the realist or rules-and-regulations approach (Carlson 1995).  
According to the former, which has been dominating the semantics of generics for a long while, the 
truth and falsity of a generic sentence depend on the truth values of a related group of instances of 
individuals possessing the same predicated property; from these instances speakers abstract such 
generalizations. Cohen (1996) argues that individuals related to the predicated property are the only 
individuals that count as satisfying that property or are exceptions to the generalization. The rules and 
regulations perspective, on the other hand, claims that each generic sentence denotes a rule out in the 
world that determines its truth and falsity. To quote Carlson (1995:227) “ generic sentences depend 
for their truth or falsity upon whether or not there is a corresponding structure in the world, structures 
not being the episodic instances but rather the causal forces behind those instances." Put differently, 
                                                          
6
 Not all semanticists believe that the logical form of characterizing sentences entertains a tripartite 
quantificational structure, see Liebesman (2009) for a different view. 
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the inductive approach starts with concrete instances to draw an abstract generalization, while the 
rules and regulations approach posits an abstract rule that is realized by a generic proposition. 
Though still triggering lively debate, both perspectives suffer serious shortcomings that 
prevent either of them from being able to fully account for genericity phenomenon
7
.  Carlson 
(1995:224) observes this, and admits that “one must eventually allow for mixed or intermediate 
position.” It is noteworthy that not all characterizing sentences are equal; some of these generics are 
deeply rooted in science, and thus express a generalization based on a proved rule or a law in 
mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and other abstract sciences. It is wise to approach the truth 
conditions of such sentences from a rules- and-regulations perspective.  Supporting evidence for this 
kind of thinking comes from the oddness that incorporating an adverb of frequency in such sentences 
creates. This oddness, and sometimes unacceptability, stems from the intuition that the truth of these 
sentences does not depend on inductively analyzing the truth values of relevant instances, but rather 
upon a rule or regulation in the world that these sentences reflect or represent. Consider the sentences 
in (38). 
(38) a. Humans are mammals. 
        b. The earth revolves around the sun. 
        c. Air contains oxygen. 
As can be intuitively predicted, these generic propositions do not allow any quantificational 
adverbs like always, usually or any other adverb of frequency. In fact, forcing one into (a) would 
render it completely unacceptable, while incorporating a frequency adverb in (b &c) renders them 
odd and counterintuitive, respectively. This indicates that such generics that take scientific rules and 
natural laws as a basis for their truth and falsity favor an account that adopts the realist approach, 
rather than the inductive approach. It is worth mentioning that Carlson (1995:231-232) expresses 
slightly the same idea when he discusses generic sentences established by rules in situations where 
                                                          
7
See Carlson (1995) for a detailed survey of problems faced by the inductivist approach, and see Cohen (1996) 
for a similar one for the rules and regulations approach. 
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no possibility to inductively analyze them exists. In his words “… for examples and situations such 
as these, the inductive approach appears in principle incapable of giving convincing account.”   
However, it is hard to posit a rule or a regulation that causes a habitual sentence, which 
basically relates regularity based on a frequently recurring event, situation, or state of affair. This 
regularity does not seem to be relevant to any necessity: scientific, physical, biological, social, 
religious, moral, or anything that would require a rule or regulation. The rules and regulations 
approach seems to hold fine with generics gleaned from scientific and natural laws, but it does not 
appear to be able to account for habitual generics with the same effectiveness. This intuition can be 
drawn from the observation that the latter, established on a habitual recurrence of an event or episode, 
but not the former, well-established and consolidated according to laws, rules, or regulations, is 
cancellable. 
(39) a.? A dog is four-legged; in fact, it has three. 
     b. Bill reads before bed; a habit he no longer keeps. 
 
It is difficult to imagine what abstract causal structures out in the world - a law, a regulation, 
or a rule – that a sentence like (40) below reflects or is caused by. 
(40) Aziz drinks tea for breakfast. 
 
The generic sentence in (40) expresses a regularity that is built on frequently repeated episodic events 
over a period of time. It is almost equivalent to (41), its quantificational counterpart. 
(41) Aziz usually drinks tea for breakfast. 
 
Therefore, it seems plausible to establish the generic interpretation of this sentence, and the like, on 
quantificational or statistical characterization. The inductive approach is expected to do well on such 
habitual sentences by accounting for genericity through considering the truth values of the instances 
where Aziz drinks tea for breakfast and generalizing regularity from these instances. 
A proponent of the rules and regulations approach might counter this quantificational 
interpretation claiming that Aziz has a disposition to drink tea for breakfast regardless of the number 
of exceptions or the true instances. However, one should seek a convincing law-like justification for 
35 
 
such disposition. What causal structure in the world would carry Aziz to have a disposition to drink 
tea for breakfast; genetic, religious, cultural, physical, biological, or even medical cause? There 
should be a causal structure in the world that would change a purely habitual event into a rule-
reflectional one. If such a regulation or disposition-instigator is not established, it seems hard; if not 
implausible; to tackle the truth conditions that frame the truth values of such sentences from a rules-
and-regulations perspective. 
It should be emphasized, however, that the two competing views seek the same goal but from 
two different perspectives. In fact, these two views do not conflict as they would appear to; they both 
treat generics as sentences that express generalizations based on a rule or a regulation that causes 
them to appear, but both differ in the origin of this rule or regulation and in the characterizing 
sentence type each approach treats. For the realist approach, the rule or regulation is represented by a 
certain structure out in the world; it is there because the world is as it is, and generics reflect these 
rules and regulations and embodies them. For the inductivist approach, however, the emergence of 
rules and regulations that habitual generics reflect takes another route. Once a characterizing sentence 
is established inductively, the inductive processing stops from playing any role in determining the 
truth or falsity of that sentence, and thus discovered or existing exceptions will have no effect on the 
truth of such a sentence because it now represents a rule. In other words, the sentence is treated as a 
regularity that exemplifies a rule that has been established inductively. Therefore, the difference 
between the generalization expressed by habitual generics and that of rule-governed ones stems from 
the source of this generalization. While the latter emerges from a rule or regulation construed 
scientifically, naturally, culturally, or socially, the former is based on a rule construed through 
recurrence and frequency. This explains why generics gleaned from habitual induction, rather than 
those established from natural laws, are cancellable. 
In sum, both approaches seem to target two separate kinds of characterizing sentences, and 
thus both are needed to fully account for the semantics of characterizing sentences. Therefore, it 
sounds plausible to suggest that the labor be divided between the two models in accounting for the 
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truth conditions of the two main types of characterizing sentences, the habitual and the basic or 
lexical, where the ‘realist’ approach tackles the latter and the inductivist deals with the former. This 
proposal echoes Carlson’s (1995:237) concluding remark after making a strong case against the 
inductivist approach that “ it may well be possible that there is no single successful analysis of the 
domain of generics in toto, and that the domain must be split for the sake of arriving at a tractable 
semantic analysis.” 
7. The Semantics of the Generic Operator 
Most semanticists agree that characterizing sentences have a tripartite underlying structure 
that incorporates a covert GEN operator and its two arguments the restrictor and the nuclear scope.  
As mentioned above, this GEN operator exhibits no unique, fixed interpretation. More accurately, any 
characterizing sentence will generally have the form in (42). 
(42) GEN x1 …xn [Restrictor(x1 … xn)] ∃y1 …yn [Scope(x1 … xn, y1 …yn)] 
 
Leslie (2008:6) articulates the mainstream view among semanticists as follows: “I know of no 
contemporary theorists that do not take this schema to underwrite the logical form of generics.” 
Although semanticists agree on the logical form of characterizing sentences, and that 
characterizing sentences  are associated with a covert generic operator which is unselective; since it 
can bind variables of different kinds especially individuals and situations; accurately specifying the 
semantics of GEN remains a widely controversial issue. Krifka et al. (1995) critically surveyed most 
of the proposals in the literature without being able to decide on the most acceptable and applicable 
one, though they adopted the Kratzerian modal approach (1981) as the model that “seems more 
promising” (p.49).  Semanticists agree also that the GEN operator cannot be taken as the universal 
quantifier, simply because characterizing sentences tolerate exceptions. It is unsuitable also to 
interpret GEN as having the quantificational force of the quantifier most since generic sentences, 
unlike their regular quantificational counterparts, obtain a substantive property, namely their law-
likeness or non-accidental nature.  Krifka et al. (1995:44) give an elucidating example of the essential 
difference between generic sentences and quantified sentences pertaining to the nature of properties 
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that each structure describes. The example they give (modified slightly to serve the point to be 
emphasized) is the following: Suppose that the last five surviving lions in the world are kept in a zoo, 
and because of an accident, four of these poor lions lost one leg. Then the quantified sentence Most 
lions are three-legged would be true, but its characterizing counterpart A lion is three-legged would 
nonetheless still be false.  It has also been mentioned above that in all the examples in (33), the 
properties predicated hold of most, and sometimes 99% (33.e), of the subject referents, but the 
sentences are intuitively judged false.   
Krifka et al. (1995) argue that the GEN operator, unlike nominal quantifiers, cannot be 
contextually restricted; it states a law-like regularity that does not observe any contextual restrictions. 
This indicates that characterizing sentences do not construct their generalizations on properties of 
actual individuals in the actual world per se. The tolerance of exception, law-likeness nature, and 
counterfactual support of characterizing generics have led many semanticists (e.g. Heim 1982; Krifka 
1987, 1988; Krifka et al. 1995; Chierchia 1995; and Greenberg 2003) to claim that  GEN is a 
modalized operator that quantifies over all accessible worlds, individuals, and situations. In a nutshell, 
the generic quantifier GEN is an unselective universal modalized operator. Krifka (1988:297) claims 
that 
(I-generics) cannot be used to express facts which hold just coincidentally, but are law-like 
statements…. For example, if some nut were to clip the wings of every existing blackbird then the 
sentence A blackbird flies would nevertheless remain true. If one tries to develop semantic analysis in 
terms of possible world semantics, I-generic sentences cannot be statements with a truth value that can 
be checked at one index, e.g. the actual world. Instead, we have to take into account a set of indices. 
Thus, genericity is reconstructed as a modal notion – as some sort of necessity. 
 
7.1 A Modal Approach to the Semantics of GEN 
7.1.1 Kratzer’s Modal Theory8 
Kratzer’s modal approach can be used as an influential way of thinking about the semantics 
of GEN in a quantificational theory of generic sentences. In a series of writings, Kratzer (1977, 1978, 
                                                          
8
 This brief exposition of the Kratzerian modal approach draws mainly on Portner (2009). It is not intended to 
be used here, as formalizing the manifestations of genericity in MSA is a future project. It gives, however, a 
workable framework for formalizing genericity in MSA in other projects. 
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1981, 1986, 1991a, 1991b, 2012) developed a theory of modals and conditionals, which is accepted as 
the canonical model by a good number of formal semanticists working in this realm of semantics. A 
major assumption of this theory is that modals are not lexically ambiguous, but rather interpreted 
differently relative to a set of background information or assumptions, which she dubbed 
“conversational backgrounds.” This indicates that the different flavors of modals, epistemic, deontic, 
bouletic, circumstantial, etc., do not emerge from the ambiguous lexical contributions of the modals 
themselves, but rather are taken over from the contextually-dependent backgrounds of the particular 
contexts that wrap these modal propositions.  
Kratzer (977) made a point of departure from modal logic pertaining to the role assigned to 
context. In modal logic, context is assumed to determine the correct word out of the set of lexically 
ambiguous modal words like should, for example, by helping the addressee choose the correct 
‘should’, among the many ‘shoulds’,which  the speaker had in mind when uttering the sentence. In 
Kratzerian theory, however, context determines the set of worlds that a modal like should quantifies 
over, and hence explicating the flavor or sense of the modal.  Therefore, context not only provides  a 
set of indices of indexical features of meaning like the identity of speaker, addressee, time, or place at 
which the sentence is used, but plays a pivotal role in determining the accessibility relation function, 
and hence the sense or flavor of the modal. According to Kratzerian theory, the different modals vary 
in terms of the possible worlds with which they are compatible. The modal May, for example, is 
compatible with both epistemic and deontic accessibility relations, while Might is compatible with 
epistemic but not with deontic accessibility relation. 
Kratzer (1977) claims that although the interpretation of a modal is often gleaned implicitly 
from context and conversational backgrounds, it can be fixed sometimes by explicit linguistic 
expressions like “in view of what I know, or in view of the rules of the secret committee”. These 
expressions work as a function f from the set of all possible worlds W to the set of all propositions 
that the speaker knows in w, in the case of the epistemic interpretation. This interpretation can be 
explicitly provided by an expression like the following: “in view of what I know” = for any w, f(w)= 
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the set of propositions which the speaker knows in w. Formally, in context c, what I know expresses a 
function f such that:  
(i) The domain of f is that subset of W in which the speaker of c exists. 
(ii) For any w in the domain of  f,  f(w) = { P: the speaker knows p in w} 
 
As standard in possible world semantics, a proposition is interpreted as a set of possible 
worlds in which that proposition is true, so for p to be true in w, w must be a member of p.  Since f(w) 
yields a set of propositions, i.e., a set of sets of worlds, and we only need a single set of worlds, we 
can use a known trick in logic to get that set. We resort to intersecting all of the propositions in the 
set, and eventually get one proposition, i.e., a single set of worlds in which all the propositions are 
true. Given this conversational background function f, the accessibility relation of a modal is defined 
as follows: for any worlds w and v, v is the set of worlds accessible from w iff every proposition in 
f(w) is true in v. So if we take f(w) to be epistemic,  f(w) represents all the facts known by the speaker 
in w, and v is accessible from w iff all the facts known by the speaker in w are true in v. More 
precisely, the set of worlds accessible from w is ∩f(w).  
The second major idea of Kratzerian modal theory pertains to the simple dichotomy 
entertained in modal logic between the set of worlds accessible and the other set of worlds which is 
not accessible. In modal logic, the set of accessibility relation functions that determine the sense of 
the modal is determined by a semantic rule that applies to all modals with no change. Thus, 
pragmatics plays fewer roles than semantics in this model; it only provides the indexical features of 
meaning of a proposition through context. In Kratzerian theory, however, the tables are turned; 
pragmatics plays the main role in determining the set of worlds over which modals quantify. Kratzer 
(1981) argues that the simple dichotomy is insufficient and problematic, and suggests an ordering 
mechanism of the set of all possible worlds W that modals quantify over. According to this 
assumption, the set of worlds is not simply dichotomized, but rather ranked through the interaction of 
two conversational backgrounds.   
40 
 
In Kratzer’s (1981) revised model, a sentence is interpreted according to two conversational 
backgrounds:  the MODAL BASE f which provides a set of relevant worlds, those in ∩ 𝑓(𝑤), and 
background g which is an ORDERING SOURCE ≤ 𝑔(𝑤) which ranks these worlds as closer or 
distant from some ideal world. The specifications of both the modal base and ordering source are 
determined contextually. For example epistemic modal base combines with an ordering source related 
to information as ‘what the normal course of events is like’, some reports or beliefs. A stereotypical 
ordering source might be related to information as ‘in view of the normal course of events’. A 
circumstantial modal base combines with an ordering source related to laws, goals, plans, and wishes: 
what the law provides, what is good for you, what our goal is, what is moral, and what have you. 
Consider the illustrative example in (43) below: 
(43) Given the state of your health, you should stay at home. 
 
The sentence in (43) can be paraphrased as follows: “In view of your state of health 
(circumstantial modal base), and in view of what is best for your health (ordering source), you 
should stay at home”. In other words, the set of worlds in ∩ 𝑓(𝑤) which is top-ranked according to  
≤ 𝑔(𝑤) is the set of accessible worlds in a simple modal sentence. The definition of ordering source 
in Kratzerian theory indicates that every comparable sequence among worlds in the relevant set of 
worlds reaches a point as we move towards the ‘ever-better’ worlds in which a proposition is true. 
In sum, in Kratzerian approach the semantics of modal verbs incorporates three parameters. 
The MODAL FORCE parameter determines whether the modal verb is represented universally or 
existentially; i.e., whether it expresses necessity or possibility. The MODAL BASE or conversational 
background determines the set of accessible worlds. And the ORDERING SOURCE parameter ranks 
these worlds as closer to or distant from some ideal world. The specification of both the modal base 
and the ordering source is determined pragmatically.  
7.1.2 Application of Kratzer’s Approach to the Semantics of GEN 
Greenberg (2003) argues that applying Kratzer’s approach to the semantics of GEN operator 
has three main advantages. First, it captures the law-likeness nature of characterizing sentences 
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through the universal quantification over all possible worlds. Second, it accounts for the exception-
tolerance of characterizing sentences since it allows the universal quantification to quantify over 
individuals in the most normal worlds only; this is attained through the ordering source parameter. 
Finally,  it naturally accounts for the variety of flavors or kinds of rules (44) which characterizing 
sentences can express through the modal base which can vary as, epistemic, deontic, instrumental, 
mathematical, linguistic, etc.,  and give different interpretations. 
(44) a. A cat meows.        (epistemic) 
   b. A driver watches traffic laws.      (deontic) 
   c. A taxpayer pays state and federal income taxes.    (legal) 
   d. A queen is the wife or widow of a king.    (linguistic) 
   e. An even number can be divided evenly into groups of two.   (mathematical)  
Kratzer’s (1981) modal framework can be adopted to informally account for the truth 
conditions of generics in MSA in this project, and to build formal models in the future. This approach 
is suggested by Krifka et al. (1995:52) to be used to calculate the truth conditions of generic sentences 
like (45), as in (46): 
(45) A lion has a bushy tail. 
 
(46) 𝑮𝑬𝑵 [𝑥1 … 𝑥𝑖, 𝑦1 … 𝑦𝑖" ](𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓, 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒙 )" 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑤 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝐵𝑤  
         𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 ≤ 𝑤 𝑖𝑓𝑓: 𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑥1 … 𝑥𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑤′
∈ 𝐵𝑤 𝑠. 𝑡 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓  [𝑥1 … 𝑥𝑖 ]𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑤′, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑  𝑤′′𝑖𝑛 𝐵w 𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑤′′
≤ w 𝑤′, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑤′′′
≤ w 𝑤′′, ∃𝑦1 … 𝑦𝑖 𝑴𝒂𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒙 [ (𝑥1) … (𝑥𝑖), 𝑦1 … 𝑦𝑖]] 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑤′′′ . 
              
(Where Bw is the modal base, and 𝑤′′ ≤ w 𝑤′ means that 𝑤′′ is closer to the ideal world 
determined by the ordering source than 𝑤′) 
 
According to the definition in (46) the sentence in (45) means that, “everything which is a lion in the 
worlds of the modal base is such that, in every world which is most normal according to the ordering 
source, it will have a bushy tail.” It is noteworthy, that the definition in (46) does not presuppose that 
there are lions in the actual world. In addition, it does not require that every single lion must have a 
bushy tail. Only lions in worlds which are ranked closer to the ideal world are counted, hence 
capturing exception tolerance of characterizing generics. 
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8. Summary 
In this chapter, the intricacies of genericity as a pervasive linguistic phenomenon were 
surveyed. It was emphasized that sentences do not often receive either a generic or episodic 
interpretation automatically; the nature of the predicate incorporated along with other syntactic 
expressions seem to be substantive in deciding which interpretation the sentence is meant to express.  
Another important point that was highlighted in this chapter is that genericity is not a uniform 
phenomenon. Two sub-phenomena; namely, reference to a kind and characterizing sentences, are 
distinguished by many semanticists. While the former establishes genericity based on a generic NP, 
where a property is directly or indirectly predicated to a kind or genus, the latter constructs its 
generalization by the collaboration of every constituent in the sentence, in particular the verbal 
predicate and the NP. The two genericity types were shown to interact; a case where the property 
predicated holds for the kind directly, rather than to any specimens of that kind. 
A major distinction between the semantic behavior of explicit quantifiers and the covert GEN 
operator was highlighted. It was shown that unlike explicit quantifiers, the GEN operator could not be 
assigned a unique interpretation. This very attribute triggered a substantial amount of research 
endeavors attempting to account for the perplexingly fluctuating truth conditions of characterizing 
sentences. Most of the research in the literature adopts one of two theories; namely, the rules and 
regulations theory or the inductivist theory. It was made clear in this chapter that neither theory is 
sufficient to account for generic sentences, and instead, a composite approach that divides the labor 
between the two theories was proposed, echoing a similar proposal made by other semanticists.  
The consensus in the literature is that the logical form of characterizing sentences is similar to 
that of explicitly quantified sentences. More precisely, characterizing sentences entertain a tripartite 
structure with an unexpressed generic operator. Since it seems futile to assign GEN a unique 
interpretation like overt quantifiers, and because of a number of characteristics that generic sentences 
share with modal sentences, GEN is construed as an unselective modalized operator that binds the 
free variables in the Restrictor. 
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CHAPTER 3: DEFINITENESS IN MSA REVISITED 
1. Introduction  
Definiteness, though hard to define, is established on one or more of the following concepts: 
familiarity, identifiability, and uniqueness. The use of the definite noun phrase the boy in (1a), for 
example,  is licenced if its referenant is familiar, perhaps already introduced into the discourse, or 
identifiable, say, standing right in front of the speaker and the listener, or unique, perhaps the only 
boy in the context situation. Most often, however, definiteness is identified by its (possible) 
grammaticizations, mostly morphosyntactic markers (see Hawkins 1978; Lyons 1999). Languages 
which formally mark this semantic category employ linguistic ingredients, mostly morphemes, to 
encode in/definiteness. In English the determiner the is often used to mark definiteness and a(n) or the 
lack of any overt determiner typically marks indefiniteness.  Consider (1) below. 
(1) a. The boy is happy. 
b. A boy is happy. 
c. Boys are happy 
 
 
Even without context, the subject NP in (a) is considered definite and the subject NPs in (b&c) are 
considered indefinite.  This is due to the presence of the and a definite/indefinite articles in (a&b) and 
the lack of an overt determiner in (c).  However, these markers are only the morphological 
representation of definiteness, which is a semantic phenomenon, and the two should not be treated as 
one thing. Sometimes this co-occurrence of identifying morphology and the semantics of definiteness 
does not hold. . Therefore, in/definiteness should be determined semantically rather than 
morphologically.  The concepts of familiarity, identifiability, and uniqueness, rather than the non-
systematic presence/absence of morphological markers are used to do so. The sentences in (2) use 
morphologically definite NPs which are semantically indefinite. 
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(2) a. When I visit Istanbul, I will eat in the restaurants there.    
  b. I like to watch the news in the evening. 
         c. Meg painted the wall in her room blue. 
 
The variety of grammaticizations of definiteness cross-linguistically and within the 
same language, the ongoing change and development of grammatical tools used in natura 
languages to encode this semantic category, and the inconsistent sense-form relation between 
the grammaticization of definiteness and the semantic concepts upon which this 
grammaticization is established (Abbot 2004; Carlson et al. 2006; De Mulder and Carlier 
2011; Lyons 1999), have caused significant indeterminacy and confusion in identifying 
definites and indefinites.  In languages which formally mark definiteness by morphological 
means, these markers must be approached with caution; in the sense that a thorough semantic 
analysis should be conducted to check whether these markers carry definiteness or simply co-
coocur with it in many (but not all) circumstances. The only solid ground for checking these 
morphological markers is to investigate whether the nouns they introduce denote definite 
referents in the real sense; i.e. referents of these nouns are familiar, identifiable, or unique in 
the contexts of their use.
The interaction between definiteness and other semantic phenomena like genericity makes 
proper identification of in/definites all the more important (see section 3 below). An important insight 
from the formal semantic literature is that rather than refer to unique indviduals, indefinite NPs may 
introduce variables into the semantic representations of the sentences in which they occur (Krifka et. 
al 1995). As noted in the previous chapter, genericity can be divided into two sub-phenomena, 
characterizing sentences and reference to a kind (Krifka et al. 1995). The former is compatible with 
semantically indefinite noun phrases denoting variable individuals, regardless of whether these NPs 
are morphologically marked for in/definiteness or not. More precisely, these NPs must be indefinite 
in sense, but not necessarily in form. The latter is compatible with semantically definite nominal 
expressions, in the sense that they denote unique kinds, regardless of their grammatical 
in/definiteness.  
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Definiteness, as a semantic phenomenon, is related to reference and the achievement of 
successful reference in conversation. Successful reference, when both the speaker and the hearer in a 
conversation are able to pick out a particular individual or kind, is established on the basis of one or 
more of the following semantic/pragmatic concepts: familiarity, identifiability, and uniqueness. This 
cluster of concepts composes the criteria for definiteness I will adopt in this dissertation. In this work, 
a noun phrase will be considered semantically definite if it can be felicitously used referentially. For 
this to happen, its referent has to exhibit at least one of the three properties in the definiteness criteria. 
If a noun phrase exhibits none properties of the definiteness criteria, it is considered indefinite.  
This chapter investgates definiteness in MSA sentences, in preparation for an examination of 
the interatction of definiteness and genericity. This semantic analysis is motivated by the assumption 
that the definite article al ‘the’9 in MSA no longer functions as a pure semantic definite marker, but 
rather developed other uses not related to definiteness. This makes an analysis of definites and 
indefinites based merely on its presence/absence non-satisfactory and confusing, particularly when 
this analysis is carried over to genericity investigation. 
This chapter is organized as follows: after this introduction, definiteness as a semantic 
phenomenon is investigated in section 2. The shortcomings of identifying definites based solely on 
the grammaticization of definiteness are discussed. Definiteness criteria grounded in familiarity, 
identifiability, or uniqueness will be adopted as machinery for determining definites and indefinites, 
regardless of the problematic grammatical definiteness. A direct repercussion of this significant 
distinction between grammatical definiteness and semantic definiteness is discussed in section 3. In 
this section, it will be shown that genericity interacts with definiteness as a semantic phenomenon, not 
with its variable grammaticizations in different languages.  Definiteness in MSA will be investigated 
                                                          
9
 The phonological realization of the definite article al- varies according to the phonetic properties of the 
noun’s initial sound to which it is attached. More precisely (a)l- fully assimilates to the initial sound of the 
noun if it is one of the traditionally termed ħuruuf ʃamsiyya ‘sun letters’ set, and remains unchanged 
otherwise. This set includes the following sounds: /tˤ/, /dˤ/, /t/, /d/, /ð/, /θ/, /s/, / ʃ/, / sˤ/, /z/, /ðˤ/, /n/, /r/. 
For instance, al- surfaces as aʃ- in aʃ-ʃams ‘the sun’. In addition, in continuous speech, the ‘a’ of al is often 
dropped, and only “l” surfaces. These morphophonemic facts have no bearing on our semantic analysis of 
nouns prefixed with the definite article al in MSA. 
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in section 4. Here, the traditional grammarians’ view of definiteness in MSA will be probed and 
highlighted. It will be shown that traditional Arab grammarians, Modern Arab linguists, and Modern 
non-Arab grammarians share the insight that al encodes semantic definiteness in Arabic. It will be 
shown that they have a clear view of definiteness, and what it means for a noun phrase to be definite 
semantically; nevertheless, they stick to the idea that the presence/absence of al exclusively 
determines in/definites in Arabic. Section 5 presents a revision of definiteness in MSA. In this 
section, the canonical use of al as a pure definite article will be examined showing that in some cases 
the presence of al marks the noun it is attached to semantically definite according to the definiteness 
criteria. In addition, this section will examine environments where al-N does not denote a 
semantically definite referent in the real sense. Based on these arguments, al is placed in stage two of 
Greenberg (1978) life cycle of definite articles, in which the definite article is used in definite and 
indefinite environments, and is used for other grammatical purposes not relevant to definiteness.  A 
conclusion is given in section 6.  
2. What is Definiteness? 
Before presenting a unified analysis of definiteness based on the semantic concepts 
underpinning this semantic category, and hence determining definites in MSA in accordance to these 
concepts, the shortcomings of identifying definiteness solely by its possible grammaticizations and 
determining definites based on grammatical markers are examined in (2.1) below. 
2.1 Grammaticization and Definiteness 
Noun phrases with a definite article are taken by many linguists (see Lyons 1999) as simple 
instantiations of definites, simply because these articles function as grammatical entities, which 
encode definiteness. In other words, it seems that the presence of these articles is often sufficient to 
classify noun phrases introduced by them as semantically definite. Lyons (1999) refers to such noun 
phrases as ‘simple definites’. Encoding definiteness, however, is not exclusively carried over by 
articles like the in English. Languages employ other tools to identify definiteness (Abbot 2004; De 
Mulder and Carlier 2011; Lyons 1999). Lyons (1999) dubbed these structures complex definites, in 
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the sense that definiteness of noun phrases is marked not by the presence of articles, but rather by the 
presence of other grammatical ingredients or syntactic structures. The variety of complex definites 
includes proper nouns, personal pronouns, noun phrases incorporating a demonstrative or possessive 
modifier, word order, case inflection, agreement inflection, and stress or intonation (De Mulder and 
Carlier 2011; Lyons 1999). 
Lyons (1999: 36) emphasizes the syntactic and semantic significance of a definite determiner 
in rendering a noun phrase definite; he argues that “[a] definite noun phrase must normally contain a 
definite determiner, and the is the one that occurs in the absence of some other with more semantic 
content.” It is worth noting that definite articles used to mark simple definites vary cross-
linguistically. In other words, languages identify simple definites in different ways: free-form articles, 
bound articles, phrasal clitics, or even a mixed system of free-form and bound articles where both 
article types are in complementary distribution. In addition, some articles are pre-posed articles and 
others are postposed articles. The more significant distinction, however, is between independent 
articles and bound or affixed articles. In this case, independent, free-form articles and bound 
morpheme articles may precede or follow the constituent they modify (Lyons 1999).  This shows how 
complicated and varied the realization of simple definites is cross-linguistically. 
Not all languages, however, encode simple in/definites formally, in the sense that not all 
languages have definite or indefinite articles. Among those languages which show an explicit 
distinction between definite and indefinite noun phrases, the distribution between the two classes 
varies. Some languages, MSA included, “make more use of apparently definite noun phrases than 
others” (Lyons 1999: 48). In most languages having one definite article, Lyons claims, the definite 
article, free or bound, is invariable, in the sense that it is not inflected, though it may undergo some 
allomorphic alternation. This is true of MSA, a highly rich inflectional language. Notice that a related 
demonstrative in MSA (3) shows agreement with the modified item in features like gender and 
number, as opposed to the definite article al ‘the’, which carries no inflection of any sort.  
(3) a. al-bint ‘the-girl’, al-banaat ‘the-girls’, al-walad ‘the-boy’ al-ʔawlaad ‘the-boys’ 
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        b. haaði-hi  l-bint ‘this-f  the-girl (this girl)’, haaða l-walad ‘this-m the-boy (this boy)’,   
haaʔulaaʔ l-banaat ‘these the-girls (these girls)’,haaʔulaaʔ  l-ʔawlaad ‘these the-boys (these 
boys)’ 
 
The story about the grammaticization of definiteness is more complicated than this. A major 
characteristic of languages is the intricate sense-to-form correspondence system. This system gets 
even more complicated in mapping form to sense in the functional sub-domain of the lexicon (see 
Pérez-Leroux et al. 2004). Carlson et al. (2006) argues that in English, and other languages, there is a 
subclass of definite NPs which appear to behave syntactically and semantically different from regular 
definite phrases. They dubbed this class weak definites. Weak definites (4), Abbott (2004) argues, are 
inconsistent with either the uniqueness theory or the familiarity theory. 
(4) a. Jill sat on the bank of the river. 
     b. Bill wrote a poem on the wall. 
        c. Jill went to the mall. 
        d. I will watch the news when I come back home. 
 
Though the NPs in (4) are syntactically definite, it seems unnatural to interpret them as 
denoting unique or familiar entities. In (a), for instance, the river has two banks, so no unique bank is 
referred to here. Similarly, in (b) no unique wall is picked since a room has four walls. The 
grammatically definite NP, the mall, in (c) does not naturally refer to a unique mall, unless the city 
has only one mall. Similarly, no unique news will be watched in (d). As Carlson et al. (2006) argue, 
weak definites and bare singulars can be semantically subsumed under one class based on their 
distribution and semantic interpretation 
Asymmetries in the grammaticization of definiteness represented by the sense-to-form 
correspondence system of the definite determiner are even more interesting. In Arabic, Albanian, and 
to a certain extent Romanian, an affixal article can be attached to an adjective for other syntactic 
purposes like agreement between the modifying adjective and the modified noun
10
. In German and 
French, there is a type of noun phrase containing the singular numeral ‘one’, which is indefinite in 
sense, but definite in form. In German der eine Mann (the one man) normally means ‘one man’ or 
                                                          
10
 Examples of languages employing the definite article in a fuzzy way or for other syntactic purposes are due 
to Lyons (1999), unless otherwise specified. 
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‘one of the men’. This form is especially used when contrasting with some other man or men.  The 
same phenomenon is found in French; L’un est parti, l’autre resté ‘One left, the other stayed’. In 
Albanian also, një ‘a’, ‘one’ is used with a definite in form noun accompanied by a possessive with 
the whole noun phrase being indefinite in sense: një motra-a time (a/one sister-DEF my) ‘a sister of 
mine’, ‘one of my sisters’. 
In many languages, the definite article is not only used with nouns in non-definite 
environments, but also no longer expresses definiteness or any related semantic concepts like 
specificity. In some languages, a definite article is semantically empty, and functions only as a carrier 
of agreement features. In French, for instance, the definite article le can be used in both the usually 
unmarked generic constructions and in simple definites. This has motivated linguists to argue that the 
article has become a mere nominality particle accompanying almost all nouns in Modern French, by 
contrast with earlier stages of the language.  Harris (1980) claims that demonstrative se is developing 
as a new definite article in French, and that the originally definite article le serves now as a bearer of 
inflectional categories for the noun phrase.  
Asymmetries in the relation holding between the grammaticization of definiteness and the 
semantic concepts, which grammaticization is supposed to encode, show that it is implausible to fully 
equate the grammatical ingredient of definiteness with its semantic ingredient. Put differently, the 
presence of morphological markers of definiteness is not a necessary and suficient condition for 
identifying definites in natural languages. In fact, there is a crucial distinction between grammatical 
definiteness represented by the grammaticization of definiteness, and semantic definiteness as an 
instantiation of successful reference to a particular individual or kind established on concepts like 
familiarity, identifiability, or uniqueness. Clearly distinguishing between grammatical definiteness 
and semantic definiteness is very important to this dissertation because the grammaticization of 
semantic definiteness is not always a straightforward process. More often than not, the definite article, 
the grammatical instantiation of simple definiteness, does not remain the exclusive carrier of semantic 
definiteness. Therefore, determining definite and indefinite noun phrases based solely on the 
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presence/absence of the grammaticization of these two semantic phenomena is problematic. This 
distinction is furnished in (2.2).   
2.2 Grammatical Definiteness vs. Semantic Definiteness  
Linguistic asymmetries in the use of the definite article indicate a need for a serious revision 
of definiteness investigation. If the article is not intended to instruct the hearer to single out the 
referent, or if there is no unique referent in the context domain, and in this case any individual which 
satisfies the descriptive content of the noun can be picked, the article cannot be taken to mark 
definiteness. In this case, there is a possibility that its appearance serves other grammatical functions 
or restrictions entertained by the grammar of the language in which such constructions exist.  This 
and other similar observations led Lyons (1999) to propose that definiteness should not be defined 
completely as a semantic/pragmatic category, but rather as a grammatical category just like tense, 
number, or gender. This grammatical category, which he dubbed grammatical definiteness, is usually 
paired with a category of meaning, semantic definiteness. This explains why there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between definiteness as a grammatical category and the category of meaning it is 
based on. In addition, it explains why this grammatical category, like other grammatical categories, is 
not present in all world languages though the semantic/pragmatic concept of definiteness is attested in 
a wide range of languages. Dryer (1989) claims that articles are attested in only one third of 
languages, and for those which have articles, only 8% have both definite and indefinite articles. This 
supports Lyons’ (1999:267) observation that “[i]t is generally the case that grammatical categories are 
not direct expressions of the semantic\pragmatic concepts which they can be said to be the 
grammaticalizations of.”  
Lyons (1999) argues that “definiteness is the grammaticalizations of what I have informally 
termed “semantic/ pragmatic definiteness”” (p. 278). However, he assumes that definiteness as a 
grammatical category is only present in languages which encode an explicit definiteness marker, a 
kind of definite article.  He draws upon studies which tackle the diachronic evolution of definite 
articles to argue for his proposed dichotomy of grammatical-semantic definiteness. In particular, he 
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referred to Greenberg (1978). Greenberg claims that the normal end of a definite article life cycle is to 
be a mere marker of nominality, noun class, gender, or case. He posits three stages of development in 
the definite article’s life cycle: 
- A definite article expressing definiteness 
 
- A definite article not expressing reference, and instead either expressing the combined 
uses of definite and indefinite articles, or accompanying the noun as a grammatical 
requirement in certain syntactic environments 
 
- A definite article being a gender morpheme or a mere nominality marker  
 
On this diachronic proposal, the definite article usually starts its life with a specific use related to a 
high level of individuation of the entity referred to, and when individuation of the entity starts to go 
low, the use of the article starts to fluctuate between definite and indefinite spaces. Finally, its 
presence is generalized to all noun types, and it develops into a noun marker. Partee (2006:275) 
agrees with the observation expressed in Lyons (1999) that “… once definiteness is grammaticized, it 
does not always stay tied directly to the pragmatic/semantic properties that most centrally motivated 
it.” Therefore, the definite article starts its life as a pure semantic/pragmatic ingredient, and might end 
up as a pure syntactic element.  
De Mulder and Carlier (2011), also  drawing on Greenberg’s (1978) diachronic presentation 
of the normal cycle of the definite article, note that even though this grammatical category is far from 
being universal, its grammaticalizational development exhibits some cross-linguistic regularities; in 
the sense that typically the definite article develops from a weakened demonstrative. They claim that 
“[w]hereas the semantic dimension is predominant in the first stage of the grammaticalization 
process, it can progressively fade out, which is reflected in a spread to new contexts where the articles 
convey neither definiteness nor specificity.” (P. 3) On Greenberg’s (1978) stage two, they argue that 
“[f]or … stage II, no frame of accessible knowledge is supposed to allow the identification of the 
referent so that the referent need not be pragmatically or semantically definite, but can be conceived 
as discursively new.” (P.7) However, they noted that the definite article does not inevitably go into 
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these three stages described in Greenberg (1987). These transitions are general tendencies, rather than 
ineluctable evolutions in the life cycle of the definite article. 
The above argumentation about the evolution of grammatical markers from encoding 
definiteness exclusively to being more or less semantically bleached grammatical entities, serving 
other grammatical requirements, is bolstered by facts about the interaction between these grammatical 
entities and other grammatical phenomena in a good number of languages. Grammatical definiteness 
interacts with a number of grammatical processes in an interesting way. Some grammatical features 
are sensitive to definiteness category. An example of this is object marking which does not take place 
if the object is not grammatically definite in some languages. Accusative case, in particular, is 
restricted to grammatically definite objects in some languages, like Turkish, Persian, and Modern 
Hebrew; whereas grammatically indefinite objects receive either a different case in some languages, 
or are totally unmarked for case in others. In Punjabi, the reverse is correct, where accusative case 
appears only on grammatically indefinite objects, and grammatically definite objects either receive an 
oblique case or take a marker expressing some other function, typically a function of indirect object. 
Spanish, as other Romance languages, does not admit bare plural NPs in canonical argument 
positions (Pérez-Leroux et al. 2004). This indicates that the definite article in these languages 
functions, among other uses, as a licensor for nouns to occur in certain syntactic positions, a 
grammatical use not essentially related to definiteness.  
For the purposes of studying its interaction with genericity, it seems that the distinction 
between grammatical definiteness and semantic definiteness is crucial as it makes the presence of the 
many asymmetries attested in world languages pertaining to this linguistic phenomenon less puzzling. 
Definiteness, as a semantic/pragmatic phenomenon is better analyzed based on its semantic concepts.  
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2.3 Semantic Definiteness: Successful Reference11 
In the literature, two approaches have been devised to capture the essence of definiteness: 
uniqueness, a semantic property, and familiarity, a pragmatic function (Abbott 2004; Carlson et al. 
2006; Lyons 1999). Familiarity implies that both the speaker and the hearer are familiar with the 
referent of the definite noun; it was introduced previously, or is pragmatically familiar. Lyons (1999) 
capitalizes on familiarity hypothesis as a crucial distinction between the semantics of definites and 
indefinites. He argues that with definite NPs the speaker signals to the hearer that the referent of the 
NP is familiar to both interlocutors. With indefinite NPs, however, the speaker does not signal this 
shared familiarity of the object denoted by the NP. Familiarity, Lyons argues, could be attained 
through three uses of the definite NP
12
: situational, anaphoric, and bridging cross-reference or 
associative use – a combination of background knowledge and anaphoric use. Consider the examples 
below. 
(5) a. [In a car wash station, a man getting off his car told a worker there] 
 
    Please! Wash the car. 
 
        b. I saw a woman sitting alone in the park. The woman looked suspicious to me. 
 
     c. I have seen a terrible car accident on Franklin Street. The driver must have been injured            
badly.   
                                         
The example in (a) shows the situational use of the-N. The referent of the NP ‘the car’ is 
familiar to both interlocutors through the physical situation, which contributes this familiarity. The 
hearer can easily pick out the intended referent because it is familiar from an immediate, visible 
situation. In (b), however, we have an example of an anaphoric use of the-N. The referent of ‘the 
                                                          
11
 This section draws heavily upon Lyons’ (1999) seminal work on definiteness, but unlike Lyons’, this section is 
restricted to investigating definiteness in simple definites; definiteness in complex definites falls out of the 
scope of this section. See Lyons (1999) for a thorough investigation of both simple and complex definites. 
 
12
 Although there might be some correlations between definite in form NPs and semantically definite NPs, the 
morphological markers are not taken as the basis for determining definites, but rather as a trigger for checking 
them against the semantic concepts they are supposed to co-occur with. The solid ground for determining 
definites is the definiteness criteria. More precisely, grammatically definite NPs are not taken as semantically 
definite until their referents are shown to obtain at least one property of the definiteness criteria. 
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woman’ is not familiar to the hearer from a visible situation, but rather from a linguistic context. The 
NP denoting the referent is mentioned before. Interestingly, the referential use of the-N is distinct 
from the other uses in that successful reference here is dependent on a linguistic context, in the sense 
that the same NP is introduced either earlier in the sentence or in a previous sentence; the other two 
uses, however, provide access to their referents extralinguistically.  This dichotomy, Lyons (1999) 
argues, is bolstered by the fact that some languages have a definite article which is used exclusively 
anaphorically such as Hausa and Hidatsa. Other languages like Lakhota distinguish an exclusively 
anaphoric article from a more general definite article. 
In the example in (c), the referent of the NP ‘the driver’ is not familiar from a physical 
situation or a linguistic context per se. It is familiar from bridging cross-reference knowledge. This is 
the associative use of the-N. In this case, the hearer employs both the shared general knowledge and 
the linguistic context. The driver has not been mentioned before, but a car accident is mentioned. The 
hearer knows that traffic accidents involve cars, and cars on wheels require drivers. Thus, the hearer 
is able to make the inference that reference is to the driver at the particular accident just mentioned. 
The inference is attained through association with the antecedent ‘car’ and the general knowledge 
which triggers all things associated with a car, and among these things ‘the driver’ can be singled out 
as a familiar individual.  
Familiarity concept is taken as a solid ground for differentiating definite and indefinite NPs, 
but it is not fully reliable. In (5.c), the hearer might be able to infer the referent of the definite NP ‘the 
driver’ from the linguistic context and commonsense knowledge, but this does not necessarily 
indicate that the hearer knows, or is familiar with that driver in the real sense. More interestingly, if 
the definite NP is replaced by its indefinite counterpart ‘a driver’ in this sentence, the familiarity 
status of the ‘driver’ would not be crucially different. This indicates that either there must be another 
semantic ingredient which legitimizes successful reference in sentences like this, or that familiarity 
concept itself needs to be modified to accommodate such uses of successful reference. 
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Similar problems with familiarity hypothesis led many linguists sympathizing with this 
hypothesis to argue that definiteness is about identifiability. On identifiability account, Lyons (1999) 
notes, the use of a definite NP, for instance, signals to the hearer to exploit linguistic and 
extralinguistic tools available to identify the referent of the NP. This view does not explicitly reject 
familiarity, but rather uses it as a medium to attain identifiability. Familiarity, when available, helps 
the hearer to identify the referent of the definite NP. With familiarity account, the hearer is told that 
he or she knows which, but with identifiability account, the hearer is directed to work out which. 
Consider (6) below. 
(6) [A patient struggling with walking is trying to fetch a book his wife brought him ten minutes 
ago as a gift for his birthday. She had put it on the TV and left. A moment after he gave up 
trying to reach it, a nurse stepped in; the patient asks the nurse] 
 
Pass me the book, please! 
 
It is impossible to account for the successful reference of ‘the book’ on familiarity account; nothing in 
the sentence or in the context provided indicates that the hearer is familiar with the referent of the NP 
‘the book’. However,  the use of the definite NP triggers to the hearer that there is one particular book 
the speaker is referring to, and that he/she needs to employ his/her extralinguistic tools to identify the 
referent, guided by the descriptive content of the noun ‘book’. The use of the verb ‘pass’ also helps 
the hearer to identify the referent; it indicates that the referent of the ‘book’ is within reach, 
somewhere in the physical situation. 
Lyons (1999) notes that descriptive grammarians’ works on definiteness have been 
dominated by an ideas still echoing nowadays in pragmatics, with versions of identifiability and 
familiarity. This tradition traces back to second century AD, with the work of Apollonius Dyscolus 
who pairs out the presence and absence of the definite article in Greek with whether or not the 
referent of the noun has already been mentioned or is known in a way or another. For Partee 
(2006:257) “[t]hese observations thus add further evidence in support of the conclusion expressed by 
Farkas (2002), Lyons (1999), and others that identifiability is the concept most central to 
definiteness… .” 
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Although identifiability might be more explicative than familiarity, in the sense that 
familiarity is subsumed under identifiability, some cases of definiteness pose themselves as 
problematic to this account, and at least resist a full explanation from this perspective on 
definiteness. The classical example of these cases, Lyons (1999) argues, is the associative use 
of the definite NP. Here, it is assumed that the hearer can associate a definite NP with an 
entity which he or she finds in the given situation. Consider the example in (7).  
(7) I have just arrived at a dentistry clinic. It is still closed, but I will wait until the dentist comes. 
 
In the above example, it is clear that neither the speaker, nor the hearer can identify the dentist. This 
is indicated by the use of the indefinite NP ‘a dentistry clinic’.  Definite reference here is successful 
not because the hearer can work out the identification of the referent using linguistic and 
extralinguistic clues. It is even impossible for both interlocutors to know whether that dentist is a man 
or a woman.  It is successful because the hearer, through association and general knowledge, knows 
that every dentistry clinic has a dentist. Nevertheless, this inference has no bearing on the 
identification of that dentist assumed to be in charge of that clinic.  
Lyons (1999) identifies other areas of definiteness where identifiability concept does need 
seem to be a fully satisfying explanation. Definiteness using relative clauses (8), cases where the 
referent is hypothetical, potential, or in the future (9-11), resist identifiability account. 
(8) Ali is in the other room playing with the toy I bought him yesterday.  
(9) The woman who marries me will be lucky. 
(10) The winner of this lottery will be rich. 
(11) The first women to reach Mars will be famous. 
These examples demonstrate the idea of uniqueness, in the sense that there is a unique entity salient in 
the context domain that the definite NP denotes. The definite NP signals to the hearer the idea that 
there is one entity which satisfies the descriptive content of the NP used. In (7), for example, the 
dentist is not identified pragmatically, but it is singled out context-dependently as the unique dentist 
salient in the context, and the hearer can even talk about this dentist referentially, ‘I will leave; he/she 
is too late’.  
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In order to account for mass and plural definites, Lyons (1999) argues that uniqueness criteria 
must be supplemented with another concept for which Hawkins (1978) is credited for introducing, 
inclusiveness. On inclusiveness account,  reference is not made to a unique entity relative to a 
particular context as the case with singular count nouns, but rather “… to the totality of the objects or 
mass in the context which satisfies the description” (Lyons 1999: 11).  
The above semantic analysis of definiteness gives an impression that definiteness is not a 
unified phenomenon. There is “definiteness” established on familiarity of the referent, “definiteness” 
based on identifiability of the referent, and “definiteness” phenomena based on uniqueness or 
inclusiveness. Regardless of whether definiteness is a unified phenomenon or not, this dissertation 
will stick to the definiteness criteria established upon concepts like familiarity, identifiability, and 
uniqueness in determining al-Ns in MSA as semantically definite or indefinite. The impulse for 
treating definiteness as a unified phenomenon, however, comes from its gramaticization. The same or 
simpler clusters of definiteness criteria are attested in languages as licensors of the so-called definite 
morphology.  Definiteness criteria underscore the role that definiteness and definite morphology play 
in establishing successful reference. For successful reference to be attained, the referent of a noun 
phrase has to exhibit at least one characteristic property which enables interlocutors to single it out 
from all other alternative individuals satisfying the descriptive content of the nominal expression. 
These properties are what semanticists identified as concepts of definiteness: familiarity, 
identifiability, uniqueness, and inclusiveness. These properties are essential pathways for successful 
reference, and they are not heterogeneous or conflicting. They all lead to successfully identifying and 
referring to an unequivocally particular individual or kind in the outside world without running the 
risk of confusing it with another individual to which the descriptive content of the linguistic 
expression applies. This is the essence of semantic definiteness; it is a conceptual designation of a 
referent of some linguistic expression as being particular and identifiable in a relevant context, and 
hence can be singled out by both interlocutors. Therefore, one way to explain what can appear to be 
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inconsistent use of definite morphology, while maintaining the view that definiteness is a semantic 
phenomenon, is recognizing steps in the grammaticization process. 
Another interesting question is about the relation between definiteness as a semantic 
phenomenon and its inconsistent grammaticizations in different languages. More precisely, since the 
grammaticization of definiteness is shown to be inconsistent and problematic, should it be ignored 
altogether from definiteness investigation? The answer to this question is grounded in another 
relevant question: Why does grammaticization of semantic categories like definiteness occur in 
natural languages? Definiteness is a semantic concept in the sense that it stands for something in the 
outside world, not within the sentence. Speakers only see the grammaticization of a semantic category 
like definiteness, not the category itself. For speakers to be able to indicate to hearers that they are 
referring to definite entities in the outside world, rather than to indefinite entities, they need linguistic 
tools to articulate this. These tools vary cross-linguistically, from explicit definite articles to implicit 
markings like word order. Languages use these grammatical ingredients to carry this semantic notion 
of definiteness. However, these grammatical tools are not necessary and sufficient condition to 
determine definites in natural languages. As shown above, more often than not, these markers start 
their life as pure definite markers, and because of the ongoing grammaticalization process, they end 
their life serving other grammatical functions, not necessarily related to definiteness.  
Grammaticalization is an ongoing process; it in principle never stops from developing new 
functions of a certain grammatical category, eliminating some functions or meanings of a certain 
grammatical tool, or creating other tools to carry meanings previously carried by other grammatical 
ingredients. However, definiteness as a semantic phenomenon is not susceptible to change, but its 
linguistic representation is. That said, a semantic analysis based on concepts underlying definiteness 
like familiarity, identifiability, uniqueness, and inclusiveness, is necessary to accurately determine 
definites in a language. This does not mean ignoring grammatical markings of definiteness in a 
language, but rather approaching them with caution, as they might not be faithful representatives of 
definiteness. Put differently, a definite in form noun is determined definite in the semantic sense if it 
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successfully refers to a particular individual or kind satisfying at least one property of the definiteness 
criteria, and indefinite otherwise. In a nutshell, investigating definiteness in languages which formally 
mark this semantic category requires checking whether these markers are still functioning as pure 
definite markers by devising a semantic analysis based on the definiteness criteria. 
It seems, therefore, that the essence of definiteness is successful reference to a particular 
individual or kind, and that successful reference is attained based on two grounds, pragmatic and 
semantic, which a referent of NP exhibits. The former is explicated by familiarity or identifiability 
and the latter by uniqueness or inclusiveness
13
.  
Before I conclude this section, I would like to make a clear distinction between definiteness 
and specificity since these two concepts overlap quite often.  In addition, articles encoding specificity 
exclusively, rather than definiteness, are widespread (see Lyons 1999). This distinction is important 
to this thesis because genericity is sensitive to definiteness, not to specificity. Therefore, it is useful to 
set them apart. Specificity is expressed when the speaker has a specific entity which satisfies the 
descriptive content of a noun phrase. Definite and indefinite NPs can be specific and non-specific, 
though definites tend to be specific, and indefinites tend to be non-specific. Consider the examples 
below. 
(12) a. Did you see the book I bought from the book fair? I left it on this shelf. 
b. The president of the United States runs up to two terms. 
c. I bought a car this morning. 
d. I want to buy a car. 
 
In (a) both NPs ‘the book’ and ‘the book fair’ are definite and specific. The speaker refers to specific 
book and book fair. In (b) however, the NP is definite, but non-specific; reference is not made to a 
specific USA president, or to the current president. Reference is rather made to any contextually 
unique individual which satisfies the descriptive content of the noun. In (c) the NP is indefinite, but 
                                                          
13
 I believe that uniqueness is more comprehensive than inclusiveness in that even mass and plural count 
nouns can be captured under uniqueness. The maximality of a mass noun or a plural count noun yields in 
speaking of one whole unique unit, which consists of integral parts or members. This wholeness can be 
referred to as one particular entity salient in the context domain. That said, I will use uniqueness as a unified 
concept for both uniqueness and inclusiveness. 
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specific. The speaker is not referring to any car; he or she has a particular car in mind that he or she is 
referring to, and yet the NP ‘a car’ is semantically indefinite. Example (d) supports the canonical 
indefinite NP as being non-specific. Therefore, as Lyons (1999) argues, the difference in meaning 
between a definite NP and an indefinite NP cannot be simply that the former denotes a specific 
individual and the latter does not. 
However, it is worth mentioning that although in (12c) ‘a car’ is particular and specific to the 
speaker, it is not necessarily so to the hearer. However, using a definite NP ‘I bought the car this 
morning’ changes the semantics of the sentence. The sentence with a definite NP, Lyons argues, 
clearly presupposes familiarity and specificity of the referent for both interlocutors. Therefore, the 
sentence with the indefinite NP can be felicitously used in a situation where the car in question does 
not fall within the hearer’s experience, hence encoding novelty of knowledge on the hearer’s part. 
However, the other sentence, with a definite NP, would be infelicitous in such situation, and would be 
appropriately uttered in a situation where the hearer is familiar with the referent of ‘the car’ in 
question in a way or another. This supports Lyons’ (1999) claim that an indefinite singular noun 
phrase might be used to speak of an arbitrary object of the class described by the noun phrase, or it 
can be used to denote a specific entity. In the former, the indefinite is said to be non-specific, but the 
latter is specific. Unlike definites, indefinites might be specific but not referential. This is because a 
specific indefinite is only identifiable by the speaker but not the hearer. The hearer cannot pick out 
the referent of a specific indefinite in a sentence like ‘I bought a bike’. Therefore, successful 
reference to a particular individual or kind is the crucial line that separates definites from 
indefiniteness, not specificity of the referent.  
Definiteness as an instantiation of successful reference to a particular individual or kind on 
speaker-hearer’s part is what is crucial when dealing with the interaction between definiteness and 
other semantic phenomena like genericity. This interaction is examined below. 
 
 
61 
 
3 Definiteness and Genericity  
Although the semantic distinction of noun phrases into generic and non-generic is 
independent of the distinction of definite and indefinite noun phrases, these two categories interact, 
and sometimes overlap, in world languages. There is a strong connection between semantic 
definiteness and genericity. This intrinsic interaction between the two phenomena manifests itself in a 
slightly shared ground of concepts. This interaction supports the claim that grammatical markings of 
definiteness in natural languages are not necessary and suficient condition to determine definites. The 
reference to a kind NP, for instance, is necessarily definite as it denotes a unique species or kind. 
However, reference to a kind can be manifested by different grammatically in/definite nominal 
expressions. Uniqueness is a concept related to semantic definiteness; hence need to be explored 
semantically, regardless of the grammatical definiteness status of the kind-referring NPs. English, for 
instance, admits singular definite noun phrases, bare plural noun phrases, and bare mass nouns to 
express reference to a kind genericity.  
(13) a. The dinosaur is extinct. 
        b. Dinosaurs are extinct. 
        c. Gold is a precious metal. 
 
If indefinite in form bare nouns are taken as indefinite in sense, they cannot be used as kind-
referring expressions simply because kinds are semantically definite by default due to their 
uniqueness. By using bare nouns to denote kinds, English speakers do not acknowledge that reference 
to kind generics are semantically indefinite; i.e., denoting variable kind individuals, but rather that the 
grammaticization of definiteness in English is not a straightforward process. Indefinite in form NPs 
can denote definite in sense referents. Equating definiteness as a semantic phenomenon with its 
variable, changing grammaticalizational manifestations runs into challenges like these, which are 
abundant in natural languages where grammatically marked definite/indefinite nouns are found in 
indefinite/definite environments, respectively (Lyons 1999). 
However, using the N seems better than using Ns, which incline to express the totality of 
members of a class or species, as kind-referring nominal expressions. In English, Lyons (1999) notes 
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that unlike grammatically indefinite noun phrases, grammatically definite noun phrases denoting a 
class or kind admit exceptions more readily than bare NPs denoting a class or species in the same 
environments. He also notes that the definite plural in English also accepts Kind-level predicates 
more easily than does BP. These observations, however, do not contradict the fact that all these 
heterogeneous NPs in terms of grammatical in/definiteness are semantically definite, and can be used 
as kind-denoting nominal expressions. Consider the examples in (14&15), taken from Lyons (1999: 
184): 
(14) a. The Italian drinks rather a lot, though I must say Luigi is very abstemious. 
     b. *An Italian drinks rather a lot, though I must say Luigi is very abstemious. 
        c. The Italians drink rather a lot, though I must say Luigi is very abstemious.   
        d.?Italians drink rather a lot, though I must say Luigi is very abstemious. 
 
(15) a. The Brazilians are twice as numerous as thirty years ago.  
     b.?Brazilians are twice as numerous as thirty years ago. 
 
The realization of generic NPs varies cross-linguistically in terms of grammatical 
in/definiteness. In some languages, generic NPs are typically definite in form, and in others, they are 
indefinite. In Spanish, for instance, BP can occur, but with a non-generic reading only. French, 
however, does not have non-singular indefinite generic NPs (Lyons 1999). Although generic NPs are 
encoded in languages with grammatically definites, and in others with indefinites, there are languages 
which use both definite and indefinite NPs to express genericity. In such case, it is not clear if these 
heterogeneous noun phrases in terms of grammatical definiteness, which are capable of expressing 
genericity, form a unified class or not, and whether they might get their generic value in different 
ways. This becomes clear if we notice that alternatives are not interchangeable, and that these NPs 
can occur in non-generic sentences (Lyons 1999).   
Borik and Espinal (2012:124) argue that “[a]ll languages that have Determiners … have 
definite kinds, a possibility which does not prevent languages from using other means to refer to 
kinds (e.g. bare plurals in E).” Krifka et al. (1995) treat the definite singular generics as the central 
generic nominals, because unlike BP and other nominal types, it is compatible with well-established 
kinds only. The assumption is that only definite singular NPs can be generic by themselves, not 
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deriving their generic values, as BPs are, from the context or the predicate associated, where the noun 
phrase itself might not be generic. This claim is bolstered by Lyons’ (1999) observation that unlike 
grammatically definite and indefinite non-singular generic NPs, which are rarely attested to be both 
permitted in one language, definite and indefinite singular generic NPs can co-occur in the same 
language. These asymmetries in the realizations of generic NPs in world languages indicate that 
reference to kind generics do not observe the grammatical definiteness status of NPs employed to 
denote kinds, but rather their semantic definiteness in that they successfully refer to a particular kind 
or species. More precisely, NPs can be used as generic nominal expressions as long as they are 
semantically definite, and fail to do so otherwise.  
Interestingly, generic NPs behave semantically like definites to a certain degree. The singular 
generic NP, for example, denotes a unique kind or species; it patterns with unique definites like the 
sun, the moon on the individual level. Lyons (1999) claims that generic noun phrases, definite or 
indefinite in form, behave like definites in that they meet both criteria for definite reference - 
uniqueness and identifiability. This does not mean, he asserts, that languages must realize them 
grammatically definite. This claim holds to the distinction he proposes between grammatical 
definiteness and semantic definiteness, and is adopted in this study. Generic noun phrases are a good 
example of this distinction, in the sense that though they may appear grammatically indefinite in 
certain languages like English, they behave, in certain ways, as definite expressions because they are 
semantically definite. 
Hawkins (1978) notes that in/definite articles – when both function as pure, semantically true 
in/definite markers - can be used in generic and non-generic reference
14
. He argues that in both cases 
the nature of the referential function of each is the same. The indefinite article still refers exclusively, 
and the definite article refers inclusively within a scope of pragmatically defined contextual 
parameters. A singular non-generic indefinite might denote a specific individual known to the speaker 
but not to the hearer, or a non-specific entity not known to both interlocutors. In its generic use, 
                                                          
14
 Reference here means denotation. 
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however, reference is made to an individual as opposed to the species, but in a random fashion. This 
randomness of the choice of the individual makes it possible to any entity in the species meeting the 
descriptive content of the noun to be a representative of the species itself. “And the fact that the 
particular referent chosen may be any member of the total class is responsible for the class idea 
inherent in singular indefinite generics” (P.214). Whenever an indefinite singular NP is used, the 
context tells which is more salient an individual or a whole species interpretation. As for the definite 
noun, inclusiveness or uniqueness is subsumed under both uses, generic and non-generic. Instead of 
instructing the hearer to identify a unique referent salient in the context domain, the definite article in 
its generic use instructs the hearer to identify a unique species or kind. “Thus, the universal idea is 
present in all uses of the, both generic and non-generic. (P. 217). 
The distinction between definiteness as a grammatical category, which represents some 
semantic/pragmatic categories of meaning, and semantic definiteness explicates the variable 
encodings of generics using grammatically definite and indefinite NPs.  Generics which are related to 
identifiability or uniqueness can be realized with grammatically definite NPs in languages in which 
these two concepts are represented grammatically definite, or with indefinite in form NPs in 
languages which do not represent them as grammatically definite. Therefore, as Lyons (1999:2870) 
puts it, “[t]he effect of these possibilities is that … there will be considerable variation between 
languages in the use of the category. Thus some languages will require generics to be definite while 
others do not; in some languages definiteness will be optional even in noun phrases clearly interpreted 
as identifiable….” 
It seems that semantic definiteness is closely related to genericity, though the 
grammaticization of this meaning category might cause asymmetries in the realization of genericity in 
world languages; a fact that should have bearing on our analysis of definiteness and its interaction 
with genericity in the NP system in MSA, (see chapter 4). However, despite the inconsistencies in use 
owed to its lifecycle, morphology is a clear place to begin investigating definiteness. Thesefore, it is 
useful to present the received, traditional grammarians’ view of definiteness in MSA and its 
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problematic shortcomings before moving ahead and proposing another view which takes semantic 
definiteness, the definiteness criteria in particular, as a basis for determining definites in MSA. 
4. The Traditional Grammarians’ View of Definiteness in Arabic  
As many world languages, MSA entertains both simple definites and complex definites. 
Definites in MSA include
15
 (Al-saamirraaʔii 2011; Al-ɣalaaliinii 1993; Hatoum 2007): 
- Pronouns like ʔanaa (I), naħnu (we), ʔanta (you-m) 
- Relative words like allaði (who/which.m), allati (who/which.f), man (who) 
- Demonstratives like haaða (this.m), haaði-hi (this-f), haaʔulaaʔ (these) 
- A noun introduced with al (the)  
- Proper nouns 
- A noun in a definite construct state kitaabu l-walaldi (book the-boy, the boy’s book) 
- A noun preceded by the vocative particle yaa (O), yaa walad taʕaal  (O, you boy come over) 
Simple definiteness in Arabic seems to be a straightforward phenomenon, where nouns prefixed with 
the definite marker al ‘the’ are considered definite (16a), and those lacking this marker are indefinite 
(16b). It is worth noting that the definite article al is invariably used with all noun types: 
animate/inanimate, singular/plural, count/mass, and feminine/masculine.  
(16) a. al-bint    ‘the-girl  b. bint    ‘a girl’ 
     al-walad            ‘the-boy’       walad   ‘a boy’ 
     al-banaat     ‘the-girls            banaat   ‘girls’ 
     al-qalam     ‘the-pen’           qalam   ‘a pen’ 
     al-ʔaqlaam     ‘the pens’          ʔaqlaam  ‘pens’ 
     al-maaʔ     ‘the-water’          maaʔ   ‘water’  
 
Traditional Arab grammarians (e.g. Al-haramii 2005, d. 1302; Al-wardii 2008, d.1348; 
Sibawayh 1988, d. 796)), many modern Arab grammarians (e.g. Al-saamirraaʔii 2011; Al-ɣalaaliinii 
1993; Hatoum 2007), and many non-Arab scholars (e.g. Buckley 2004; Haywood and Nahmad 1962; 
Wright 1898) studied definiteness in Arabic extensively. They all share two important insights: (1) 
                                                          
15
 This section restricts itself to simple definites, nouns introduced with the definite article al ‘the’ and its 
allomorphic alternants, in MSA; other complex definites fall out of the scope of this section. 
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definiteness in Arabic is realized by one of the seven categories mentioned above
16
, and (2) al is a 
definite article that renders a noun it is added to definite.  Many modern grammarians have inherited 
key ideas about the distinction and determination of definites from traditional grammarians. Brustard 
(2000:18) summarized the perceived dichotomy of nouns in Arabic as definite and indefinite based on 
the morphology only. In her words “[p]erspective and descriptive grammars alike describe the system 
of definiteness and indefiniteness as dichotomous: nouns are either definite or indefinite … [n]ouns 
can be made definite with the addition of the definite article … .” Al-wardii (2008) investigates the 
grammatical and semantic function of the definite article al in Arabic. He states that a noun in Arabic 
could be either definite or indefinite. An indefinite noun, which is the unmarked noun in Arabic, is 
the noun which can be made definite by adding al to it. Sibawaih (1988), the great Arab grammarian, 
describes the role of the definite article al in semantically differentiating between nouns having it and 
their minimally contrasting bare counterparts in terms of its bearing on definiteness. For him, al 
renders a noun definite, in the sense that it signals to the hearer that the referent of the noun is familiar 
to him/her, and that he/she is supposed to pick out a particular individual out of all individuals in the 
class to which the descriptive content of the noun applies. That referent, he asserts, is marked known 
to the hearer, and the hearer is assumed to recall the referent intended by the speaker, in a way or 
another. In his words (Vol.1, p.5) 
waʔamma l-ʔalif wa-l-laam fa-naħwa ar-raʤul wa-l-faras wa-l-baʕiir wa-maa ʃaabaha ðaalik. Wa-
ʔinnamaa sˤaara maʕrifa liʔannaka ʔaradta bi-l-ʔalif wa-l-laam aʃ-ʃayʔa biʕaynih duuna saaʔiri 
ʔummatih, liʔannaka ʔiðaa qult: marar-tu bi-raʤulin, fa-ʔinnaka ʔinnamaa zaʕamta ʔannaka ʔinnamaa 
mararta bi-waaħidin mimman yaqaʕ ʕalayhi haaða l-ism, laa turiidu raʤulan biʕaynihi yaʕrifuhu l-
muxaatˤab. waʔiðaa ʔadxalta l-ʔalif wa-l-laam faʔinnama tuðakiruhu raɮulan qad ʕarafah, fataquulu: ar-
raʤul l-laðii min ʔamrihi kaðaa wakaðaa; liyatawahhama l-laði [kaana] ʕahdahu maa taðakkara min 
ʔamrihi. 
 
(With regard to a and l [al] such as in the man, the mare, the camel, and the like, it [the noun] became 
definite because you [the speaker] intend [to refer to] a certain entity out of all members of a genus [class]; 
this is because if you say: I passed by a man, then you claim that you passed by an individual to which this 
noun applies, not referring to a particular individual known to the addressee. And if you insert al [to the 
noun], you remind him [the hearer] of a man he already knows; thus you say: the man who has such and 
such attributes; so that he [the hearer] recalls the one [the man] he [the hearer] knows such and such 
attributes about.)[Clarification added]. 
                                                          
16
 There is a disagreement among Arab grammarians concerning definites in Arabic whether they are seven or 
five, but all agree that nouns introduced with al are definite. 
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Al-harami (2005), another prominent traditional Arab grammarian, explains other uses of al 
as a grammatical and semantic definite marker. He talks about two uses of al: anaphoric and genus 
referring. In the former, the reference of a noun prefixed with al is successful because that noun has 
been mentioned previously, and so becomes identifiable from the linguistic context. In the latter use, 
al is used with nouns uniquely referring to a whole genus, rather than to any members of a genus. 
This is roughly equivalent to reference to a kind genericity introduced in late twentieth century in 
Krifka (1988). In discussing definite nouns introduced with al, Al-harami (2005:245) says that such 
nouns  
naħwa: ar-raʤul wa-l-ɣulaam, fa-haaðihi 'l-laam' takuun li-l-ʕahd, wa-maʕnaa l-ʕahd: ʔan ya-kuun qad 
taqaddam ðikr raʤul ʕahidtah wa-ʕaraftah, fayaquul lak muxaatˤibuk: raʔayta ðaalika r-raɮul, yaʕnii: 
allaðii ʕaraftah, wa-yuwadˤiħuhu lak qawluhu taʕaalaa: " kamaa ʔarsalnaa ʔilaa firʕawna rasuulaa. 
faʕasˤaa firʕawnu r-rasuul.” ʔalaa taraa ʔanna 'rasuulaa' al-ʔawwal ʤaaʔa nakira, falamma ʔuʕiida 
ðikruhu bil-ʔalif  wal-laam, ʕalimnaa ʔannahu ðaalika r-rassul al-maʕhuud llaðii taqaddama ðikruhu 
nakira ... wa-qad takuunu haaðihi 'l-laam' lil-ʤins, ka-qawlihi taʕaalaa: " ʔinna l-ʔinsaan la-fii xusr" lam 
yurid ʔinsaanan biʕaynihi, wa-ʔinamaa ʔaraada biqawlihi: 'al-ʔinsaan' ʤamiiʕ banii ʔaadam, fa-dalla 
ʕalaa ʔanna 'al-ʔalif wa-l-laaam' takuunaan li-ʤamiiʕ l-ʤins. 
 
(as: the man, and the boy, where this ‘l’ marks familiarity, and familiarity means that the hearer knows and 
is familiar with the man who has been previously mentioned; in this case the speaker says to you (the 
hearer): Did you see that man, which means the one you knew, and this use is explicable in Quran (73: 
15&16) “As We sent to Pharaoh a messenger. But Pharaoh disobeyed the messenger,” don’t you see that 
the first use of ‘messenger’ is indefinite, and when re-used with al, we knew that that was the familiar 
messenger previously mentioned as indefinite … and this ‘l’ could be used with a genus, as in Quran 
(103:2) “ Indeed, the human is in loss,” where no specific human is referred to, but He meant when saying 
“the human” all mankind, so this shows that ‘al’ is used to signal a genus as a whole.) 
 
It is clear from these two quotations, which represent the mainstream view of the definite 
article al in Arabic traditional grammar, that traditional Arab grammarians had a clear understanding 
of what definiteness is, and what it semantically means for a noun to be definite, in particular. This 
indicates that for traditional Arab grammarians, a noun prefixed with al is a definite in the sense that 
it is either identifiable in a way or another, or unique. The definite article al contributes this semantic 
identifiability/uniqueness to nouns to which it is attached. In other words, a noun prefixed with al is 
semantically definite, and a noun lacking al is semantically indefinite. On this perspective, al-N can 
only be semantically definite, and cannot be used in indefinite environments. 
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Most modern Arab grammarians agree with traditional ones with respect to the semantic 
function of the definite article al, and its sole role in rendering a noun to which it attaches 
semantically definite.  Al-ɣalaaliinii (1993: 147) explicitly states that adding al to a bare noun in 
Arabic renders that noun definite; in his words, “al-muqtarin bi-al: ʔismun sabaqathu (al) 
faʔafaadathu t-taʕriif, fasˤaara maʕrifatan baʕda ʔan kaana nakira. Ka-r-raʤul wa-l-kitaab wa-l-
faras.” (The [definite noun] prefixed with al [is] a noun preceded by (al) which contributes 
definiteness; thus, [it] becomes definite though it was indefinite [before adding al to it], such as: the 
man, the book, and the mare). However, he talks about uses of al as not a definite marker as with 
some proper nouns like al-ħaariθ ‘the-Harith (personal noun), al-ʕiraaq ‘Iraq’, and with relative and 
adverbial words as al-laði ‘who/which.m’, and al-lati ‘who/which.f’. However, he mentions that the 
received interpretation among Arab grammarians is that even in these cases definiteness is expressed, 
and that al contributes to the semantic definiteness of these words.  
After listing the seven definite categories in Arabic, Hatoum (2007) argues that four of these 
definites can be made indefinite. Most importantly to our study, he mentions the definite noun 
prefixed with al as one of these four. He explains that among these four definite categories which can 
be rendered grammatically and semantically indefinite is “al-ismu l-maʕrifa al-mutakawwin bi ((al)): 
naquul: ((al-kitaab)), faya-kuun haaða l-ismu maʕrifa; nuʤarriduhu min ((al)), biqawlinaa: 
((kitaab)), fayunakkar, ʔay: yusˤbiħ nakira" (the definite noun with ((al)) attached to it: if we say 
((the-book)), the noun is definite, and if we remove the al as in ((a book)), the noun becomes 
indefinite. 
Al-saamirraaʔii (2011:100)17 is exceptional in this regard. He argues that the definite article 
can be used with nouns denoting not a definite referent, but rather any referent that meets the 
descriptive content of the noun, in the sense that the descriptive content, not the referent, is known to 
the hearer. He argues that this use of al is intended to “al-ʔiʃaara ʔilaa waaħid mimma ʕurifat 
                                                          
17
 No wonder that Al-saamirraaʔii digs that deep in the semantics of al, as his seminal book is entitled ‘the 
meanings of syntax’. He thoroughly investigates the semantic basis and ramifications of most of the syntactic 
phenomena in Arabic. 
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ħaqiiqatah fii ð-ðihn min duun qasˤd ʔilaa t-taʕyiin wa huwa naħw qawlik (iðhab ʔilaa s-suuq wa-
ʃtarii lanaa kaðaa wa- kaðaa) liman lam yadxul l-madiina ʔillaa haaðihi l-marra walam yara 
suuqahaa min qabl. faʔanta hunaa laa taqsˤid suuqan biʕaynih." (Referring to an individual whose 
characteristic attributes are known in mind, without intending to specify a certain individual such as 
in saying (go to the market, and buy us such and such) to a person who had not entered the city 
before, and had never seen its market. In this case, you do not refer to a particular market). This is an 
insightful point raised by Al-saamiraaʔii because it explicitly indicates that al, the definite article, can 
be used with nouns in indefinite environments. However, the way he interprets this use does not 
reflect that he refers to this developed use of al in Arabic. For him, this use of al is another 
instantiation of using al with nouns denoting a genus. It is not used to denote a particular member of a 
class, in the sense that al in this case does not contribute familiarity, but rather used with a noun with 
an indefinite referent, but still contributes definiteness in terms of uniqueness; the noun refers to one 
unique genus. He compares two contrasting perspectives on the interpretation of this use of al among 
Arab grammarians, though niether view disputes the claim that al here contributes definiteness, but 
rather disagree about what type of definiteness it expresses, uniqueness or familiarity.  He concludes 
(P. 109), agreeing with their interpretations, that both views are correct, and that the disagreement is 
rhetorical. In his words: 
…fa-ʔal haaðihi ʤinsiyya fii ħaqiiqatihaa, liʔannahu laa yuraad bimadxuulihaa ʃayʔ biʕaynih bal yuraad 
bihi waaħid min al-ʤins l-maʕhuud, fa-l-ʤins maʕhuud maʕluum wamaa daxalat ʕalayhi ʔal waaħid ɣayr 
muʕayyan min haaða l-ʤins ... fa-hiya ʔiðan laysat lil-ʕahd ð-ðihnii l-laðii sabaqa ʔan ʔawdˤaħnaah, 
waʔinnama tufiid ʔanna l-ʤins biʔasrihi maʕhuud. ʕalaa ʔanna baʕdˤuhum yaðhab ʔilaa ʔanna (ʔal) fii 
ʤamiiʕ ʔaħwaalihaa li-taʕriif l-ʕahd wa-yuqsam l-maʕhuud ʔilaa qismayn: maʕhuud ʃaxsˤ wa-maʕhuud 
ʤins... wa-ħuʤatuhum fii ðaalik ʔanna l-aʔaʤnaas ʔumuur maʕhuuda fii l-ʔaðhaan maʕluuma lil-
muxaatˤabiin  mutamayyiz baʕdˤuhaa ʕan baʕdˤ. wa yabduu lii ʔanna l-xilaaf lafðˤii bayn l-fariiqayn.  
 
(… this al, in fact, indicates a genus [reference] since its incorporation is not intended [to denote] a 
particular entity, but rather an entity of the familiar genus, as the genus is familiar and known, and the 
[noun] to which al is attached is [refers to] a non-specific individual of this genus… so it [al] is not to 
express familiarity which we explained above, but indicates that the whole genus is familiar. Though some 
of them (Arab grammarians) see that al in all its uses is for expressing familiarity, and familiarity is 
divided into two kinds: a familiar individual and a familiar genus… and their argument for this 
[interpretation] is that genuses are familiar in the minds [of interlocutors], [and] known to the addressees, 
[and genuses] are distinguishable. And it seems to me that the controversy between the two camps is a 
difference in wording). 
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It appears that although Al-saamirraaʔii (2001) identifies an interesting use of al in an 
indefinite environment where the noun to which it is prefixed naturally denotes an indefinite referent.  
The seminal, heavy traditional literature blurred his characterization of this use of al, and caused him 
to refrain from proposing something that would disagree with the received canonical status of al as a 
definite article which contributes either a familiar or unique individual or genus.  In his long and 
rather detailed discussion of this interesting use of al, he never uses the term nakira ‘indefinite’ to 
characterize the referent of this type of NPs. However, such use of al will be capitalized, examined, 
and interpreted differently in my analysis of the definite article al in section (3) below. 
Non-Arab scholars who wrote descriptive grammar books of Arabic do not seem to propose a 
different view from that of traditional Arab grammarians. Wright (1898) and Haywood & Nahmad 
(1962) state that adding the definite article al to a noun renders it definite. Buckely (2004:19) states 
that “[a] word with the definite article becomes defined.” He identifies many uses of the definite 
article al without specifying whether in all these uses the definite article contributes semantic 
definiteness, uniqueness and familiarity, or not. This indirectly indicates that he adopts the received 
traditional view of the status of al in Arabic. He summarizes (pp. 19-31) the variety of uses of the 
definite article al as follows:  
a. The definite article is used with a noun which becomes definite because it has been previously 
mentioned. 
 
b. The definite article is used with a noun that has not been previously mentioned, but assumed 
familiar to the hearer through shared knowledge. 
 
c. The definite article is used with nouns with unique referents, like the sun, seasons, weekdays, 
meals, etc. 
 
d. The definite article appears with some words indicating place, often used as adverbials like min l-
ʔasfal (from the-below ‘from below’); min d-daaxil (from the-inside ‘from inside’); min l-xalf 
(from the-back ‘from the back’).                        
     
e. The definite article is used with nouns denoting a species, class, or kind. 
 
f. The definite article is used with nouns governed by the preposition min ‘from’. 
 
g. Abstract nouns are often used with the definite article. 
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h. The definite article often occurs in verbal nouns. 
 
i. The definite article is used with adjectives and active and passive participles when functioning 
as nouns. 
 
l. The definite article is used with adjectives and participles governed by the preposition min. 
m. The definite article must be used with adjectives modifying definite nouns. 
n. The definite article is randomly, but frequently, used with place names. 
 
o. The definite article is used with titles followed by names referring to persons. 
 
p. The definite article is used with cardinal and ordinal numbers.  
 
q. The definite article is used with some words referring to time; in this case it functions as the 
demonstrative ‘this’. 
 
r. The definite article is used instead of a possessive pronoun suffix with names of parts of the body, 
and family relations and companions.  
 
Astute readers can identify some uses of al in which it contributes semantic definiteness, and 
others in which it does not. Some of these cases will be revised, investigated, and given a more 
plausible interpretation in the following section. 
5. Definiteness in MSA Revisited  
Taking into consideration that definiteness is a semantic category established on concepts of 
familiarity, identifiability, or uniqueness of the referent; this set of criteria will be used to identify 
simple definites in MSA. Put differently, if a noun introduced with al is shown to denote an 
individual satisfying one or more of the definiteness criteria, this noun will be considered definite. 
However, a noun introduced with al, denoting an individual which fails to express either familiarity, 
identifiability, or uniqueness, will be considered semantically not definite. In this case, these 
asymmetrical uses of al where nouns introduced with it are not shown to satisfy the definiteness 
criteria, and still the presence of al is acceptable, or even necessary, will be investigated to show the 
developed grammatical functions of the definite article in MSA, and its grammatical status on 
Greenberg’s (1978) cycle of definte articles.   
 This section is divided into two major sub-sections. The original use of the definite article al 
as a real definite article introducing a noun whose referent is familiar, identifiable, or unique is 
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discussed in (5.1). Other uses of al in indefinite environments and for grammatical functions not 
related to definiteness are investigated in (5.2).  
 
5.1 The Canonical Use of the Definite Article al in MSA 
The definite article al, at least on its canonical use, contributes definiteness to the noun it is 
attached to; in the sense that the referent of that noun is either familiar, identifiable, or unique - 
referring to a context-dependent unique individual, or to a unique genus. In the following sections, the 
interaction between the definite article al and each of these meaning ingredients is examined. 
5.1.1 Familiarity 
The definite article al marks familiarity of the referent of the noun prefixed with it by 
signaling to the hearer that he/she is familiar with the denotation of the noun through three uses of al: 
A. Anaphoric Familiarity:  
On this use of al, the noun prefixed with al has been previously mentioned, hence becomes 
familiar to the hearer through the linguistic context. Consider the examples in (17): 
(17) a. [Two men are talking about good deeds each of them has done today. One of them says:] 
 
marar-tu   bi-raʤul-i-n         yatˤlub-u        musaaʕadah, fa-saaʕd-tu     r-raʤul 
passed-1    by-a man-Gen-N   3.ask-Nom     help,     so-helped-1     the-man 
 (I passed by a man asking for help, so I helped the man) 
 
          b. [A student talking to her friend on the phone] 
 
 ʔams,       iltaqay-tu  tˤaalib-a-n             ʤadiid-a-n. atˤ-tˤaalib-u  
 yesterday,  met-1     a student-Acc-N   new-Acc-N. The-student-Nom     
 yaskun-u  biʤaanib-i    baytii 
 3-live-Nom next to-Gen   house-my 
  (Yesterday, I met a new student. The student lives next to my house) 
 
The reference in (17.a)  is successful because the speaker signals to the hearer that the referent of r-
raʤul ‘the-man’ is the same as that of the raʤul ‘a man’, mentioned earlier in the sentence. This is 
attained through the linguistic context. The first mention of raʤul ‘a man’ is indefinite, which 
indicates that novel information is delivered, and that the hearer is not assumed to be familiar with the 
referent of that man. However, on its second appearance in the sentence, r-raʤul ‘the-man’ is 
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definite, which is intended to signal to the hearer that this is the same man that you are now familiar 
with, and even can refer to successfully in other sentences.  Therefore, r-raʤul ‘the-man’ refers not to 
any individual in the class of men, but rather to a definite man asking for help that the speaker passed 
by. This is different from saying marar-tu bi-raʤul-i-n yatˤlub-u musaaʕadat-a-n, fa-saaʕd-tu 
raʤul-a-n ‘I passed by a man asking for help, so I helped a man’. The natural reading of this 
sentence is that both instances of ‘man’ are not co-referential, and the use of indefinite raʤul ‘a man’ 
signals to the hearer that the speaker is talking about two different men. Therefore, the speaker of 
(17.a) intentionally chooses the second mention of r-raʤul to be definite to make it explicit to the 
hearer that both instances of ‘man’ are co-referential.  
This type of familiarity does not guarantee or indicate that the hearer knows the referent, and 
can identify him or her. It means that the hearer can single out the referent and refer to him/her using 
the same linguistic context. In (17.b), for instance, the second definite instance of atˤ-tˤaalib ‘the-
student’ which appeared indefinite tˤaalib ‘a student’ in the previous sentence is now familiar to the 
hearer.  This familiarity does not indicate that she can identify him; in fact, the situation provided 
denies such an idea, since both interlocutors are talking on the phone and probably living in distant 
places from each other. It is familiar in the sense that the noun introduced with al in this case can be 
singled out by the hearer through linguistic context. She can later refer to atˤ-tˤaalib ‘the-student’ by 
saying ‘the student who my friend met yesterday and lives next to her house….’ Therefore, this kind 
of familiarity does not indicate identifiability, but enables the hearer to single out and refer to the 
referent. In (17.b), it is natural for the hearer to use al-N atˤ-tˤaalib ‘the-student’ if she wants to get 
more details about the student: maa huwa taxasˤsˤ-u tˤ-tˤaalib? ‘What is the student’s major?’. And if 
the hearer’s mother comes in and asks her about which student she is talking about, she can 
felicitously answers, ‘the student who my friend met yesterday and lives next to her house’. Other 
examples of anaphoric familiarity are given in (18): 
(18) a. [A girl telling her friend about her sister’s wedding, and that they need a big place to have           
the wedding in] 
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     sa-tatazawwaʤ-u  ʔuxt-ii        fii sˤaalat-i      ʔafraaħ.    asˤ-sˤaalat-u   kabiirat-u-n    ʤiddan. 
     Fut-f.marry-Nom   sister-my  in a hall-Gen   weddings. The-hall-Nom big-Nom-N    very 
     (My sister will marry in a wedding hall. The hall is very big) 
 
b. [A man is talking on the phone with a friend he has met in another country while doing   his 
masters, and has not seen him for more than two years. He tells him about his experience in 
moving from a city to a village] 
 
             qabla   ʕaam,       intaql-naa       ʔilaa  qarya.    ʔana  wa-ʕaaʔilat-ii       ʔasˤbaħ-naa     
             before  a year,      moved-3.pl     to       a village. I        and-family-my    became-3.pl   
             nuħib-u               l-qariat-a           kaθiiran 
             3.Pl.like-Nom    the-village-Acc   much 
              (A year ago, we moved to a village. (Now) My family and I like the village very much) 
 
       c. [A mother encouraging her son to do as Yazan, her friend’s son] 
 
         ʔahdaa Yazan-u          ʔumma-hu  saaʕah.   maa-zaala-t  taħtafiðˤ-u    bi-s-saaʕat-i       
         gave      Yazan-Nom  mother-his  a watch. Still-3.f          keep-Nom    of-the-watch-Gen   
         ʔilaa  l-  lyawm       
         until  the-day 
           (Yazan gave his mother a watch as a gift. She still keeps the watch until today) 
 
B. Shared Knowledge Familiarity:  
Familiarity here is not attained through the linguistic context. In other words, the noun needs 
not to be mentioned previously for its referent to be familiar; in fact, on this use of al, the noun to 
which al is attached appears for the first time, though reference is successful. Familiarity, on this use 
of al, is established through assumed shared knowledge of the referent of the noun between 
interlocutors. This shared knowledge guarantees successful reference of the noun, and assists the 
hearer pick out the exact referent intended by the speaker. The examples in (19) explicate this use of 
al: 
(19) a. ʔaxiiran, iʃtaray-tu   l-ħisˤaan 
         finally,    bought-1        the-horse 
    (Finally, I bought the horse) 
 
          b. hal  ʃaahad-ta   l-musalsal-a      ʔams? 
              q     watched-2.sg the-series-Acc  yesterday? 
                 (Did you watch the series yesterday?) 
 
 The speaker of (19.a) makes ħisˤaan ‘horse’ definite by adding al ‘the’ to it, l-ħisˤaan ‘the-
horse’. In doing so, the speaker intends to signal to the hearer that he/she is not talking about any 
horse, but rather referring to a particular horse both interlocutors are familiar with, and can pick out. 
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Reference is successful here because the speaker assumes shared knowledge about this particular 
horse with the hearer. This shared knowledge can be obtained in many different ways: both have been 
talking about the speaker’s willingness of buying that horse; the hearer knows that the speaker has 
been saving money for buying that horse; the hearer accompanied the speaker more than once to buy 
that horse, but the owner refused to sell it, etc. Interestingly, if this shared knowledge exists between 
these two interlocutors, and the speakers instead utters ʔaxiiran, iʃtaray-tu  ħisˤaan-an ‘Finally, I 
bought a horse’, the hearer will unambiguously get the message that the speaker bought a different 
horse from that both of them are familiar with. In this case, it is natural for the hearer to either infer 
that the speaker could not manage to buy that horse he/she likes, and decided to buy any horse 
instead, or to ask the speaker about the reason that made him/her give up the idea of buying that 
particular horse. 
The use of the definite al-musalsal ‘the-series’ in (19.b), rather than its indefinite counterpart 
musalsal ‘a series’, is intended to indirectly convey to the hearer that he/she knows the particular 
series the speaker refers to. This familiarity could be established in different ways: both interlocutors 
talked about the plot of that series and how entertaining it is; the speaker hears the hearer talking 
about that series to his friends often, telling them how much he/she likes it, and cannot wait to see the 
new episode, etc. If there were more than one series that the hearer follows and seems very excited 
about, reference would be unsuccessful. In this case, it is natural for the hearer to ask which series the 
speaker is referring to. This indicates that familiarity per se cannot be taken as a solid ground for 
definiteness in all cases. More examples of familiarity based on shared knowledge between 
interlocutors are given in (20): 
(20) a. [Two students attended a lecture by a new professor. One of them tells the other two hours     
later] 
 
        is-tamtaʕ-tu  bi-ħadiiθ-i        l-ʔustaað-i    kaθiiran 
        enjoyed-1      with-talk-Gen  the-professor-Gen  much  
        (I enjoyed the professor’s talk very much) 
 
      b. [A girl thanking her mother for taking her on a nice trip] 
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     kaan-at   r-riħlat-u   raaʔiʕa 
        was-f  the-trip-Nom awesome 
        (The trip was awesome) 
 
         c. [A man consoling his friend who was informed that his son had a car accident] 
 
        ʔaasif li-l-ʔaxbaar-i    l-muħzina 
          1.sorry    the-news-Gen   the-saddening 
         (I am sorry for the saddening news!) 
 
C. Situational Familiarity:  
In this use of al, familiarity is attained through a physical situation; in the sense that the 
referent of the definite noun is present in the visible situation in which the interlocutors are. 
Therefore, the speaker intends to use a noun with al because he/she wants to signal to the hearer that 
reference is made to that particular individual or entity visible to both of them. This familiarity type 
presupposes uniqueness of the referent in the physical situation; otherwise, reference might not be 
successful if more than one individual to which the descriptive content of the noun applies exist. In 
this case, the speaker might use a demonstrative to clear up an expected ambiguity. Consider the 
examples in (21): 
(21) a. [A father helping his son improve his spelling] 
 
yaa ʔibn-ii,    ʔamsik  l-qalam, wa-ktub     maa     ʔumlii-hi ʕalay-k  
O    son-my,  hold      the-pen, and-write   what   1.dictate-it    to-you 
(O my son, hold the pen and write what I dictate to you) 
 
          b. [Two men are trying to move a heavy desk and saw a friend of them stepping in the room] 
 
       saaʕid-naa   fii  ħaml-i   l-maktab 
        help-us         in  carrying  the-desk 
       (Help us carry the desk) 
 
Reference to al-qalam ‘the pen’ in (21.a) is successful because the referent of the definite 
noun phrase is familiar to the hearer through the physical situation. He can see it, and pick it up with 
no room of confusing it with any other pen from that intended by the speaker. The use of a noun with 
al here, presupposes the existence of only one pen in the physical situation. If there were more than 
one pen in the physical situation, the speaker might either use a body gesture to direct the hearer to 
the particular pen, use a demonstrative, or use an indefinite noun qalam ‘a pen’, instead. In the latter 
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case, the speaker signals to the hearer that he/she does not have a particular pen in mind that he/she 
wants him to pick up, but rather that the hearer can pick any pen from the set of pens available in the 
physical situation. By using al-qalam ‘the pen’, however, visible situation familiarity on the part of 
the hearer is expressed.  
In (21.b), the hearer obtained familiarity of al-maktab ‘the desk’ by physically seeing both 
men holding the intended desk trying to carry it. If the speaker used the indefinite counterpart maktab 
‘a desk’ instead, the hearer might get a message that there are more than one desk available and that 
the two men are asking him to move any desk out of the ones available. In this case, it is natural for 
the hearer to look around the room to see how many desks are there, and if he sees more than one, he 
might ask about which one they want to move. This is true even if the two men were holding a certain 
desk when one of them uttered the sentence with an indefinite noun phrase maktab ‘a desk’. The 
hearer in this case might get the impression that both men are not intending to move a particular desk, 
but chose the one they are holding because it is lighter than the others, and might want to change their 
minds about the one they are holding after getting more hands, for example. Familiarity established 
on physical situation is the clearest of all familiarity types, and al on this use functions roughly as a 
demonstrative. More examples of this type of familiarity encoded by al are given in (22): 
(22) a. [a woman visiting her friend who has bought new sofas]  
 
  maa  ʃaaʔ  Al-laah, al-kanab-u         ʤamiil-u-n     ʤiddan 
  what  will    God,       the sofas-Nom  nice-Nom-N    very  
   (What God wills, the sofas are very nice)
18
 
 
     b. [A host reminding his guests to drink the tea he served them before it cools down] 
 
       fal-naʃrab  ʃ-ʃaay-a        qabla     ʔan    yabrad 
   let-3.Pl.drink   the-tea-Acc   before    to      3.cool down 
   (Let us drink the tea before it cools down) 
 
     c. [A husband eating his dinner, which was prepared by his wife] 
 
   atˤ-tˤaʕaam-u  laðiið,       ʔant-i   tˤabaaxat-u-n    maahirat-u-n       yaa   ʕaaʔiʃa 
                                                          
18
 The introductory phrase is used by Arabs to expresses appreciation, joy, praise for something, event, or 
person. It is used as an expression of respect, while at the same time serving as a reminder that all 
accomplishments are so achieved by the will of Allah. 
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       the-food-Nom delicious,  you-f   cook-Nom-N     skillful-Nom-N    O     Aisheh  
    (The food is delicious; you are a good cook, Aisheh) 
 
However, as hinted above, in MSA, as other languages, not all definite references can be 
analyzed as instances of familiarity. The following section investigates cases where familiarity fails to 
explain simple definiteness in MSA, and instead identifiability is used to analyze definiteness in these 
cases.  
5.1.2 Identifiability 
Familiarity, though used often as a semantic-pragmatic ground on which definiteness is 
established, fails in certain cases to explicate successful reference. Therefore, as mentioned in section 
(2), semanticists sympathetic with familiarity concept propose that a more general term, 
identifiability, is the basis of definiteness. The major distinction between familiarity and 
identifiability is that on identifiability account, reference can be successful, though familiarity of the 
referent on the hearer’s part is not obtained. Put differently, the hearer does not need to be familiar 
with the referent of a noun phrase to be able to identify and single it out in a certain context.  In a 
situation where the speaker is trying to fix his car’s flat tire, that speaker might say to his wife who 
just showed up, even without needing to turn around, the sentence in (23).  
(23) naawil-ii-nii    l-mifak   raʤaaʔan 
      pass-2.f-me     the-screwdriver please 
(Pass me the screwdriver, please) 
 
In this example, the reference of l-mifak ‘the screwdriver’ is impossible to be successful on 
familiarity account. There is nothing in the physical situation that necessarily assures that the hearer 
even saw that screwdriver or knew about it. The hearer upon hearing l-mifak ‘the screwdriver’ tends 
to infer that there must be one screwdriver in this physical situation, and she needs to employ her 
extralinguistic apparatus to identify it, such as looking around and see the screwdriver somewhere, or 
looking for it and locate it. So the use of al in this case does not presuppose that l-mifak ‘the 
screwdriver’ is familiar to the hearer in the real sense, but rather functions as a set of indirect 
instructions which triggers the hearer to work out the referent of the NP indirectly. 
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Moreover, identifiability account explains the use of al-N successfully to refer to a definite 
individual not only unfamiliar to the hearer, but also does not exist in the visible situation. In a 
context where the speaker has just bought a new car, and drove back home, he might felicitously utter 
the sentence in (24), asking his son, who does not even know that his dad bought a new car, to wash 
that new car. 
(24) iðhab        w-aɣsil  s-sayyarat-a     l-ʤadiida 
   2.m.go      and-wash     the-car-Acc       the-new 
(Go and wash the new car) 
 
Reference would not be successful in (24) on familiarity account; in fact as stated above, the hearer 
has no idea about his father buying a new car. What makes reference felicitous here is the message 
conveyed indirectly to the hearer by the use of al-N, which gives him two things: there is a particular 
new car his dad is referring to- this is the linguistic part, and that he needs to identify that particular 
car – this is the extralinguistic part of the message. Upon hearing s-sayyara ‘the car’, the hearer infers 
that his father is not referring to any car, but rather to a particular car. Following this inference, the 
hearer tends to exploit extralinguistic tools to identify that car. He might go directly to the garage 
since he knows that his father often parks his car there, or get out and try to locate it in front of the 
house if he knows that the old car is still in the garage. Interestingly, the hearer would be able to 
identify the referent of a noun phrase that he is not familiar with, and does not even exist in the visible 
situation. More interestingly, s-sayyara ‘the car’ represents completely novel information to the 
hearer, and is still definite in form and sense. This case weakens the widespread claim in discourse 
analysis that definiteness represents old knowledge, and indefiniteness represents novel knowledge. 
Other examples of al-N which tends to be analyzed on identifiability account are given in (25); the 
analysis framework provided for (23&24) can be applied to those in (25). 
(25) a.   A: lima    ʔanta       murtabik? 
        why    2.sg.m     confused? 
 B: ʔaðˤunn-u             ʔanna-nii  ʔdˤaʕ-tu      l-miħfaðˤat-a     hunaa  fi     l-ɣurfa 
      1.sg.think-Nom      that-I    lost-1.sg    the-wallet-Acc  here     in    the-room  
              A: ħasanan, sa-ʔabħaθ-u                ʕan-haa 
        well,       Fut-1.sg.look-Nom      for-it 
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(A: Why are you confused? B: I think I have lost the wallet here in this room. A: Well, I   
will look for it) 
 
b. [In a soccer field where boys are playing soccer, one boy kicked the ball behind some   
bushes. A boy just showed up and expressed his desire to join them. One of the boys says to 
him] 
 
ibħaθ         ʕan   l-kurat-i           ʔin  ʔaradt-a            ʔan talaʕab-a     maʕa-naa 
2.m.look   for    the-ball-Gen    if    want.2.m-Acc   to    play-Acc      with-us 
   (Look for the ball, if you want to play with us) 
 
c. [In a two-story house, a man who is visiting his friend asks the host where he can sleep. The  
host answers] 
 
as-sariir-u        fii    tˤ-tˤaabiq-i         l-ʔawwal 
the-bed-Nom   in    the-floor-Gen    the-first 
   (The bed is in the first floor) 
 
In certain cases, however, both familiarity and identifiability fail to explain al-N reference in 
MSA. These cases entertain an account based on uniqueness criterion of the referent of the al-N used. 
This aspect of definiteness is investigated in (5.1.3) below. 
5.1.3 Uniqueness  
Among the major uses of al as a definite article is that it signals to the hearer that the referent 
of the noun it is attached to is a unique individual or genus in a certain situation. Put differently, in 
these cases, the speaker by using al-N intends to convey to the hearer that in the situation he/she is 
referring to there is only one entity that satisfies the descriptive content of the noun used, and based 
on this, the speaker can successfully use al-N in such contexts. In these cases, it is worth noting, there 
is no guarantee that the hearer can identify that unique individual in the real sense. Consider the 
example in (26): 
(26) [On first day of classes, one student asks his classmates] 
 
hal   sa-yaʔtii        l-ʔustaað-u   l-laywm? 
q      Fut-3.come the-professor-Nom     the-day? 
(Will the professor come today?) 
 
The use of the definite al-N  in (26) is successful, and rather necessary, though there is no 
guarantee that the hearers can identify who the professor of that class is. There is a strong possibility 
that the name of the professor teaching that class was anonymous, as often happens in some schools. 
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It is hard to account for the use of l-ʔustaað ‘the-professor’ based on familiarity or identifiability. If 
the professor did not show up on that class, and some of the students ran into that professor few hours 
later, there is no guarantee, based on (27), that they would identify him. This use of the definite can 
be more felicitously accounted for based on uniqueness criterion. The use of al-N in this example is 
successful because it is part of our common-sense knowledge that every face-to- face class must have 
a professor. In other words, the use of al-N here signals to the hearer that there is a unique individual, 
salient in the domain of the class context, which satisfies the descriptive content of the noun. 
Uniqueness, rather than familiarity or identifiability, legitimizes the use of al-N in this example. 
As stated in Lyons (1999), uniqueness criterion seems more appealing to account for cases 
where the referent is potential or in the future. In a context where two interlocutors are discussing a 
future semi-final soccer match, one would utter (27) which uses an al-N noun phrase: 
(27) al-faaʔiz-u              fii    haaðihi  l-mubaaraat-i      sa-yantaqil  li-l-mubaaraat-i                   
   the-winner-Nom   in     this        the-match-Gen     Fut-move    to-the-match-Gen    
   n-nihiaaʔiyya 
   the-final  
(The winner of this match will move on to the final match) 
 
Successful reference of al-faaʔiz ‘the winner’ cannot be established on familiarity or identifiability 
account; simply because neither the speaker nor the hearer knows which team will win. If you ask 
either the speaker or the hearer before the match about who the winner is, the natural answer is ‘I do 
not know; either one could win’. This indicates that the winner of that match is not identified or 
known to either the speaker or the hearer. However, uniqueness criterion seems to work better in 
explaining the use of al-N in this example. Both interlocutors share common-sense knowledge about 
semi-final soccer matches. In such matches, one of the two competing teams has to win the match; 
there is no room for such a match to end in a tie. Based on this shared knowledge, reference is made 
to the unique, but not identified in the real sense, team which will win the match. It refers to the most 
salient unique entity in the coming soccer match, which satisfies the descriptive content of the noun 
faaʔiz ‘winner’.  Other examples of the use of al-N that resist familiarity or identifiability accounts, 
and instead entertain uniqueness account are given in (28): 
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(28) a. [A family looking for a park to have a picnic in found a good one, but discovered that it     
was closed. One of them says]  
 
al-ħadiiqat-u     muɣlaqa. ʔaðunn-u             ʔanna   l-ħaaris-a           ɣaadara   mubakkiran 
the-park-Nom   closed.     1.sg.think-Nom   that       the-guard-Acc   left            early 
(The park is closed. I think the guard had left early) 
 
b. [After moving his son to a new school, and never saw the principal before, a parent having   
an argument with his son’s teacher over some grade issues says:] 
 
 ʔuriid-u   ʔan  ʔaraa   l-mudiir-a     raʤaaʔan 
             1.sg.want-Nom   to     see      the-principal-Acc   please 
              (I want to see the principal, please) 
 
c. [An immigration officer talking to an international visitor] 
 
              ʔaʕtˤin-ii   l-ʤawaaz-a             min  fadˤlik 
              give-me    the-passport-Acc    in    care.your 
              (Give me the passport, please) 
 
In addition to denoting a unique individual salient in a certain context, al-N can be used to 
denote a unique kind, species, or, as traditional Arab grammarians like to put it, genus. Here, 
reference is not made to any member of a kind or species, but rather to the whole kind or species as a 
unique entity. Consider the examples in (29): 
(29) a. al-kalb-u   ħayawaan-u-n      ʔaliif 
  the-dog-Nom    animal-Nom-N    domestic 
     (The dog is a domestic animal) 
 
           b. asˤ-sˤaqr-u             tˤaaʔir-u-n       ʤaariħ 
             the-hawk-Nom    bird-Nom-N     of prey 
                    (The hawk is a bird of prey) 
 
           c. aʃ-ʃaytˤaan-u      ʕaduww-u    l-ʔinsaan 
              the-devil-Nom   enemy-Nom   the-Man 
       (The devil (Satan and his demons) is the enemy of Man) 
 
           d. al-qird-u   mina  θ-θadiyyaat 
             the-monkey-Nom from   the-mammals 
       (The monkey is a mammal) 
 
The definites in (29) denote kinds or species. They do not refer to any member of that kind or 
species, but rather to the kind or species as a whole. These kinds are unique, in the sense that each 
kind is the only salient entity in the context domain, which might be the whole world. In (a), for 
example, reference is made to the unique individual species of dogs, not to any dog or a group of 
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dogs. Likewise, in (b) the definite asˤ-sˤaqr ‘the hawk’ is intended to denote the whole unique species 
of hawks, not to any member of that species. The same interpretation holds for the rest of the definites 
in (29). 
Therefore, the use of al as a pure definite marker in MSA entails that the referent of al-N is 
familiar, identifiable, or unique. Noun phrases prefixed with al whose referents fail to meet at least 
one of the definiteness criteria are rendered semantically not definite; hence, al will prove not to be an 
exclusive definite marker. In this case, it is plausible to claim that morphology per se is not reliable 
enough to determine in/definiteness in MSA. A semantic analysis based on the categories on which al 
definite marker is established has to be incorporated to probe the synchronic function of al in MSA, 
and whether it is still a faithful carrier of definiteness in the language, or has developed other 
grammatical uses which are not much relevant to its original function. This will be examined in the 
following section.  
5.2 Other Uses of al  
The definite article al does not function as a pure definite marker in MSA. In fact, it has 
developed other uses not necessarily related to definiteness. The presence of al-Ns is much more 
frequent than the presence of bare Ns. This heterogeneous frequency of al-N and bare N indicates that 
the presence of al serves other grammatical functions, and that it no longer marks definiteness 
exclusively. Sub-section (5.2.1) investigates the definite article al introducing nouns whose referents 
are not semantically definite according to the definiteness criteria. These al-Ns can be replaced with 
their bare N counterparts with slight change in meaning. Sub-section (5.2.2) discusses cases where al-
Ns are used in indefinite environments, and still these al-Ns are not interchangeable with their bare N 
counterparts. This indicates that the presence of al here serves other grammatical functions not 
necessarily related to in/definiteness.  Sub-section (5.2.3) probes cases where al attaches to nouns, 
adjectives, and adverbs which are semantically neutral, if not irrelevant, to semantic definiteness. The 
presence of al in these cases explicitly serves other grammatical functions like phrase-clause 
distinction. 
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5.2.1 The Use of al in Indefinite Environments  
Although the definite article al in MSA is used with nouns whose referents are familiar, 
identifiable, or unique, this use of al is not exclusive. In fact, it is used with nouns whose referents are 
completely the reversed, i.e. semantically indefinite nouns; they are not familiar, identifiable, or 
unique. The nouns denote random individuals of certain classes upon which the descriptive content of 
the nouns used apply. In a situation where a senior high school student is talking with his uncle about 
his plans after graduating from high school, the uncle asks his nephew
19
: 
(30) Uncle: maaðaa   tuxatˤitˤ  ʔan  tafʕal  baʕda  ʔan     tunhii      l-marħala   θ-θaanawiyya? 
          what        2.plan    to     do       after    that    2.finish    the-stage     the-secondary? 
           Student: kul   ihtimaam-ii      munsˤabbun  ʕalaa  duxuuli      l-ʤaamiʕa  
            all    attention-my    focused          on      admission  the-university 
           Uncle: hal   tufadˤdˤil   ʤaamiʕa           muʕayyana? 
do    2.prefer     a university      particular?  
           Student: laa, ʔay   ʤaamiʕa   ʤayyeda 
             no, any   university  good 
           Uncle: bi-t-tawfiiq        yaa   bunay 
  with-the-luck    O      sonny 
(Uncle: What do you plan to do after finishing the secondary stage? Student: All my   
attention is focused on being admitted to a university. Uncle: Do you prefer a particular 
university? Student: No, just any good university. Uncle: Good luck sonny)  
 
According to the traditional view of definiteness, the use of al in l-ʤaamiʕa ‘the-university’ 
is sufficient to mark the noun prefixed with it ʤaamiʕa ‘a university’ semantically definite. However, 
it is clear from the scenario that l-ʤaamiʕa ‘the-university’ is not semantically definite according to 
the definiteness criteria. In other words, the referent of l-ʤaamiʕa ‘the-university’ is not familiar, 
identifiable, or unique to both interlocutors. This is explicated by the uncle’s question of whether the 
student has in mind a particular, definite university he refers to, and the student’s answer expressing 
his interest to be admitted to any good university, not to a unique one he has in mind. Therefore, no 
reference is expressed in this grammatically definite instance of l-ʤaamiʕa ‘the-university’, yet the 
definite article al is attached to this noun phrase. The exact denotation of l-ʤaamiʕa ‘the-university’ 
is that it denotes any random individual ʤaamiʕa ‘university’ in the class of entities to which the 
                                                          
19
 In all examples of this section, only al-Ns in indefinite environments, appearing in bold, will be discussed; 
NPs with semantically definite referents are irrelevant to this section. 
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descriptive content of ʤaamiʕa ‘a university’ applies. This is the same kind of interpretation which 
indefinite nouns entertain. Therefore, it is plausible to claim that al in this example does not 
contribute definiteness to the noun it is attached to, hence does not function as a definite article in this 
case. It is worth noting that the question raised by the hearer about which university the student is 
planning to be admitted to does not indicate that the hearer got a message that the speaker by using l-
ʤaamiʕa ‘the-university’ is referring to a particular, definite university that he could not work it out. 
The same question is felicitous even if the speaker used ʤaamiʕa ‘a university’ in the example, (see 
(34) below). The hearer understands that the speaker is referring not to a particular university, but 
rather to any university, but maybe he wants to get more information to let the speaker feel that he is 
interested in his future, or to give him some advice about a applying to a particular university he 
thinks is the best choice for his nephew. 
The definite article al is used with nouns which are explicitly identified indefinite throughout 
the linguistic discourse.  In a situation where a Jordanian student got a scholarship to pursue his 
masters in linguistics in Luxembourg, a country he has never been to or even heard of before; a friend 
of his is discussing with him how to manage his time and money there. They are discussing food 
issues, in particular where the student should eat his meals. The friend asks: 
(31) Friend: ʔayna   sa-taʔkul   hunaak? 
where   Fut-2.eat   there? 
           Student: ʔana  laa   ʔuħib  ʔan    ʔatˤbux, liðaalika    sa-ʔaakul  fi    l-matˤaaʕim 
            I         not  1.like   to      1.cook,  so               Fut-1eat   in    the-restaurants 
           Friend: ʔana  laa      ʔaʕrif      l-matˤaaʕim       fii   liksumburg, laakin  ʔatamanna 
          I         NEG  1.know   the-restaurants   in   Luxemburg, but       1.wish 
          ʔan  takuuna     saʕiidan   hunaak 
          that  2.be           happy      there 
(Friend: Where will you eat there? Student: I do not like to cook, so I will eat in restaurants. 
Friend: I do not know about restaurants in Luxemburg, but I hope you will be happy there.)    
 
The noun phrase l-matˤaaʕim ‘the-restaurants’ is definite in form; it is introduced with al, the definite 
article. However, is l-matˤaaʕim ‘the-restaurants’ semantically definite? Put differently, does this 
noun phrase denote familiar, identifiable, or unique referents? A straightforward answer is no. This 
answer is justified by the facts introduced in the context; the speaker has never been or heard of the 
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country Luxembourg. This indicates that both the speaker and the hearer are not familiar with its 
restaurants; neither the speaker nor the hearer can identify them. They are thousands of miles far, and 
they are not unique because both interlocutors cannot even tell how many restaurants there are in 
Luxembourg. It is clear that l-matˤaaʕim ‘the-restaurants’ fails to satisfy any of the definiteness 
criteria clusters, yet the definite article al is felicitously used with matˤaaʕim ‘restaurants’. A more 
plausible interpretation of l-matˤaaʕim ‘the-restaurants’ is that it denotes any random members of the 
class of matˤaaʕim ‘restaurants’. More precisely, it denotes semantically indefinite entities, 
unfamiliar, unidentified, and not unique.  That said, al here is no longer considered a grammatical 
carrier of semantic definiteness, hence its presence does not guarantee that the noun it is attached to is 
semantically definite.  
However, one may argue that l-matˤaaʕim ‘the-restaurants’ denotes definite referents based 
on cross-reference familiarity. The ‘restaurants’ has not been mentioned before, but Luxemburg and 
eating have been mentioned. By commonsense knowledge, any country has restaurants, and the 
speaker by using the word eating conjures up for the hearer all places relevant to eating like cafés, 
restaurants, etc. Therefore, both interlocutors refer to the restaurants there, not to any other 
restaurants. It is worth mentioning that English admits the use of ‘the restaurants’ in the same context, 
even though the speaker has no particular restaurants in mind. This analysis, however, is untenable. In 
MSA, the same sentence is felicitous even if the singular l-matˤʕam ‘the-restaurant’ is used. The use 
of a singular grammatically definite restaurant cancels cross-reference familiarity; no country in the 
world is by default has one restaurant which can be invoked as part of the commonsense shared 
knowledge. It is worth noticing that English does not allow a singular restaurant in the same context. 
In another situation where two friends are chatting about a movie currently playing in some 
movie theatres, one of the two interlocutors asks his friend whether he watched that movie or not. 
Their conversation is in (32): 
(32) Friend1:  hal   ʃaahdta     film   t-taaytanik? 
q      watched.2.sg   film   the-titanic? 
           Friend 2:  laa, lam    ʔuʃaahid-hu   baʕd, laakin  sa-ʔaðhab   li-s-siinamaa     
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               no, NEG   1.watched-it   yet,   but       Fut-1.go      to-the-cinema 
  li-ʔuʃaahida-hu 
  to-1.watch-it 
Friend 1:  hal   tufakkir  fii   ʔan  taðhab     li-siinamaa    muʕayyana? 
  q      2.think    in   to    2.go          to-a cinema   particular? 
Friend 2:  laa, sa-ʔaðhab   li-ʔay   siinamaa   taʕridˤu-hu 
 No. Fut.1.go      to-any  cinema      play-it 
(Friend 1: Did you watch the movie Titanic? Friend 2: No, I have not watched it yet, but I 
will go to a movie theatre to watch it. Friend 1: Are you thinking of going to a particular 
movie theatre? Friend 2: No, I will go to any movie theatre (currently) playing it.) 
 
In this scenario, the movie Titanic is familiar to both interlocutors; however, it is clear that the movie 
theatre(s) currently playing it is not, yet s-siinamaa ‘the-movie theatre’ occurs with the definite article 
al. This lack of familiarity of the referent of s-siinamaa ‘the-movie theatre’ on the part of both the 
speaker and the hearer is explicitly stated by the utterances of both interlocutors, which followed the 
occurrence of the grammatically definite s-siinamaa ‘the-movie theatre’. The hearer ‘Friend 1’ 
expresses his unfamiliarity of the movie theatre the speaker refers to by asking the speaker if he 
intends to go to a particular movie theatre. If the referent of the movie theatre were known to the 
hearer in a way or another, he would not ask this question; notice that this question is felicitous even 
if the speaker used an indefinite noun phrase siinama ‘a movie theatre, instead. The speaker’s 
response to the hearer’s question explicitly states that he is not referring to a particular individual 
movie theatre, but rather to any individual movie theatre out of the class of ‘movie theatre’. This 
response, also, clearly illustrates that the speaker has no particular movie theatre he wants the hearer 
to identify. As for uniqueness, the word ʔay ‘any’ which preceded siinama ‘a movie theatre’ in the 
speaker’s response to the hearer’s question of whether he is thinking of going to a particular movie 
theatre, invalidates uniqueness account. ʔay ‘any’ co-occurs with indefinite nouns in  MSA; notice 
that it is followed by a bare noun siinama ‘a movie theatre’, and indefinite nouns do not denote 
unique referents by default since any random individual satisfying the semantic content of the noun 
used can be picked out.  
Another example taken from Quran (18:109) indicates that even when Classical Arabic was 
used, there were instances of al-N in indefinite environments. Consider (33): 
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(33) “qul law kaana l-baħru midaadan li-kalimaati rabbi, lanafida l-baħru qabla ʔan     tanfada                      
kalimaatu rabbi, walaw ʤiʔnaa bimiθlihi madadaa” 
     (Say [Mohammad], if a sea were ink for [writing] the words of my Lord, the sea would be     
exhausted before the words of my Lord were exhausted, even if We brought the like of it as a 
supplement) 
 
In this verse two instances of l-baħr ‘the-sea’ occurred. Both of them are grammatically definite; they 
are introduced with al. The second instance represents anaphoric familiarity since in the linguistic 
domain, another instance of the same noun phrase is previously mentioned, and both phrases are 
coreferential. Therefore, the hearer is familiar with the referent of the second instance of l-baħru as 
he/she assumes that it refers to the same referent of the noun previously mentioned. That said, the 
second instance needs no further investigation. As for the first instance of l-baħr ‘the-sea’, there is 
nothing in the verse, neither in the preceding or following verses, which guarantees that the 
addressee, Prophet Mohammad, is familiar with, or can identify the particular sea Allah is referring 
to. For traditional Arab grammarians, the first instance of l-baħr ‘the-sea’ is semantically definite 
because the noun here does not refer to any member of the class ‘sea’, but rather to the ‘genus’ sea. 
Therefore, reference is successful here on uniqueness account; instead of referring to a unique 
individual sea, Allah refers to the unique genus sea. However, closer investigation of the phrase 
“walaw ʤiʔnaa bimiθlihi madadaa” (even if We brought the like of it as a supplement) invalidates 
this interpretation. Allah wants to emphasize that his words are infinite by saying that even if We 
brought a similar sea to the one mentioned first, and used that other sea(s) as ink to write the words of 
Allah, any sea would not be sufficient for writing Allah’s words. This shows that the first instance of 
l-baħr ‘the-sea’ does not refer to the genus sea, but rather to any random member in the genus, for 
which a similar random individual sea out of the class of ‘seas’ can be also brought. Notice the use of 
bimiθlihi madadaa ‘the like of it as a supplement’, which indicates that a similar individual, not a 
genus, can be brought. This is interesting because a genus by default is unique; there is no other genus 
with the same characteristics. However, any genus has members which share the same distinctive 
attributes which qualify them to be members of that genus. Therefore, when Allah mentioned ‘the like 
89 
 
of it as a supplement’ He intends another individual sea out of the class ‘seas’ which shares with the 
first random individual sea the same characteristic attributes.  
Interestingly, the examples in (30-32) can be restated with indefinite nouns replacing the ones 
in bold with almost no change in meaning with respect to definiteness. This gives further support for 
treating these NPs as semantically indefinite, and that the occurrence of the definite article al does not 
contribute definiteness to these nouns. This also has bearing on treating al as a pure definite marker, 
in the sense that it carries semantic definiteness, and that though it functions as a definiteness carrier 
in some cases, it does not do so exclusively. This use of al as not a definite marker might have 
developed some time after its first stage as a pure definite marker, which indicates that taking its 
presence/absence as an absolute ground to determine in/definites in MSA is untenable. Example 
(30)
20
 is repeated in (34) with a change of the definite noun l-ʤaamiʕa ‘the-university’ into its 
indefinite counterpart ʤaamiʕa ‘a university’. 
(34) Uncle: maaða tuxatˤitˤ  ʔan tafʕal  baʕda  ʔan  tunhii     l-marħala    θ-θaanawiyya? 
      what    2.plan     to    do       after   that  2.finish   the-stage     the-secondary?  
          Student: kul  ihtimaamii       munsˤabbun  ʕalaa  duxuuli      ʤaamiʕa 
            all   attention-my   focused          on      admission  a university 
          Uncle:  hal   tufadˤdˤil   ʤaamiʕa           muʕayyana? 
            q     2.prefer      a university        particular?  
          Student:  laa, ʔay   ʤaamiʕa   ʤayyida 
  no, any   university  good 
          Uncle:  bi-t-tawfiiq  yaa  bunay 
           with-the-luck    O     sonny 
  (Uncle: What do you plan to do after finishing the secondary stage? Student: All my attention is     
focused on being admitted to a university. Uncle: Do you prefer a particular university? Student: No, 
just any good university. Uncle: Good luck sonny)  
 
Replacing l-ʤaamiʕa ‘the-university’ with ʤaamiʕa ‘a university’ does not affect our interpretation 
of the sentence; notice that the translation given for both noun phrases is similar ‘a university’.  Both 
l-ʤaamiʕa and ʤaamiʕa in (30&34) denote a referent which is unfamiliar, unidentifiable, and not 
unique. The slight difference that I can notice, as a native speaker, is that the use of the definite 
sounds more natural than the indefinite. This has nothing to do with definiteness, but rather with a 
                                                          
20
 The definite nouns in the other two examples (29&30) can be replaced with their indefinite counterparts, 
with no change on their interpretation in terms of definiteness. 
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development in the use of al which tends to co-occur with most nouns except for those which are 
intended to be existential like there is/are Ns. This is reflected in the frequent uses of the 
grammatically definite nouns in MSA, as opposed to a receding use of indefinites. It sounds to me 
that a tendency of using only al-Ns in MSA is being developed
21
.  
Other examples of al-N in indefinite environments are given in (35): 
(35) a. [A student studying in a college far from her home city is telling her friend how she keeps       
in touch with her family] 
 
natabaadal-u   l-ʔaxbaar-a   ʔanaa wa-ʕaaʔilat-ii      fii nihaayat-i  l-ʔusbuuʕ 
3.Pl.exchange-Nom the-news-Acc    I           and-family-my     in  end-Gen     the-week 
   (My family and I exchange news in the weekend) 
 
        b. [A women expressing her fascination with trees] 
 
    ʔaʕʃaq-u  l-ʤuluus-a   taħta    ʃ-ʃaɮara 
    1.love-Nom the-sitting     under  the-tree 
    (I love sitting under a tree) 
 
        c. [A mother complaining about her son not focusing in school] 
 
     yumdˤii  muʕðˤam-a  waqti-hi    fii  muʃaahadat-i      l-ʔaflaam 
     3.spend most-Acc     time-his    in   watching-Gen    the-films 
     (He spends most of his time watching movies) 
 
d. [A father asks his younger son where his older sister could be; the son answers: she could 
not find something to drink, so] 
 
       ðahabat  li-taʃtarii l-ħaliib 
       went.3.f to-3.f.buy the-milk 
       (She went out to buy milk) 
 
e. [A college student asks her friend why she did not apply for a college after graduating from     
high school; the friend answers] 
 
laa     ʔuħibb-u     ʔan ʔumdˤii   saaʕaat tˤawiilah wa-ʔanaa ʔastamiʕ li-l-muħaadˤaraat 
    NEG  1.like-Nom to   1.spend    hours     long        and-I       1.listen   to-the-lectures    
    (I do not like to spend long hours listening to lectures) 
 
                                                          
21
 Investigating this grammatical tendency falls out of the scope of this dissertation. In addition, no attempt to 
explain the function of al when attached to nouns with semantically indefinite referents will be made. The 
main concern of this chapter is to prove that relying on the presence/absence of al as an exclusive marker of 
definiteness is problematic, and that a semantic analysis based on the definiteness criteria is required to 
determine definites and indefinites in MSA.  
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It is worth mentioning that in all the sentences in (35) the definite nouns in bold can be 
replaced with indefinite counterparts with no change in meaning in terms of definiteness, though as 
mentioned above the ones with grammatically definite nouns sound more natural than those with bare 
nouns.  
However, in certain cases al-N is used in indefinite environments where it is ungrammatical 
to replace the al-N with its bare N counterpart. This ungrammaticality has nothing to do with 
definiteness because the al-N in this case does not denote a semantically definite referent, and if it is 
an issue related to definiteness, using bare N should be non-problematic. These uses are discussed 
below.     
5.2.2 Obligatory al in Indefinite Environments  
Support for claiming that al no longer functions as a pure grammatical encoder of semantic 
definiteness, and that it has developed other uses not essentially related to this semantic ingredient 
comes from facts that al is used with nouns entertaining an indefinite interpretation only; nonetheless, 
these NPs are not mutually interchangeable with their grammatically indefinite counterparts. This 
indicates that the use of al, in these cases, does not relate to definiteness category, and that its use is 
enforced by other grammatical requirements entertained by the grammar of MSA. In a situation 
where a mother is calling her daughter, complaining that her daughter, who is working in a different 
country, is not sending her enough money; the mother argues that her daughter does not spend her 
money appropriately. The daughter argues back asking her mother to give her examples of her misuse 
of her money. The mother utters the sentence in (36): 
(36)  ʔaðˤunn-u        ʔanna-ki  tunfiqiina   muʕðˤam-a   daxli-ki            ʕalaa        
           1.think-Nom    that-you   2.f.spend    most-Acc     income-your    on        
           l-malaabis/*malaabis 
           the-clothes/*clothes 
           (I think you spend most of your income on [buying] clothes) 
 
In this example, for the sentence to be grammatically acceptable the noun malaabis ‘clothes’ 
must be introduced with al, otherwise it will be grammatically unacceptable. Interestingly, l-malaabis 
‘the-clothes’ and malaabis ‘clothes’ both denote semantically indefinite referents in this example. 
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Thus, if ungrammaticality is due to in/definiteness mismatch, there must be no problem in using the 
bare N malaabis ‘clothes’ as it also denotes a semantically indefinite referent. However, we need to 
verify that l-malaabis ‘the-clothes’ is semantically not definite, in the sense that it does not refer to a 
familiar, identifiable, or unique object. The speaker, in using  l-malaabis ‘the-clothes’, does not refer 
to a particular collection of clothing objects she is familiar with; as stated above her daughter lives in 
a different country. Notice also the use of ʔaðˤunn-u ‘I think’, which indicates that the speaker is not 
familiar with which clothes she is talking about, or can identify them. As for uniqueness account, 
there is nothing in the sentence, or in the situation provided, that indicates that the speaker is referring 
to a unique collection of clothes on which her daughter spends her money. Notice the use of the verb 
tunfiqiin ‘2.f.spends’ which indicates habituality of the event of spending; one cannot habitually 
spend money on buying the same unique collection of clothes. A more plausible interpretation is that 
when the speaker used l-malaabis ‘the-clothes’, she meant any random object to which the descriptive 
content of the noun applies. In addition, this analysis of the denotation of l-malaabis ‘the-clothes’ as 
denoting a semantically indefinite collection of clothes complies with the habitual reading of the 
sentence introduced by the present-tense verb tunfiqiin ‘2.f.spends’. According to this reading, the 
mother says that generally, whenever her daughter spends money, she spends it on buying different 
pieces of clothes. This example is quite interesting because it clearly illustrates the interaction 
between genericity and definiteness, and that accurately distinguishing grammatical definiteness and 
semantic definiteness is crucial to investigating this kind of interaction.         
In another situation, a host in a talk show asks her guest what he usually does whenever he 
feels upset or depressed. The guest utters (37): 
(37) ʔaxruʤ-u   xaariʤ-a  l-madiinat-i fi   l-layl-i/*layl-i 
         1.get out-Nom outside-Acc       the-city-Gen at   the-night-Gen/*night 
  wa-ʔamʃii     bayna  l-ʔaʃʤaar-i/*ʔaʃʤaar-i   
  and-1.walk   between        the-trees-Gen/*trees 
            (I go outside the city at night and walk between trees) 
 
This example is quite interesting because it has two instances of al-N that cannot be replaced with 
their bare N counterparts, though neither of these al-Ns is semantically definite. In using al-layl ‘the-
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night’, the speaker does not intend to trigger to the hearer that he refers to a particular night she is 
familiar with in a way or another, or can identify using extralinguistic machinery; notice that the 
speaker refers to al-layl ‘the-night’ as a time correlated with his going outside the city when he feels 
upset. Since he does this only when he is upset, and there is no specific feeling upset states he is 
referring to, this night is never the same because he might feel upset every  two or three weeks, for 
example, and no single night lasts that long. This invalidates uniqueness account also. Since feeling-
upset states are not known when to happen, the time they happen in is naturally not known or 
indefinite. Therefore, the speaker, though using the grammatically definite al-layl ‘the-night’, he, as 
well as the hearer, understands that it denotes any random night that coincides with his accidental 
feeling upset state. The second instance of al-N, l-ʔaʃʤaar ‘the-trees’, is clearly semantically 
indefinite. The speaker does not refer to definite trees he walks between whenever he feels upset and 
goes outside the city. In fact, being outside the city is itself indefinite; there are many places which 
are technically considered outside a certain city. The speaker when using l-ʔaʃʤaar ‘the-trees’ does 
not intend to refer to semantically definite trees in the real sense. He rather refers to any trees which 
happen to exist whenever he feels upset and decides to go outside the city for a walk between trees. In 
fact, if someone takes a photo of a certain pair of trees the speaker walked between once and shows it 
to the speaker, there is nothing in the sentence that guarantees that he would be able to recognize 
them, or remember that he walked between them once. In addition, if the host in the show asks the 
speaker about the number of trees he walked between on the last time he did this, or to describe to her 
every single pair of trees he walked between, those questions would be taken as ridiculous by the 
speaker and the audience, and probably will cause a burst of laughter. A more plausible interpretation 
is that this grammatically definite noun phrase is semantically indefinite based on the definiteness 
criteria; the referents of these trees are not familiar, identifiable, or unique to both interlocutors. This 
example, the previous one, and the other examples in (38) below show that the use of al cannot be 
taken as a necessary and sufficient condition for distinguishing definites from indefinites in MSA, 
though al-N in certain cases is not in complementary distribution with N. 
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(38) a. [A judge asks a woman about the grounds for her divorce; the woman replies] 
 
huwa laa     yahtamm-u           bii          wa-laa        bi-ʔawlaad-ih,  fa-huwa  yukarris-u 
he      NEG  3.take care-Nom  of me      and-NEG   of-children-his, as-he      3.dedicate-Nom 
kul   waqti-hi     li-mutaabaʕat-i      l-ʔaxbaar-i/ *ʔaxbaar-i   min    qanaat-in  ʔilaa  ʔuxraa 
     all     time-his   to-following-Gen    the-news/*news       from   a channel   to      another 
(He does not take care of his children or me as he spends his time watching newscasts from 
one channel to another) 
 
b. [A sign on a beach says] 
 
mamnuuʕ     s-sibaaħa/*sibaaħa 
forbidden      the-swimming/*swimming 
 (Swimming is forbidden) 
 
c. [A host asks his guest to describe things she enjoys doing with her leisure time; the guest 
answers] 
ʔiʕdaad     l-qahwa/*qahwa     wa-l-maʃii/*maʃii            ʕalaa  ʃ-ʃaatˤiʔ 
making     the-coffee/*coffee    and-the-walking/*walking   at    the-beach 
 (Making coffee and walking at the beach) 
 
d. [Two men met in a hotel’s restaurant. One of the two told the other that for twenty years now 
he has been on many vacations all around the world. The other man asks about the times his 
hotel mate had his vacations; the man replied] 
 
            ʔana  ʔusaafir-u        θalaaθ-a       marrat-i-n  fii   s-sana/*sana.    saafar-tu      ʕaʃrat-a  
             I       1.travel-Nom    three-Acc     times-Gen-N   in    the-year/*year. travelled-1   ten-Acc 
maarat-i-n       fii   ra-rabiiʕ/*rabiiʕ,    wa-xamsiin-a   marrat-a-n      fii    ʃ-ʃitaaʔ/*ʃitaaʔ 
times-Gen-N   in   the-spring/*spring, and-fifty-Acc   times-Acc-N  in    the-winter/*winter 
(I travel three times a year. I travelled ten times in spring, and fifty times in winter) 
 
e. [A young woman took her mother who has lost her hearing in both ears to a doctor’s 
appointment. The doctor noticed that the old woman is too upset, and asked her daughter about 
this. The daughter said that her mother is a very pious Muslim and she was upset because since 
she became deaf a year ago she could not hear any calling to prayer, which is heard five times a 
day] 
 
  munðu  sana,  lam    tastatˤiʕ   ʔan    tasmaʕ-a   l-ʔaðaan/*ʔaðaan 
since     a year,  NEG  3.f.could  to      3.f.hear     the-calling to prayer/*calling to prayer 
(Since a year, she could not have heard a calling to prayer) 
 
In addition to the use of al with nouns in an indefinite environment, where al-N is sometimes 
interchangeable with N and sometimes not, al has developed other uses where it obligatorily attaches 
to nouns for grammatical reasons irrelevant to in/definiteness phenomenon. These uses are discussed 
in (4.2.3) below. 
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5.2.3 Other Obligatory Uses of al  
Not all uses of the definite article al can be accounted for based on definiteness or 
indefiniteness accounts. In other words, al obligatorily attaches itself to nouns, adjectives, and 
adverbs which are semantically neutral, if not irrelevant, with regard to both definiteness and 
indefiniteness. These uses of al are triggered by some grammatical rules which, for reasons not 
related to definiteness phenomenon, entertain al-N phrases only. Therefore, in these cases the 
presence of al cannot be taken as an indicator of definiteness. The attributive adjective presents a 
clear case of these uses of al. In MSA, the attributive adjective agrees with the noun it modifies in 
number, gender, and grammatical definiteness. Consider the examples in (39). 
(39) a. haaðihi  l-bint    l-ʤamiil-a 
     this.f  the-girl   the-beautiful-f 
      (This beautiful girl) 
  
          b. al-kursiyy   l-maksuur 
  the-chair    the-broken 
      (The broken chair) 
 
          c. al-muʕallim-aat  l-maʃɣuul-aat 
  the-teacher-Pl.f    the-busy-Pl.f 
        (The busy [female] teachers) 
 
          d. atˤ-tˤullaab   l-muʤtahid-uun 
  the-students  the-diligent-Pl.m 
       (The diligent students) 
 
The examples in (39) are grammatically definite noun phrases in which the adjectives 
modifying them are obligatorilly definite. Grammatical definiteness in adjectives is required for two 
reasons not related to definiteness. The first reason has to do with syntactic agreement between head 
noun and complement adjective in MSA. Put differently, the adjective, the complement in this case, is 
rendered grammatically definite to fulfill agreement feature, which requires that an adjective 
modifying a head noun have to agree with that noun in number, gender, and definiteness. The 
adjective itself is not semantically definite; simple semantic definiteness in MSA is restricted to NPs 
which denote familiar, identifiable, or unique referents. Therefore, the presence of al in these 
adjectives is syntactically motivated.  The other more interesting grammatical reason has to do with 
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distinguishing a subject-predicate sentence from a noun phrase. Changing the grammatically definite 
adjectives in all the sentences in (39) into grammatically indefinite ones yields in subject-predicate 
sentences, rather than noun phrases. Consider (40) below: 
(40) a. haaðihi  l-bint    ʤamiil-a 
         this.f the-girl   beautiful-f 
  (This girl is beautiful) 
 
        b. al-kursiyy          maksuur 
the-chair      broken 
    (The chair is broken) 
 
        c. al-muʕallim-aat   maʃɣuul-aat 
 the-teacher-Pl.f    busy-Pl.f 
    (The [female] teachers are busy) 
 
        d. atˤ-tˤullaab  muʤtahid-uun 
the-students diligent-pl.m 
    (The students are diligent) 
 
Notice that the word order in the sentences (39) is similar to that in the phrases (40). Therefore, the 
difference between the two expression types is brought upon by the presence/absence of al on the 
adjective without any change on the definiteness status of the NPs in both the phrases and the 
sentences. It is clear that this use of al is purely grammatical, and al here cannot be taken as a definite 
marker. 
A similar case is found in demonstrative-noun expressions. In a demonstrative-noun 
expression, the expression is rendered a phrase if the noun following the demonstrative is al-N, and a 
sentence if the noun following the demonstrative is bare N. Consider the examples in (41). 
(41)   a. haaðaa     l-walad  ‘this the-boy’   (This boy) 
          a'. haaðaa    walad   ‘this boy’   (This is a boy) 
  b. haaðihi     sˤ-sˤuura  ‘this.f the-picture’  (This picture) 
            b'. haaðihi    sˤuura   ‘this.f picture’      (This is a picture) 
  c. haaʔulaaʔ  l-qitˤatˤ   ‘these the-cats’   (These cats)  
  c'.haaʔulaaʔ  qitˤatˤ    ‘these cats’    (These are cats) 
  d. ʔulaaʔik    l-fannaanaat  ‘those the-artists.f’  (Those [female] artists)  
  d'. ʔulaaʔik   fannaanaat  ‘those artists.f’   (Those are [female] artists) 
 
It is worth mentioning that the presence/absence of al in these examples is not related to definiteness 
since definiteness is encoded by the demonstratives, rather than the al article here. According to 
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Lyons (1999), nouns introduced with demonstratives belong to what he dubbed complex definites, in 
which definiteness is encoded indirectly, not by a definite article. Therefore, since definiteness in 
these expressions is carried by the demonstratives, the presence/absence of al functions not as a 
definiteness carrier, but as phrase vs. sentence marker, respectively. As with the noun adjective 
expressions, the definiteness status of the noun introduced by a demonstrative is not affected by the 
presence/absence of al. 
Another environment where a noun has to be grammatically definite is quantificational 
sentences. In a quantificational sentence an al-N, rather than a bare N, must occur after all quantifiers 
except kul ‘every’22. This grammatical requirement is enforced regardless of the semantic definiteness 
status of the noun. Consider the example in (42). 
(42) [A teacher discussing feminism and freedom issues in the Arab world with her students in  
Gender and Feminism class] 
 
fii  kul  l-bilaad          l-ʕarabiyya/*bilaad23 ʕarabiyya, muʕðˤam-u     l-banaat/*banaat  
in  all   the-countries    the-Arabic/*countries  Arabic,     most-Nom     the-girls/*girls 
ʕindahunna   ħuriyya   ʔaqal min     muʕðˤam-i    l-ʔawlaad/*ʔawlaad 
have.Pl.f        freedom  less    than     most-Gen    the-boys/*boys 
        (In all Arab countries, most girls have less freedom than most boys) 
 
This example has three instances of al-N following different quantifiers; two are semantically 
indefinite and one is semantically definite. The semantically definite is l-bilaad  l-ʕarabiyya ‘Arab 
countries’ following quantifier kul ‘all’. It is definite on both uniqueness and familiarity accounts. On 
uniqueness account, it refers to a unique set of individual countries which are Arabic in the world 
situation. Whereas, on familiarity account, the noun phrase refers to a familiar set of objects known to 
interlocutors either because it was previously mentioned in class as an example of countries where 
there is some gender discrimination, or from assumed shared knowledge. However, the other two 
                                                          
22
 In MSA, the quantifier kul is homonymic; it stands for either ‘every’ or ‘all’. The one meaning ‘every’ allows 
only a grammatically indefinite singular noun after it, and the one meaning ‘all’ allows only a grammatically 
definite plural or a mass noun after it. 
 
23
 Using the indefinite bilaad is accepted on the other kul ‘every’ reading; in this case bilaad means ‘a country’, 
rather than ‘countries’.  
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nouns l-banaat ‘the-girls’ and l-ʔawlaad ‘the-boys’ following the same quantifier muʕðˤam ‘most’ are 
not definite in the real sense. Neither the speaker, nor the hearers can identify, or are familiar with the 
referents of these two noun phrases; there might be at least a hundred million boy and girl referents. 
No one is familiar with, or can identify this huge number of individuals. It is clear also that the 
referents of these two noun phrases are not unique. Therefore, these noun phrases introduced with al 
are semantically indefinite. This asymmetry of quantifiers allowing only al-Ns after them regardless 
of the semantic definiteness of the NPs indicates that the obligatory presence of al in noun phrases 
following quantifiers is enforced by a grammatical requirement entertained by the grammar of MSA, 
which does not observe definiteness. Other examples of semantically indefinite al-Ns and 
semantically definite al-Ns following the same quantifiers are given in (43&44), respectively. 
(43) a. kull-u  l-ʔurduniyyiina/*ʔurduniyyiina  yuħibb-uuna   balada-hum 
  all-Nom     the-Jordanians/*Jordanians  3.love-pl          country-their 
    (All Jordanians love their country) 
 
         b. baʕdˤ-u              sˤ-sˤiiniyyiina/*sˤiiniyyiina       yatakallam-uuna   l-ʔinkliiziyya 
some-Nom        the-Chinese/*Chinese              3.speak-pl       the-English 
     (Some Chinese speak English) 
 
         c. muʕðˤam-u  n-nabaataat/*nabaataat  taħtaaʤ-u  l-ʔuxiʤiin 
most-Nom the-plants/*plants  need-Nom the-oxygen 
     (Most plants need oxygen) 
 
         d. fii ʔafriiqyaa, kaθiir min  l-ʔatˤfaal/*ʔatˤfaal           yuħramuuna   min  t-taʕliim 
             in Africa,       many  from    the-children/*children   are deprived    of    the-education 
     (Many children in Africa are deprived of education) 
 
(44) a. kull-u        tˤ-tˤullab/*tˤullab          fii  haaðaa  sˤ-sˤaff       iʤtaaz-uu   
            all-Nom    the-students/*students   in   this        the-class     passed-Pl   
 l-imtiħaan     n-nihaaʔii    
 the-exam       the-final 
    (All students in this class passed the final exam) 
 
         b. baʕdˤ-u  s-sayyaarat/*sayyaarat  allatii    iʃtaraytu-haa  kaanat     raxiisˤa 
  some-Nom the-cars/*cars            which     1.bought-them were    cheap  
      (Some of the cars I bought were cheap) 
 
         c. muʕðˤam-u  ð-ðukuur/*ðukuur  fii  ʕaaʔilat-ii   wuliduu      qabla      l-ʔinaaθ 
most-Nom  the-males/*males   in   family-my  were born   before    the-females 
     (Most male [children] in my family were born before female [children]) 
 
         d. kaθiir  min  l-muʤawharaat/*muʤawharaat    fii   haaða    sˤ-sˤunduuq   
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  many  of    the-jewels/*jewels                            in   this         the-chest        
 ʔahdaa-haa   lii             ʔabii 
  gave-them    to me       father-my 
     (Many jewels in this chest are gifts from my father) 
 
Additional support against treating al as a pure semantic marker by which definites and 
indefinites are determined in MSA comes from introductory and concluding phrases. The distribution 
of al-N and N in these phrases is slightly random and does not relate to definiteness in the real sense. 
Some examples are given (45). 
(45) a. Obligatory al-N:   
 
fii l-waaqiʕ/*waaqiʕ     'in the-reality; in reality' 
fii l-ħaqiiqa/*ħaqiiqa    ‘in the-fact; in fact’ 
fii l-ʔasˤl/*ʔasˤl      ‘in the-origin; in origin/originally’ 
fii l-ɣaalib/*ɣaalib        ‘in the-most; mostly’ 
fii l-muʤumal/*muʤumal    ‘in the-total; in total’ 
bi-t-tawfiiq/*bi-tawfiiq       ‘with-the-luck; good luck’ 
maʕ faaʔiq l-iħtiraam/*iħtiraam  ‘with most the-respect; most respectfully’ 
 
          b. Obligatory N:  
 
bi-sˤaraaħa/*bi-s-sˤaraaħa  ‘with-frankness; frankly’ 
bi-ʔamaana/*bi-l-ʔamaana    ‘with-honesty; honestly’ 
bi-ʃakil ʕaam/*l-ʕaam     ‘in-form general; in general’ 
bi-xtisˤaar/* bi-l-xtisˤaar  ‘in-short; in short’ 
 taariixiyyan/*at-taariixiyyan   ‘historically’  
                          baadiʔ ðii bidʔ/*l-bidʔ         ‘start of a starter; to begin with/first of all’ 
                    
As can be noticed the distribution of al-N and N in these introductory and concluding phrases 
is irrelevant to semantic definiteness, and the presence/absence of al is formulaic or idiomatic. This 
shows that al is no longer used as a pure definite marker in the real sense, but rather other uses, 
mostly irrelevant to its original function, have developed, which place al in a different stage on 
Greenberg’s (1978) life cycle of a definite marker. This stage is probably the second, where a definite 
marker no longer functions as an exclusive definite marker, but rather found in definite and indefinite 
environments, with few uses slightly irrelevant to in/definiteness. However, it has not reached stage 
three yet, in which a definite marker is completely grammaticalized and functions as a pure nominal 
or gender marker. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this chapter definiteness, a semantic phenomenon that has strong bearing on the analysis of 
both reference to a kind genericity and characteristic genericity in MSA, has been investigated. It has 
been shown that the traditional Arab grammarians’ view of determining simple definites is untenable 
and problematic. According to this view, noun phrases are classified into semantically definite and 
semantically indefinite based on the presence/absence of the definite article al, respectively. It has 
been shown that this view is not useful to this thesis, and misses an overall generalization of what is 
definiteness in the real sense.   
Arguments against the traditional view of determining definites and indefinites in MSA are 
based on facts related to other uses of al which do not seem to be relevant to definiteness. The 
definite article al has been shown to felicitously introduce nouns which entertain indefinite 
interpretation only. In such cases, the al-Ns are interchangeable with their bare N counterparts with a 
slight change in meaning that has nothing to do with the definiteness status of the minimally 
contrasting noun phrases. Further support for rejecting the traditional morpho-syntactically oriented 
dichotomy of noun phrases into definites and indefinites comes from uses of al-N in indefinite 
environments, in which al-N is not interchangeable with its N counterpart, though both noun phrase 
types entertain an indefinite denotation only. The ungrammaticality of replacing al-N, entertaining an 
indefinite denotation only, with its minimally contrasting N, entertaining the same indefinite 
denotation, is problematic to the traditional view of simple definites. However, this asymmetry can be 
easily accommodated if the presence of al in these cases is not taken as a carrier of definiteness, but 
rather is enforced by other requirements entertained by the grammar of the language, like sentence vs. 
phrase distinction, and demonstrative-noun vs. sentence distinction. Some grammatical structures 
allow only al-N to surface for reasons not relevant to definiteness. A final argument raised against the 
traditional perspective of determining simple definites in MSA comes from expressions in which the 
distribution of al-N and N is completely random and formulaic.  
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In order to account for these asymmetrical uses of the definite article al in MSA, this chapter 
adopted Lyons (1999) major distinction between semantic definiteness and grammatical definiteness. 
This distinction draws a clear line between what is semantically definite, determined on the 
definiteness criteria which require the referent of a noun phrase to satisfy at least one of its three 
conceptual components: familiarity, identifiability, or uniqueness to be definite, and what is 
grammatically definite. The latter draws upon the presence/absence of the grammaticalization of 
semantic definiteness, which is susceptible to diachronic change and often develops other uses not 
related to the function it was first established to fulfil. Therefore, as the case with other grammatical 
or functional categories, grammatical definiteness might start its life as a pure semantic marker, and 
ends up a pure syntactic marker, as gender or nominal marker. That said, grammatical definiteness 
per se cannot be taken as a solid ground for determining definites and indefinites in MSA, as well as 
many other languages (see Lyons 1999). 
It is worth noting that precisely identifying semantically definite and  indefinite noun phrases, 
based on the definiteness criteria, has strong bearing on the analysis of generics in MSA. For instance, 
some habitual sentences require a semantically indefinite referent for the interpretation of the 
sentence to be felicitous in MSA (see ex. 37 above); however, MSA has some restrictions on the 
distribution of noun phrases in terms of grammatical definiteness that has nothing to do with the 
definiteness status of the referent of the noun phrase semantically. Therefore, according to these 
grammatical restrictions, only a grammatically definite noun phrase is allowed to surface in certain 
structures. That said, genericity manifestations examined in NPs and verbless sentences in the 
remainder of this dissertation will be guided by this understanding of definiteness and indefiteness 
based on the definiteness criteria.
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CHAPTER 4: ON GENERICITY IN NPS IN MSA
24
 
1. Introduction  
Assuming the analysis of al developed in the previous chapter in which al-N does not 
invariably mark definite noun pharses, characterizing sentences in MSA will be shown to share the 
semantic structure of characterizing sentences in English, Italian, German, and other studied 
languages.  The semantic structure of a characterizing sentence requires a semantically indefinite 
subject argument that denotes variable individuals for the sentence to generalize over. This is a 
crucial condition for a characterizing sentence, as opposed to a particular sentence, which is tied to a 
particular entity or a group of particular entities (Krifka et al. 1995). If we accept the traditional view 
of definiteness in MSA - according to which every al-N is definite in form and sense - we will end up 
with two unwelcomed results. The first outcome, which is the more adverse and implausible, is that 
MSA lacks characterizing sentences as a whole
25. This result contradicts native speakers’ intuitions 
who use characterizing sentences widely to express generalizations about individuals out in the world. 
Moreover, this result is incompatible with speakers’ intuitions about sentences like those in (1) 
pertaining to the generic interpretation which such and similar sentences express.  
(1) a. tu-ħibb-u   l-bint-u  ʔumm-a-haa 
 Pres.f-love-Nom  the-girl-Nom mother-Acc-her 
     (A/The girl loves her mother 
     
          b. ya-ħtaaɮ-u   sˤ-sˤaɣiir-u   ʔilaa  ʔumm-i-h 
              Pres-need-Nom the-young-Nom  to mother-Gen-his 
    (A/The young (baby) needs his mother)
                                                          
24
 Syntacticians debate on whether or not determiners project full phrases, and are thus the heads of DPs, which 
take NPs as their complements. The analysis that follows in this project is consistent with treating determiners 
as specifiers of NPs.  
 
25
 The traditional grammarians’ view dictates also that bare NPs are mostly existential, and hence cannot be 
used as subject arguments in characterizing sentences, see (section 3) below. 
 
 
          c. al-malikat-u   maɣruur-a               
 the-queen-Nom arrogant-f 
    (A/The queen is arrogant) 
 
The second less awkward, but still implausible outcome, is that characterizing sentences in 
MSA are idiosyncratic and language peculiar in that the subject argument NP is tied to a particular 
individual. This chapter will argue against both of these repercussions, showing that the accurate 
characterization of the semantic definiteness status of al-Ns based on the definiteness criteria 
elaborated in chapter 3 eliminates these two counterintuitive results. According to the analysis 
proposed in this chapter, characterizing sentences are pervasive in MSA, and their semantic structure 
maps to that of characterizing sentences in natural languages. The line between a characterizing 
sentence and its particular counterpart is drawn based on the correct semantic distinction of al-Ns in 
terms of definiteness, where a semantically definite al-N subject is compatible with an episodic 
reading of the sentence, and a semantically indefinite al-N is compatible with a characterizing 
sentence and a generic reading of the sentence. As discussed in chapter 3, the predicate, the context, 
and other constituents in a sentence are crucial clues to determine whether an al-N subject is 
semantically definite/indefinite, and hence the exact reading of the sentence, generic/non-generic.     
In addition to investigating characterizing sentences incorporating al-N subjects in MSA, this 
chapter will examine the variety of noun phrases in MSA with special focus on nominal forms which 
are allowed/disallowed in argument positions in generic sentences. Bare, mass, definite, and 
referential NPs will be scrutinized in episodic and generic environments to see whether the language 
dedicates any of these nominal forms to formally mark generic or episodic readings, or whether a 
specific nominal expression is marked as a generic NP or a kind-referring expression.  
Another important goal of this chapter is to investigate the preliminary claim of Modern Arab 
scholars (see Fassi Fehri 2012, chapter7) that unlike English and other languages, MSA does not 
allow a bare NP in a sentence that does not express an episodic reading, hence the bare NP being an 
episodicity marker in MSA. This chapter, however, rejects this claim and shows that in certain 
syntactic and semantic environments, bare NPs can be used in generic sentences. More strikingly - 
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contra to the commonsense view of bare NPs in MSA - when a bare NP is felicitously used in a 
characterizing sentence, it can only receive a non-existential interpretation. A significant distinction 
will be made between the referential use of bare NPs when unmodified, and the quantificational use 
when modified. The latter is compatible with characterizing sentences, while the former seems 
compatible with episodics only. 
The construct state (CS) in MSA, a Semitic peculiar nominal construction, will be examined 
to explicate its compatibility with generic sentences. The focus of this section will be to investigate 
whether the indefinite in form CS phrases behave differently from bare simple nouns pertaining to 
their compatibility with characterizing sentences, and whether the grammatically definite CS phrases 
behave differently from their simple definite counterparts pertaining to both characterizing sentences 
and reference to kind sentences. It will be shown that unlike unmodified bare NPs, bare CS phrases 
are compatible with characterizing sentences. However, grammatically definite CS phrases behave in 
a way similar to that of al-Ns with regard to both characterizing and particular sentences. In reference 
to kind sentences, however, grammatically definite CS phrases can be used as kind-denoting nominal 
expressions, but unlike kind-referring al-Ns, kind-referring CS phrases denote sub-kinds or sub-
species, rather than whole kinds or species.  
2. The Noun Phrase in MSA: A Syntactic Overview 
A noun phrase in MSA consists of a noun and its modifiers.  Morphologically speaking, 
nouns are classified into two categories: derivational and non-derivational. Derivational nouns, 
termed masˤdar ‘source’ in traditional grammar, are derived from verbs, and are semantically close to 
the root. The patterns of derived verbs are fixed
26
. Non-derivational nouns are not derived from verbs. 
Consider the examples in (2& 3). 
(2) Derivational Nouns 
 
kitaaba(t) ‘writing’ As in al-kitaaba mumtiʕa ‘Writing is fun’ 
muʕallim  ‘teacher’     
ʕilm  ‘science/knowledge’ 
                                                          
26
 Arabic is highly derivational language that adopts root and pattern morphological model. 
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mustawdaʕ ‘store’  
 
(3) Non-Derivational Nouns 
 
raʤul  ‘man’ 
bint  ‘girl’ 
ʔanf  ‘nose’ 
namir  ‘tiger’ 
 
The nouns in (2) have corresponding verbs from which they are derived. For the noun kitaaba(t) 
‘writing’ there exists the verb katab ‘to write’, from which the noun is derived. Likewise, muʕallim 
‘teacher’ is derived from the verb ʕallam ‘to teach’. Similarly, ʕilm ‘science/knowledge’ is derived 
from ʕalim ‘to know’, and mustawdaʕ ‘store’ from ʔawdaʕ ‘to store/deposit’. It is clear that the verb 
and its derived noun exhibit some semantic similarity obtained from the meaning of the root they both 
share. The derivational process yields different fixed noun patterns on par with the varying verb 
patterns.  
The nouns in (3), however, have no verb counterparts.  The noun raʤul ‘man’, for example, 
has no corresponding verb. Similarly, bint ‘girl’ is not derived from a corresponding verb; simply 
because there is no verb relevant to this noun. The same rationale holds for the rest of the nouns in 
(3). Therefore, these nouns could be considered primitive nominal expressions that belong to a semi-
closed, less-productive set. The derivational noun set, on the other hand, is highly productive; 
whenever a new verb is coined, borrowed, or made up, it is expected that a corresponding verbal noun 
or masˤdar, as well as other nominal forms, will be automatically derived.  
Noun phrases in MSA can be classified according to morphosyntactic and semantic 
properties that include - among other things - definiteness, number, case, and gender. These 
properties affect the syntactic distribution and the semantic interpretation of noun phrases. In the 
following paragraphs, I will briefly address these listed properties in order.  
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The nouns in MSA, count and mass, are either grammatically definite or indefinite
27
. A 
definite noun (4) is overtly marked by the article al ‘the’ being prefixed to it.  The article and the 
noun are fused together in one word. 
(4) al-kitaab  ‘the book’ 
    al-kutub  ‘the books’ 
       al-ʤundiyy  ‘the soldier’ 
       al-maaʔ  ‘the water’ 
       al-maal  ‘the money’ 
 
Grammatically indefinite nouns (5), on the other hand, lack an overt D
28
. Therefore, the absence of 
the definite article indicates indefiniteness of the noun. It is worth mentioning that indefinite nouns 
are not overtly marked for indefiniteness, though -n suffix, which always appears on indefinite nouns, 
is taken by some linguists as an indefinite marker. 
(5) kitaab-u-n  ‘a book-case-N’ 
 kutub-u-n  ‘books-case-N’ 
 ʤundiyy-u-n ‘a soldier-case-N’ 
 maaʔ-u-n  ‘water-case-N’ 
 maal-u-n  ‘money-case-N’ 
 
Nouns in MSA have three numbers - singular, dual, and plural. Dual and plural nouns are 
explicitly marked, while singular nouns lack an explicit number morphology. The lack of overt 
number morphology marks singularity. Put differently, grammatical singularity in MSA is taken as 
the default number that needs no explicit marker, whereas other numbers require overt marking with 
respect to number. See (6) below for number morphological classification and examples. 
(6)   
 
Singular 
masculine 
Singular 
feminine 
Dual masculine Dual  
feminine  
Plural masculine Plural feminine 
 
muslim           
‘Muslim’ 
Muslim-a(t) muslim-aan muslima-t-aan muslim-uun muslim-aat 
 
muʕallim 
‘teacher’ 
muʕallim-a(t) muʕallim-aan muʕallim-at-aan muʕallim-uun muʕallim-aat 
                                                          
27
 Definiteness here refers to grammatical definiteness, marked by the presence/absence of al ‘the’, not to 
semantic definiteness established on the definiteness criteria. 
 
28
 There are a number of arguments against treating –n morpheme - usually termed nunation - as indefinite 
marker (e.g. Fassi Fehri 1993, 2012; Hallman 1999), so this study treats it as declension marker, and capital N is 
used to stand for nunation, (see section 7). 
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As is clear from the data in (6), singular nouns in MSA are not overtly marked for number. Dual 
nouns, however, are marked using the suffix –aan, which is used invariably with masculine and 
feminine nouns. Plural nouns are more complicated than what is introduced in the data; all the 
example nouns belong to the traditionally termed sound plural nouns. This class employs the suffixes 
–uun and –aat to mark plural number on masculine and feminine nouns, respectively. It is worth 
mentioning that the quality of the long vowel in –uun suffix varies from uu, aa, to ii according to the 
grammatical status of the noun; in particular the case assigned to it, where the three vowels mark 
nominative, accusative, and genitive case, respectively. Unlike sound plurals, which are marked with 
suffixal endings, the other class of plurals (7), termed broken plural in traditional grammar, is 
expressed with a range of roughly thirty different forms of varying degrees of productivity and 
semantic specificity (Hoyt 2008). Mass nouns take two plural forms: the collective noun (8), usually 
expressed as a broken plural, and the paucal plural (9), which is usually a sound plural, and denotes 
the plural of a singulative object of relevant mass noun. 
(7) kitaab  ‘book’  kutub  ‘books’ 
       ʃayʔ  ‘thing’  ʔaʃyaaʔ  ‘things’ 
      sitara(t)  ‘curtain’ sataaʔir ‘curtains’ 
      qanniina(t) ‘bottle’  qanaani ‘bottles’ 
 
(8) ɣanam  ‘sheep’ 
       samak  ‘fish’ 
         baqar  ‘cows-collective’ 
          ʃaʤar  ‘trees-collective’ 
 
(9) ɣanama(t) ‘sheep-sg’ ɣanam-aat ‘sheep-countable’ 
          samaka(t) ‘fish-sg’ samak-aat ‘fish-countable’ 
          baqara(t)  ‘cow-sg’ baqar-aat ‘cows-countable’ 
          ʃaʤara(t)  ‘tree-sg’ ʃaʤar-aat ‘trees-countable’ 
 
Among all the descendants of Classical Arabic, MSA is exclusively marked for case. Other 
Arabic dialects have lost this morphology and employed word order instead for theta-role assignment. 
In MSA, declinable nouns are assigned nominative, accusative, or genitive case based on their 
108 
 
syntactic position in the sentence. These cases are demonstrated by –u, -a, or -i suffixes29, 
respectively. Consider the data in (10). 
(10) a. ʤaaʔ-a   l-walad-u 
  came-3     the-boy-Nom  
 (The boy came) 
 
        b. raʔay-tu  l-walad-a 
saw-1   the-boy-Acc 
 (I saw the boy) 
 
c. marar-naa bi-l-walad-i 
passed-1.Pl by-the-boy-Gen 
 (We passed by the boy) 
 
Gender morphology appears on certain classes of words, but it plays a major role in 
agreement marking and other concordial relations (Hoyt 2008). Grammatical gender in MSA relates 
to a variety of semantic categories like biological sex (11.a), individuation of non-human mass nouns 
(11.b), and inanimate mass plurality (11.c).  Feminine gender is realized by the bound –at30 suffix, 
where its absence indicates masculinity. In other words, masculine gender is morphologically 
unmarked on singular nouns.  Other feminine nouns are not morphologically marked for gender, but 
they syntactically and semantically behave as feminine, either because they denote biologically 
feminine individuals (11.d), or by convention (11.e). As for plural forms, only sound plural shows 
gender morphology (11.f). The data below illustrate these syntactic facts. 
(11)   a. xaadim   ‘a male servant’  xaadim-a(t)  ‘a female servant’ 
     b. samak   ‘fish-mass’  samak-a(t)   ‘an individual fish’ 
     c. ħiʤaar-a(t)  ‘stones’   niʃaar-a(t)   ‘mulch/sawdust’ 
          d. bint    ‘girl’   ʕaruus    ‘bride’   
     e. ʃams    ‘sun’   ħarb     ‘war’ 
     f. mudarris-uun   ‘male instructors’ mudarris-aat   ‘female instructors’ 
 
 In general, all modifiers; simple adjectives, adjective phrases, relative clauses, and 
prepositional phrases; follow the modified noun in a noun phrases. Consider the examples below. 
                                                          
29
 These vowels are lengthened when used to mark case on dual and plural nouns. 
 
30
 The phonological status of t in  -at suffix depends on whether there is a pause or not following the noun 
which carries it. More accurately, this consonant is expressed in continuous speech, and is null at pausing, 
hence written in brackets to mark its phonological optionality. 
109 
 
(12) aʃ-ʃaix-u   l-qa sˤiir 
      the-old man-Nom the-short 
       (the short old man) 
 
     al-kalb-u  llaðii  y-anbaħ 
     the-dog-Nom which  3-bark  
 (the dog which is barking) 
 
     balad-u-n  fii ʔfriiqyaa 
     a country-Nom-N  in Africa 
 (a country in Africa) 
 
However, relative adjectives and ordinal numerals can precede the nominal modifie in the so-called 
construct state, (see section 6). 
(13) ʔadˤxam-u  ħuut 
largest-Nom whale 
 (the largest whale) 
 
ʔatˤwal-u  nahr 
longest-Nom river 
 (the longest river) 
 
ʔawwal-u ʃahiid 
first-Nom martyr 
 (the first martyr) 
 
      saadis-u  r-ruʔasaaʔ 
      sixth-Nom the-presidents 
       (the sixth president) 
 
It is worth mentioning that the head noun and the attributive adjective show full agreement in 
case, number, gender, and definiteness; whereas a predicative adjective concords with the noun in 
gender and number only. This is a syntactic benchmark distinguishing a nominal phrase from a 
clause. 
(14) a. atˤ-tˤaalib-at-u  l-muħtaar-at-u 
the-student-f-Nom the-confused-f-Nom 
 (the confused female student) 
 
          b. kaan-at atˤ-tˤaalib-at-u  muħtaar-at-a-n 
 was-f  the-student-f-Nom confused-f-Acc-N 
   (The female student was confused) 
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While the attributive adjective in (a) agrees with its modified noun in case, gender, number, and 
definiteness, the predicative adjective in (b) agrees with the nominal subject in gender and number 
only. 
3. Genericity and the Nominal Phrase Distinction in MSA  
Krifka et al. (1995) emphasize that cross-linguisticly, generics can be manifested by a variety 
of different syntactic structures. Generic sentences in English, for instance, can be expressed using an 
array of syntactically different NPs: indefinite singular NPs (a), bare plural NPs (b), definite NPs (c), 
mass noun NPs (d), and proper names (e). 
(15) a. A dog barks. 
  b. Dogs bark. 
  c. The dog barks. 
  d. Gold is a precious metal. 
  e. Jill drives to school. 
 
Despite their syntactic distinctions with respect to the nominal phrase type used in subject argument, 
each sentence in (15) is clearly generic; no sentence reports an isolated episode about a particular NP 
referent. All the sentences can be rephrased using the adverb in general, for example, with slight 
change in meaning in the rephrasing sentence.   
MSA shares this crosslinguistic feature in that a variety of nominal expressions can 
be incorporated in generic sentences. However, the traditional view of definiteness indicates 
that only grammatically definite nouns or nouns occurring in maximal definite phrases can 
appear in generics because grammatically indefinite nouns force existential interpretation 
only (Fassi Fehri 2012)
31
. This is illustrated in (16-21): 
(16) Definite singular subject 
 
       al-ʕarabiyy-u   kariim 
       the-Arab-Nom  generous 
          (The Arab is generous) 
 
(17) Definite plural subject 
 
       al-ʕarab-u       kuramaaʔ 
                                                          
31
 This claim is untenable as bare NPs can be used in generics; see below section (7.2).   
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       the-Arabs-Nom  generous.Pl 
       (Arabs are generous) 
 
(18) Mass noun subject 
 
       al-maaʔ-u         ʔsaas-u  l-ħayaa 
       the-water-Nom   basis-Nom  the-life 
        (Water is the basis of life) 
 
(19) Proper noun subject 
 
        y-amʃii  ʕaliyy-u-n   li-l-madrasa 
        3-walk     Ali-Nom-N  to-the-school 
         (Ali walks to school) 
 
(20) Bare singular occurring in definite construct state (idˤaafa construction) 
 
  y-anbaħ-u   kalb-u     l-ʤiiraan-i            laylan 
  3-bark-Nom  dog-Nom  the-neighbors-Gen  at night 
   (The neighbors’ dog barks at night) 
 
(21) Bare plural  occurring in definite construct state (iˤdaafa construction) 
 
    y-ataħaddaθ-u  ʔawlaad-u  ʕamm-ii      bi-sˤawt-i-n      xaafit 
    3-speak-Nom      sons-Nom     uncle-my   in-voice-Gen-N  soft 
  (My uncle’s sons speak softly) 
 
All the sentences in (16-21) are generic in that they express a generalization of some kind. For 
example, sentences (16&17) do not talk about particular Arabs, but rather about Arabs in general. 
Similarly, (18) does not relate a property to a particular amount of water, but it gives a property of 
water in general, (19) expresses a fact about how Ali goes to school in general, and this kind of  
interpretation holds for (20&21).  
It is worth noticing that the same kind of NP subjects can occur in episodic sentences as well 
(22); a fact that needs a lot of investigation in order to tease apart generic/no-generic readings of a 
sentence incorporating a grammatically definite NP. Put differently, what avails/blocks a generic/non-
generic reading of a sentence incorporating a definite NP subject? This question is addressed in 
section 4 below.  
(22) a. haaða  l-ʕarabiyy-u    kariim 
    this  the-Arab-Nom  generous 
     (This Arab is generous) 
 
112 
 
        b. haaʔulaaʔi l- lʕarab-u        kuramaaʔ 
  these  the-Arabs-Nom  generous.Pl 
    (These Arabs are generous) 
 
        c. al-maaʔ-u    llaðii ʃarib-tu-hu kaana munʕiʃ 
     the-water-Nom  which drank-1-it was refreshing 
     (The water I drank was refreshing) 
 
        d. haaða ʕaliyy-u-n   y-amʃii  li-l-madrasa 
    this     Ali-Nom-N  3-walk  to-the-school 
      (This is Ali walking to school) 
 
        e. nabaħ-a   kalb-u     l-ʤiiraan-i            laylan 
    barked-3  dog-Nom  the-neighbors-Gen  at night 
  (The neighbors’ dog barked at night) 
 
        f. taħaddaθ-a   ʔawlaad-u  ʕamm-ii     bi-sˤawt-i-n            xaafit-i-n  ʔams   
            spoke-3         sons-Nom  uncle-my   in-voice-Gen-N    soft-Gen-N   yesterday 
       (My uncle’s sons spoke softly yesterday) 
 
However, traditional grammarians and even modern Arab linguists (see, Fassi Fehri 2012, 
chapter 7) claim that unlike English and other languages, MSA allows both indefinite singular and 
bare plural subjects in existential sentences only. This is because these NP forms only express 
existential denotation that semantically contradicts genericity
32
. 
(23) y-alʕab-u     walad-u-n  ʔamaama  bayt-i-hi    
     3-play-Nom  boy-Nom-N  in front of  house-Gen-his 
   (A boy is playing on the street)    (*generic /episodic interpretation) 
 
(24) y-alʕab-u    ʔawalaad-u-n  ʔamaama  bayt-i-him      
     3-play-nom  boys- nom-N      in front of  house-Gen-their 
         (Boys are playing on the street)     (*generic /episodic interpretation) 
 
The only interpretation that (23&24) receive is episodic. The two sentences report accidental playing 
episodes true of existentially calculated boy individuals at a certain time and place. It is noteworthy 
that these two sentences can be rephrased by combining the existential expression θammata ‘there 
is/are’ with no change in meaning in the resulting sentence. These two sentences are incompatible 
with time reference adverbs like haaðihi l-ʔayyaam ‘these days’, which enforce a non-existential 
denotation of the bare NP subjects in (23&24), and promote a habitual reading of the sentences, (see 
chapter 5).  
                                                          
32
 It will be shown that this claim is inaccurate and needs refinement, (see section 6). 
113 
 
Therefore, it seems that MSA, according to the traditional grammarians’ view, allows only 
definite nouns tied to particular individuals to be used in generics, and the presence of indefinite 
nouns blocks the generic reading of a sentence and avails a non-generic reading only.  This analysis, 
though looks simple and straightforward, is problematic as it shows that MSA either lacks 
characterizing sentences- a cross-linguistic semantic phenomenon, or that MSA is peculiar in its 
representation of characterizing sentences. This analysis sets the characterizing sentence structure in 
MSA apart from the semantic representation of characterizing sentences in world languages.  Contra 
to genericity phenomenon in world languages that requires the NP in a characterizing sentence about 
which a generalization is made be semantically indefinite, MSA- according to the traditional view of 
definiteness which invariably classifies an al-N as definite in form and sense- requires that the NP 
must be definite to be incorporated in a characterizing sentence. This asymmetry is investigated 
thoroughly in section (4) below, where arguments are made against both asymmetrical options.  
4. Genericity and the Definite NP in MSA  
The variety of noun phrases that can be used in generic sentences in MSA, characterizing 
sentences in particular, is problematic to genericity investigation. According to the syntactic facts in 
section (3), only definite nouns can be incorporated in sentences expressing a generic reading, and 
indefinite nouns can only be inserted in sentences entertaining a non-generic reading. In order to see 
how problematic this asymmetry is to the semantic representation of characterizing sentences, I will 
brief the traditional view of the interaction between NPs and characterizing sentences in MSA in 
(4.1), and then discuss the semantic essence of a characterizing sentence in (4.2). In (4.3), I will argue 
against the traditional view introduced in (4.1), showing that the semantic representation of 
characterizing sentences in MSA conforms to the semantic representation of characterizing sentences 
introduced in (4.2). 
4.1 Characterizing Sentences in MSA: The Traditional View  
Although genericity has received very little attention in modern Arabic linguistics, the 
commonsense viewpoint is that in general, the different interpretations of NP as generic or existential 
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depend mainly on the overt presence/absence of the definite article al ‘the’. The overt presence of al 
avails generic and existential readings of the NP, in the sense that al-N is either kind-denoting 
expression, generic NP, or object denoting expression, existential NP (Fassi Fehri 2012). The lack of 
al, however, forces an existential interpretation only.  This view is on par with the traditional view of 
simple definites in MSA, which was shown problematic in chapter three. According to this view, NPs 
are dichotomized as definite or indefinite based on the overt presence/absence of al determiner, 
respectively. Fassi Fehri (2012:179) states, “Arabic NP/DP interpretations as generic (Gen) or (only) 
existential (Ex) depend on whether they express overtly the definite determiner or article D, or 
whether they lack such an overt expression of D.” Notice the characterization of the denotation of 
NPs, not sentences, as generic or existential. The contrast is illustrated in (25) and (26), respectively: 
(25) a. y-aʔkul-u      l-ʔasad-u          l-laħm 
  3-eat-Nom   the-lion-Nom   the-meat 
    (The lion eats meat) 
     b. t-aʔkul-u     l-ʔusuud-u  l-laħm 
    3.f-eat-Nom   the-lions-Nom  the-meat 
  (Lions eat meat) 
 
(26) a. y-aʔkul-u        asad-u-n  l-laħm 
  3-eat-Nom   lion-Nom-N   the-meat 
   (A lion is eating meat) 
 
    b. t-aʔkul-u     ʔusuud-u-n  l-laħm 
   3.f-eat-Nom   lions-Nom-N  the-meat 
  (Lions are eating meat) 
 
In (25) both the generic reading, the kind Lion; and the existential reading, some contextually salient 
lion(s), are available. In the generic reading, the property of eating meat is predicated to the Lion 
kind. The existential reading of (25) focuses on uniquely salient lions in the domain of discourse that 
are involved in an episodic eating event at the time of utterance. In (26), however, only an existential 
interpretation of the NPs, and hence the sentences as a whole, are available. The only interpretation 
that can be gleaned is a report of accidental eating event of some lion(s) eating meat at a particular 
time and location. Using a definite NP as a kind-referring expression is felicitous as a kind is 
semantically definite.  
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The same contrast holds with respect to mass nouns. The illustration is in (27) and (28). In the 
examples, nouns with definite al obtain generic- kind-referring-,and existential- object-referring, 
denotations; whereas, bare nouns which lack overt al can only receive existential interpretation.  It is 
noteworthy that number and countability have no bearing on this distinction as is clear from (25&26) 
and (27&28), respectively. 
(27) a. laa      n-astatˤiiʕ-u  l-ʕay ʃ-a  biduuni  l-maaʔ 
    NEG 1.Pl-can-Nom the-living-Acc without  the-water 
(We cannot live without water) 
 
   b. al-ħaliib-u   ɣiðaaʔ-u-n  sˤiħħiy 
   the-milk-Nom  food-Nom-N healthy 
(Milk is a healthy food) 
 
(28) a. ʔ-uriid-u maaʔ-a-n raʤaaʔan 
    1-want-Nom water-Acc-N please 
  (I want water, please!) 
 
   b. ʃaribnaa  ħaliib-a-n  ʔams 
     drank.3.pl    milk-Acc-N yesterday 
(We drank milk yesterday) 
 
Based on the data above, it seems reasonable to generalize, according to the traditional view, 
that the presence of an indefinite NP blocks the generic reading of a sentence and promotes an 
episodic reading as the only available interpretation. The presence of a definite NP, on the other hand, 
gives rise to an ambiguous sentence with two competing interpretations: generic, where the definite 
NP is kind-denoting, and existential, in the sense that the definite NP refers to one unique entity or 
entities salient in the domain of discourse. It should be noticed that the traditional way of determining 
in/definites is purely morphological. However, Fassi Fehri (2012) refines this view about the 
existential reading of bare nouns claiming that some bare nouns can be used only in habituals and 
when-clauses, which he calls modalized contexts, as they provide what he calls sentence binding of 
GEN, provided by the event structure. This is evident from identifying  generic definite NPs as 
denoting kinds only; whereas, a generic object can be expressed by an indefinite (in form) NP in 
habitual and in when-clauses. In his words, “[s]ummarizing the contextual and interpretational 
requirements discussed so far, the following descriptive statements appear to apply to Definite and 
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Indefinite Generics found in Arabic: Kind denoting Gen are expressible only through overtly definite 
DPs, and are likely to be referential arguments (kind names). Object-denoting Gen are expressible 
through various sorts of indefinite DPs, bound (unselectively) by Gen operators; they are necessarily 
quantificational arguments. Gen operators (providing for characterizing environments) are: Habitual 
Aspect, Q-Adverbs, and appropriate Ps.” (P.200). I will, however, set aside the claim about the 
indefinite NP to be discussed in section 7 below, and focus on the one relevant to the definite NP for 
the rest of this section 
The traditional view of determining NPs allowed in generic sentences is problematic. On the 
one hand, it only admits definite NPs in generic sentences,  excluding bare NPs from being inserted in 
generic sentences except in habituals and  modalized contexts where generalizing is over events or 
situations, rather than individuals. On the other hand, due to the received traditional viewpoint that al-
N is semantically definite, the only denotation that a definite NP can receive in a generic sentence is 
kind denotation. This gives the inaccurate impression that either a characterizing sentence is not 
available in MSA, or that contra to the characterizing sentence semantic representation in natural 
languages, MSA is peculiar in realizing a characterizing sentence using a semantically definite NP. In 
the following section, I will briefly discuss the type of generalization a characterizing sentence 
expresses, and the semantic requirements that need to be satisfied by an NP functioning as its subject 
to be allowed in a characterizing sentence. This investigation will show clearly that a characterizing 
sentence is infelicitous with a semantically definite NP; a fact that will be used to argue against 
MSA’s peculiarity of realizing a characterizing sentence using a definite NP in subject argument in 
section (4.3). In addition, it will be shown in that section that MSA entertains characteristic genericity 
phenomenon, and manifests it semantically in accordance to the universal semantic representation of 
characteristic genericity. 
4.2 A Characterizing Sentence: What Kind of Generalization is Expressed? 
By definition, a characterizing sentence reports a generalization over patterns of regularities 
that summarize groups of non-accidental facts, episodes, or state of affairs. Unlike a particular 
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sentence, which expresses a statement about “particular events, properties of particular objects, and 
the like” (Krifka et. al 1995:3), a characterizing sentence expresses a generalization based on 
properties not tied to a particular object or event, but rather to any object or event which satisfies the 
descriptive content of the NP or VP used. Consider the difference between characterizing sentences 
(29) and their particular counterparts (30)
33
. 
(29) a. A graduate student is diligent. 
b. A dog hates cats. 
c. An Italian loves pizza. 
 
(30) a. The graduate student is diligent. 
b. The dog hates cats. 
c. The Italian loves pizza. 
 
The sentences in (29) are true generics; they each report a generalization of some kind. In (a), being 
diligent is reported as a property of graduate students in general, not about a particular, specific 
graduate student. In (b), hating cats is reported as a property of dogs in general. Likewise, the 
sentence in (c) states something about Italians in general, not a particular Italian. However, the 
sentences in (30) are opposite to those in (29) in that they state isolated facts about particular objects. 
This distinction is triggered by the different definite/indefinite NPs used in (29) and (30) respectively. 
A semantically indefinite NP can trigger a generic reading because indefiniteness assumes a 
descriptive characterization true of a variable or place holder that can be fleshed out by any individual 
satisfying the descriptive content of the noun. This is a crucial condition for a sentence reporting a 
generalization over entities or events. If the referent of the NP is definite in the real sense, a 
generalization cannot be made. Krifka et al. (1995: 32) explicitly state this condition as a crucial 
benchmark distinguishing a characterizing sentence from its particular counterpart. They argue that 
“… a generalization expresses that if an entity satisfies certain conditions (or has certain properties) 
A, then it also satisfies certain conditions (or has certain properties) B… [c]haracterizing sentences 
must have at least one variable which is not explicitly tied to some particular object. If this were not 
                                                          
33
 The definite NPs in (29) are non- kind-referring; they refer to definite referents salient in the context. 
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the case, they would merely state that a particular object (as described by the restrictor) has a certain 
property (as described by the matrix, and they could no longer express a ‘generic’ fact.” 
This condition applies also to habitual sentences where a generalization is made about events 
or situations. If the denotation of a predicate is tied to a particular event, rather than to indefinite 
variable events, the sentence can only receive an episodic interpretation. Consider the habituals in 
(31), and their contrasting episodics in (32).  
(31) a. Jill studies hard for finals. 
 b. I eat falafel for breakfast. 
 c. Bill gets scared when he sees a snake. 
 
(32) a. Jill is studying hard for finals. 
  b. I am eating falafel for breakfast. 
  c. Bill got scared when he saw a snake yesterday. 
 
It is worth noticing that only the episodic sentences in (32) are compatible with time reference 
adverbials like now and today which limit the denotation of the predicate to a particular, existential 
event. Adding such adverbials to the sentences in (31) renders them unacceptable. 
It seems that a characterizing sentence requires a semantically indefinite entity or event to 
quantify and generalize over. A semantically definite entity or event blocks the generic reading of a 
sentence, and triggers an episodic reading instead. This crucial semantic condition of a characterizing 
sentence puts the traditional claim that in MSA only definite NPs can be used in generic sentences, 
and that the use of an indefinite NP is limited to existential sentences on the line. On one hand, it sets 
characteristic genericity in MSA from its canonical realization in natural languages. On the other 
hand, it implies that in MSA only a reference to a kind generic can be expressed; whereas, 
characterizing sentences with object denoting subject arguments are non-existent in MSA. The latter 
inference is untenable as speakers of MSA use characterizing sentences widely to express 
generalizations about numerous regularities in the world. Therefore, this outcome is void, and does 
not need further investigation. The other outcome that MSA is peculiar in its semantic mapping of a 
characterization sentence is interesting and is investigated below. 
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4.3 Characteristic Genericity in MSA: Is it Language Peculiar? 
In this section, I will argue against the traditional view that only definite NPs with kind 
denotation are allowed in sentences entertaining a generic reading. My claim is established upon the 
findings of chapter three, where a major, significant distinction is made between grammatical 
definiteness and semantic definiteness. Based on this distinction, I argue that the traditional view is 
confusing these two overlapping phenomena. I agree, to a certain extent, with the traditional view that 
in general characterizing sentences in MSA are expressed with al-Ns, but disagree with its 
characterization of definites and indefinites in MSA based on the presence of the definite article al. 
My claim is that although characterizing sentences in MSA allow al-Ns, these NPs - contras to the 
traditional view – are semantically indefinite. If the incorporated NP is semantically definite, 
however, the only reading available is either reference to a kind
34
, or episodic. Therefore, if we put 
the problematic morphosyntactic way of determining in/definites away, and adopt the semantic 
criteria of determining definites proposed in chapter 3, this implausible semantic mapping of 
characterizing sentences in MSA will evaporate, and everything falls in place. This view is on par 
with the canonical representation of characterizing sentences, which requires that the NP upon which 
a generalization is made must not be tied to a particular, semantically definite object.  
As argued in chapter 3, definiteness, as a semantic phenomenon, is established on at least one 
of the concepts of the definiteness criteria: familiarity, identifiability, and uniqueness. Although the 
definite article is taken by many semanticists as the canonical definite determiner which coalesces 
with a common noun and contributes either uniqueness or familiarity, this grammatical ingredient 
cannot be taken as a necessary and sufficient condition for determining simple in/definites in MSA 
(see section 5 of chapter 3).   
                                                          
34
 I will set reference to a kind genericity aside, to be discussed in (5) below, and focus on characterizing 
sentences in this section. 
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The following section focuses on the canonical definite NP, al-N in MSA, and tries to 
scrutinize its syntactic and semantic properties, and how it fits in and contributes to generic sentences, 
characterizing sentences in particular. 
4.3.1 Characterizing Sentences and the Definite NP with al Determiner   
The basis of my claim that characterizing sentences in MSA conform to the universal 
semantic structure of characterizing sentences is that correctly identifying al-N as semantically 
definite or indefinite would resolve the asymmetry created by the traditional view’s implausible 
outcome that characterizing sentences are idiosyncratic, different from the canonical semantic 
structure of a characterizing sentence. Put differently, we need to investigate the inter-sentence 
interaction between al-N and other constituents in the sentence- the predicate in particular, and the 
intra-sentence interaction between the sentence and its pragmatic discourse; i.e., the sentence’s 
semantic and pragmatic sides. By doing so, the goal is to accurately determine the al-N used in a 
sentence as semantically definite, hence identifying the sentence as a particular sentence, or 
semantically indefinite, hence identifying the sentence as a characterizing sentence. Both the 
predicate and the discourse have strong bearing on determining the al-N as semantically 
indefinite/definite, and hence interpreting the sentence as a whole as generic/non-generic, 
respectively. 
An interesting question to be addressed here is whether MSA formally encodes the two 
competing meanings of the grammatically definite NPs, generic
35
 – quantificational, and existential – 
referential, and whether the type of predicate incorporated has some bearing on the ultimate 
interpretation of the sentence, generic or non-generic. Predicates, according to Carlson 1977, are 
classified into levels based on the type of properties they denote. Carlson distinguishes between three 
types of predicates, which he dubbed Stage-level predicates, Individual-level predicates, and Kind-
level predicates, abbreviated as S-level, I-level, and K-level predicates, respectively. Since Carlson’s 
                                                          
35
 Generic here means that the noun is semantically indefinite- denoting a variable individual to which the 
descriptive content of the noun applies - and can be used in a characterizing sentence; it does not indicate that it 
is a kind-referring NP. 
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proposal, the syntactic and semantic ramifications of this distinction have been a lively topic among 
semanticists (e.g. Asher 2010; Chierchia 1995; Diesing 1988, 1992; Kratzer 1995). S-level predicates 
denote properties that are ephemeral, transient, episodic, and mostly spatio-temporally bounded like 
sleep, be in the bathroom, scratch, etc. I- level predicates, however, are construed to express 
properties of individuals that are permanent and stable in a sense. As Carlson (1977) argues, there are 
three basic constructions of I-level predicates: 
(33) a. Stative VPs, like hate, know, love, believe, own, etc. 
     b. Predicative NPs, like be a student, be an animal, be a woman, be mammals, etc. 
     c. Adjectives like smart, tall, white, transparent, etc. (vs. angry, sad, available, busy, etc.) 
 
Kind-level predicates denote properties that apply to kinds, species, or ‘genus’ only, not any instance 
or groups of instances of a kind. Examples of K-level predicates are not as many as S-level or I-level 
predicates, but they can be easily cited; widespread, extinct, die out, common, rare are canonical 
examples.  
The differentiation made in Carlson’s (1977), and maybe before, between S-level and I-level 
predicates contributes significantly to the explanation of some syntactic asymmetries found in 
structures incorporating these two predicate types. Many semanticists (e.g. Carlson 1997; Kratzer 
1995; Milsark 1974, 1977) have observed that S-level predicates are compatible with some structures, 
like temporal adverbials, locatives, perception sentences and there-sentences; whereas,  I-level 
predicates are not. In addition, Carlson (1977) argues that bare plurals in English can have two 
different interpretations, existential and generic. The type of interpretation depends on the associated 
predicate; I-level predicates, he asserts, give rise to a generic interpretation, but S-level predicates 
give rise to an existential interpretation. We will investigate the effect of the predicate’s level on the 
ultimate interpretation of sentences combining grammatically definite NPs functioning as arguments 
in MSA, and whether either S-level or I-level predicates trigger, block, or give rise to generic/non-
generic interpretation of the sentence. These points are furnished by the following sets of data in 
(34&35). 
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(34) a. al-bint-u  t-aɣsil-u      sˤ-sˤuħuun-a      munðu  saaʕat-i-n     fii      l-matˤbax       
      the-girl-Nom 3.f-wash-Nom     the-dishes-Acc  since    an hour-Gen- N  in    the-kitchen 
(The girl has been doing the dishes in the kitchen since an hour) 
 
b. t-atanaawal-u    n-niswat-u   tˤaʕaam-a   l-ʔiftˤaar-i             fii     
    3.f-eat-Nom the-women-Nom   food-Acc     the-breakfast-Gen   in       
     sˤ-sˤaalat-i   haaðaa  sˤ-sˤabaaħ 
 the-living room-Gen   this  the-morning  
 (The women are eating breakfast in the living room this morning) 
 
        c. y-aʃrab-u  ʃ-ʃurtˤiyy-u              l-maaʔ-a               lʔaan 
            3-drink-Nom   the-policeman-Nom the-water-Acc     now 
 (The policeman is drinking water now) 
 
        d. ʔunðˤur   yaa   bunay,  al-baqara-t-u   fi l-ħaðˤiira 
look        O      sonny,  the-cow-f-Nom in the-barn 
 (Look O sonny, the cow is in the barn) 
 
   e. al-kitaab-u ʕalaa r-raff-i,  wadˤaʕ-tu-hu  qabla  saaʕa 
 the-book-Nom on the-shelf-Gen     put-1-it before   an hour 
 (The book is on the shelf; I put it (there) an hour ago) 
  
The sentences in (34) can only receive existential or episodic interpretations, in which the NPs used 
as subject arguments denote unique individuals salient in the domain of context. Scrutiny of the 
predicates used in the sentences reveals that all of these predicates are S-level predicates which 
predicate properties true of spatiotemporal slices of individuals, as Carlson (1977) meta-cognitively 
defines stages of individuals. Notice that the predicates are compatible with temporal adverbials; 
munðu saaʕat-i-n ‘since an hour’, haaðaa sˤ-sˤabaaħ ‘this morning’, lʔaan ‘now’, qabla saaʕa ‘an 
hour ago’; locatives, fii l-matˤbax ‘in the kitchen’, fii sˤ-sˤaalat-i ‘in the living room’; and perception 
verbs like ʔunðˤr ‘look’. These are tests employed in the literature to identify predicates denoting 
stage-level properties. As well established in genericity literature, generic sentences do not express 
spatiotemporally bounded propositions; the propositions expressed, however, are taken to be true with 
no restrictions on time, place, or number of individuals. Thus, it seems that the presence of S-level 
predicates blocks genericity, and gives rise to an existential interpretation of the definite NP, and 
hence the whole sentence. This generalization conforms to the generalization made by Carlson (1977) 
regarding the interpretation of bare plurals, bare mass, and the definite singular in English when are 
associated with S-level predicates.  
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I turn now to consider another set of data, and see the effect of incorporating I-level 
predicates on the interpretation of the grammatically definite NP and the sentence as a whole. 
Consider the data in (35). 
(35) a. ar-raʤul-u  ʃ-ʃarqiyy-u  ɣayuur 
               the-man-Nom  the-eastern-Nom jealous 
         (The/A Middle Eastern man is jealous) 
 
  b. y-aʕrif-u  l-muʕallim-u   masʔuuliyyaat-i-hi  
   3-know-Nom the-teacher-Nom responsibilities-Acc-his  
    (The/A teacher knows his responsibilities) 
  c. al-kalb-u  ðakiyy 
    the-dog-Nom  intelligent 
    (The/A dog is intelligent) 
   
  d. t-uħibb-u  l-bint-u  ʔumm-a-haa 
      3.f-love-Nom the-girl-Nom mother-Acc-her 
         (The/A girl loves her mother) 
 
  e. al-malika-t-u   maɣruura 
              the-queen-f-Nom arrogant-f 
    (The/A queen is arrogant) 
 
  f. t-aʕiiʃ-u  l-bint-u            maʕa  ʕaaʔila-t-i-haa   fi   l-ʔurdunn 
             3.f-live-Nom the-girl-Nom   with family-f-Gen-her in   the-Jordan 
   (The/A (unmarried) girl lives with her family in Jordan) 
 
The sentences in (35) are ambiguous between generic/nongeneric readings, though the generic 
reading is naturally more salient.  A quick look at the sentences shows that the predicates used are all 
I-level predicates; note that inserting a spatiotemporal expression or a perception verb in any of the 
sentences renders it unacceptable, see (36) for the effect of such insertion on some of the sentences in 
(35). 
(36) a*ar-raʤul-u ʃ-ʃarqiyy-u  ɣayuur-u-n           fii    l-matˤbax/l-yawm 
  the-man-Nom  the-eastern-Nom     jealous-Nom-N   in     the-kitchen/today 
    (The/A Middle Eastern man is jealous in the kitchen/today) 
 
b.*al-kalb-u  ðakiyy-u-n   fii  l-ħadiiqa/lʔaan 
 the-dog-Nom  intelligent-Nom-N in   the-park/now 
    (The dog is intelligent in the park/now) 
   
c.*ʔunðˤur   yaa   bunay,   t-uħibb-u    l-bint-u ʔumm-a-haa 
look        O       sonny,  3.f-love-Nom    the-girl-Nom mother-Acc-her 
   (Look O sonny, the/a girl loves her mother) 
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This indicates that, in sentences uttered out of the blue, associating I-level predicates with al-
Ns triggers a generic reading of sentences, without blocking the possibility that such sentences can be 
interpreted existentially depending on the context. The sentence in (35.a), for instance, entertains a 
generic interpretation where the Middle Eastern men, in general, has the property of being jealous, 
this reading can be true when uttered out of the blue with little or no contextual support, in the sense 
that this sentence takes the whole world as its situation. Another episodic interpretation is available; 
according to which a unique, context-dependent Middle Eastern man is reported to hold the property 
of being jealous. The same ambiguous reading holds for the other sentences in (35).  Therefore, it 
seems that in pure semantic analysis, such construction promotes the generic reading, and whatever 
weakens this reading comes from the pragmatic side of the sentence, the context in particular, which 
helps determining the semantic in/definiteness status of the al-Ns used, and hence the interpretation of 
the sentence as a whole. 
A crucial question about the source of ambiguity in sentences associating definite NPs and I-
level predicates poses itself here. More explicitly, what is the source of this ambiguity? A 
straightforward answer is the denotation of the definite NP; whether it denotes a semantically definite 
or indefinite referent. The former forces an episodic interpretation, while the latter avails a generic 
interpretation. Notice that a generic sentence reports a generalization over a group of individuals, 
events, state of affairs, or facts, not a particular instance of these. Therefore, in order to glean the 
exact interpretation of a sentence incorporating a definite NP and an I-level predicate, we need to 
investigate the exact denotation of the definite NP used. In other words, is this definite NP 
semantically definite, denoting a unique, identifiable, or familiar referent, or the reversed, in this case 
denoting an indefinite referent. This analysis recalls the crucial distinction made in chapter three 
between grammatically definite NP and semantically definite NP. This distinction has strong bearing 
on our interpretation of sentences with definite NPs as generic or non-generic. The context provided 
plays a major role in the determination of a grammatically definite NP as definite or indefinite in the 
real sense. To see this, I will sharpen the intended interpretation of the sentences by providing 
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contexts for the data in (35) that limit the denotation of the NPs to indefinite referents, and see the 
kind of interpretation these sentences avail. Later, I will provide different contexts to the same data 
that limit the denotation of the NPs to semantically definite referents, and see which reading, 
generic/non-generic, the sentences provide. Consider the data in (35) repeated in (37) with indefinite 
environments. 
(37) a. [A Jordanian student at an American school talking to her Jordanian roommate about her 
future husband, and that he must be from the Middle East. The other friend wants to know why 
her friend is so strict in this regard, though a woman can find a good husband from outside the 
Middle East. The student answers:] 
  
 ar-raʤul-u  ʃ-ʃarqiyy-u  ɣayuur 
 the-man-Nom  the-eastern-Nom jealous 
 (A Middle Eastern man is jealous) 
 
b. [In a press conference on the Teacher Day in Jordan, The minister of education expresses    his 
trust in teachers, and that they know their job duties and responsibilities] 
 
 y-aʕrif-u   l-muʕallim-u   masʔuuliyyaat-i-hi  
 3-know-Nom  the-teacher-Nom responsibilities-Acc-his  
 (A teacher knows his responsibilities) 
 
c. [A father is asking his little daughter which pet she wants as a birthday present and why. The 
girl says she wants an intelligent animal, and] 
 
 al-kalb-u  ðakiyy 
 the-dog-Nom  intelligent 
  (A dog is intelligent)   
 
   d. [A professor discussing with his students why girls are so close to their mothers] 
 
 t-uħibb-u   l-bint-u  ʔumm-a-haa 
 3.f-love-Nom  the-girl-Nom mother-Acc-her 
 (A girl loves her mother) 
 
e. [In a psychology class in an Egyptian school, students are discussing the effect of power on 
people’s personalities; they are listing what they think general attributes of a queen. One student 
says] 
 
 al-malika-t-u   maɣruura 
 the-queen-f-Nom arrogant-f 
 (A queen is arrogant) 
 
f. [In a sociology class, A professor is telling her students that unlike unmarried girls in the 
West who often leave their parents’ house at 18, in Jordan] 
 t-aʕiiʃ-u     l-bint-u  maʕa  ʕaaʔila-t-i-haa   fi   l-ʔurdunn 
 3.f-live-Nom    the-girl-Nom with family-f-Gen-her in   the-Jordan 
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 (A (unmarried) girl lives with her family in Jordan) 
 
The access to the right interpretation of the sentences in (37), generic or non-generic, is the 
denotation of the al-Ns used, whether they are semantically definite or indefinite. According to the 
definiteness criteria, al-N is definite if it satisfies at least one of its concepts. More precisely, an NP 
whose referent is familiar, identifiable, or unique is definite, and indefinite otherwise. None of the al-
Ns in (37) seems to be definite on the definiteness criteria. In (a), for example, the al-N ar-raʤul ʃ-
ʃarqiyy ‘the Middle Eastern Man’ does not denote a familiar, identifiable, or unique referent. Notice 
that both of them are talking about a possible husband in the future, not about an actual husband in 
the present, or a man proposing to the speaker that the hearer is familiar with. The right denotation of 
ar-raʤul ʃ-ʃarqiyy ‘the Middle Eastern Man’ is any individual out of the class of individuals to which 
the descriptive content of the NP applies, the Middle Eastern man class.  Support for this analysis 
comes from the context provided, where the hearer wonders why her friend is so strict about the 
origin of her future husband, though she can find a good husband even from a different origin. If both 
interlocutors are referring to a familiar, identifiable, or unique referent, this wonder would be out of 
context and not acceptable, or irrelevant. Similarly, the al-N in (b) does not denote a definite referent. 
l-muʕallim ‘the teacher’ the minister mentioning does not refer to a definite referent in the real sense. 
The minister is delivering a speech commemorating the Teacher Day, so nothing in the context or in 
the sentence indicates that the minister is referring to a particular definite teacher, but rather to any 
individual to which the descriptive content of l-muʕallim ‘the teacher’ is true. Likewise, the al-N al-
kalb ‘the dog’ in (c) refers to any dog as being intelligent, not to a particular definite dog known to 
both interlocutors. In (d), al-N l-bint ‘the girl’ is semantically indefinite. Notice that the context 
provided is a class discussing a social phenomenon of girls being very close to their mothers, not a 
specific definite case of a girl who happens to love her mother. The referent of l-bint ‘the girl’ being 
semantically indefinite is felicitous in this class context. The al-N al-malika ’the queen’ in (e) is also 
semantically indefinite; nothing in the context indicates that a unique, familiar, or identifiable queen 
is referred to, but rather the opposite. Notice that the class is discussing the general attributes of a 
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queen in general, not a particular queen. It is worth mentioning that there is no queen in Egypt, and if 
reference were made to a particular queen, this queen should be identified whether she is the queen of 
Jordan, Morocco, Britain, or any other country that has a monarchy. This indefinite denotation holds 
for the al-N in (f), where reference is not made to a particular Jordanian girl, but rather to any 
Jordanian girl. This analysis is supported by the context provided, where a class is discussing women 
status in different countries and cultures. The property of living with one’s family is true of any 
Jordanian girl, not of a particular one only. It seems that all al-Ns in (37) are indefinite in sense, 
though they are definite in form.  
In sum, the NPs in (37) behave not like definite NPs in English, but rather as indefinite NPs, 
in the sense that they do not naturally denote unique, identifiable, or familiar groups of individuals, 
but rather the reversed, (see chapter 3). They denote functions that take situations and return sets of 
individuals. Informally,  l-muʕallim  and al-kalb in (37. b&c) denote the set of all individuals which 
are muʕallim ‘teacher’ , and the set of all individuals which are kalb ‘dog’ in any given situation, 
respectively. In other words, such definite NPs are definite in form but indefinite in sense, in that they 
denote not familiar, identifiable, or unique entities, but rather sets of individuals to which the content 
of the nouns used apply. This analysis contradicts the traditional dichotomy of NPs in MSA which 
states that definites and indefinites are determined based on the presence/absence of a definite 
determiner like the article al ‘the’. 
 I now return to the interpretation of the sentences in (37). No sentence in (37) reports a single 
fact, a random event, or an accidental state of affair of a particular individual salient in the context 
domain. It is clear that the sentences in (37) report generalizations true of any individuals to which the 
descriptive contents of the al-Ns apply. The sentence in (a), for example, says that in general, any 
individual who is Middle Eastern man has the property in the matrix, be jealous. This generalization 
is not true of a particular Middle Eastern man known to both interlocutors, but is true of Middle 
Eastern men generally. The sentence in (b) says that in general, an individual who is a teacher is an 
individual who knows his/her duties and responsibilities. In (c), a generalization is made about any 
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individual dog as being intelligent. The sentence in (d) expresses a generalization about queen 
individuals being generally arrogant. In (e), a generalization is made about girls stating that in general 
an individual who is a girl is such that that individual loves her mother. Similarly, (f) expresses a 
generalization about Jordanian girls. It says that in general a Jordanian girl individual is such that she 
lives with her parents before marriage. These sentences express true generalizations about non-
particular members of classes to which the descriptive content of the NPs apply. What forces a 
generic interpretation of these sentences as generic only is the I-level predicates and the denotation of 
the al-Ns incorporated as not referring to familiar, identifiable, or unique individuals, but rather the 
reversed. This indefinite denotation avails the generic reading of the sentences since generics report 
regularities true of individuals, events, state of affairs, or facts, not instances of these. This shows how 
crucial identifying true definites in MSA is.  
It is worth mentioning that all the sentences in (37) can be rephrased by inserting the 
adverbial phrase biʃakil ʕaam ‘in general’ with no or slight change in meaning in the resulting 
sentence. Krifka et al. (1995) suggest using this test as a tool for distinguishing characterizing 
sentences from particular sentences. According to this test, if a sentence is combined with this adverb 
or similar adverbs like typically or usually, with no or slight change in meaning in the rephrasing 
sentence, the original sentence is characterizing. 
 However, sentences combining definite NPs in form and sense and I-level predicates, or S-
level predicates, avail a non-generic reading only. Put differently, the use of semantically definite al-
N forces an episodic reading as the only acceptable interpretation of the sentence. This is the kind of 
reading often gleaned from sentences reporting isolated facts, events, or states of affair about 
particular, context salient individuals. To see this, the sentences in (35) are repeated in (38) with 
contexts limiting the denotation of the NPs to definite referents.  
(38) a. [On their way home, and after having dinner in their new Middle Eastern classmate’s house,  
one of the students made an observation about the Middle Eastern man’s wife not shaking  
hands with them. One of the students, who has known the Middle Eastern man for a year said]  
 
ar-raʤul-u  ʃ-ʃarqiyy-u  ɣayuur 
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the-man-Nom  the-eastern-Nom jealous 
(The Middle Eastern man is jealous) 
 
b. [A school principle trying to calm down a parent who is complaining about his son’s math 
teacher for not grading homework] 
 
y-aʕrif-u  l-muʕallim-u   masʔuuliyyaat-i-hi  
3-know-Nom the-teacher-Nom responsibilities-Acc-his  
(The teacher knows his responsibilities) 
 
c. [A father asking his daughter about what she likes most about the new dog he brought her as  
a birthday present] 
 
al-kalb-u  ðakiyy 
the-dog-Nom  intelligent 
(The dog is intelligent)   
 
d. [A father explaining to his friend why he decided to give full custody of his only daughter to 
her mother] 
 
t-uħibb-u  l-bint-u  ʔumm-a-haa 
3.f-love-Nom the-girl-Nom mother-Acc-her 
(The girl loves her mother) 
 
e. [A woman whispering to her friend while attending an opening ceremony of the 32
nd
  
International Arab Youth Conference in the rose-red city of Petra  under the patronage of 
queen Noor] 
 
al-malika-t-u   maɣruura 
the-queen-f-Nom arrogant-f 
(The queen is arrogant) 
 
f. [A Jordanian girl, who was working in a bank in Saudi Arabia, has resigned and returned to 
Jordan. Her supervisor, who was on a 2-year leave without pay, asked another Jordanian 
employee if she knows anything about that Jordanian girl. The Jordanian employee says] 
 
 t-aʕiiʃ-u l-bint-u  maʕa  ʕaaʔila-t-i-haa   fi   l-ʔurdunn 
 3.f-live-Nom    the-girl-Nom with family-f-Gen-her in   the-Jordan 
 (The (unmarried) girl lives with her family in Jordan) 
 
The al-Ns in (38) are definite in form and sense, in that they refer to definite referents in the 
real sense. In (a), for example, ar-raʤul-u ʃ-ʃarqiyy-u ‘the Eastern man’ denotes a semantically 
definite referent as it satisfies the familiarity condition of the definiteness criteria. It refers to a 
particular individual interlocutors are familiar with from assumed shared knowledge of the referent of 
the NP. The speaker by using al-N here intends to signal to the hearer(s) that he refers to that 
particular Eastern man they are familiar with. Likewise, the al-N in (b) refers to a semantically 
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definite muʕallim ‘teacher’ referent. Reference is successful here because the NP l-muʕallim ‘the-
teacher’ has been previously mentioned in the discourse. Therefore, the speaker by using l-muʕallim 
‘the-teacher’ wants to indicate to the hearer that this teacher is co-referential with the teacher 
mentioned before, and now is familiar to both interlocutors through anaphoric familiarity. Similarly, 
in (c) successful reference of the use of al-N al-kalb ‘the dog’ is due to anaphoric familiarity. The NP 
al-kalb ‘the dog’ refers to a particular dog known to the speaker and the hearer. The NP al-bint ‘the 
girl’ in (d) is semantically definite as it denotes a familiar individual bint ‘girl’ to both interlocutors. 
The referent of al-bint ‘the girl’ is known to the speaker and the hearer based on shared knowledge, or 
uniqueness account because the hearer knows that the speaker has one daughter only, so she is unique 
context-dependently. In (e), the al-N al-malika ‘the queen’ denotes a definite referent that is familiar 
to interlocutors from a physical situation. The queen is present in the visible situation in which the 
interlocutors are. Lastly, the NP al-bint ‘the girl’ in (f) denotes a semantically definite referent known 
to the speaker and the hearer from both shared knowledge and anaphoric familiarity.  
As expected, the sentences in (38) are non-generic. All sentences report isolated or accidental 
facts and state of affairs true of particular individuals. No regularity is reported in any of the 
sentences. To see this, notice that unlike the sentences in (37), which avail generic interpretations 
only, the sentences in (38) accept inserting personal demonstratives like haaðaa ‘this’, haaðihi ‘this.f’ 
with very slight change in meaning. The presence of such demonstratives enforces an episodic 
reading of the sentence. Consider some of the sentences in (38) repeated in (39) with demonstratives 
incorporated. 
(39) a. [A school principle trying to calm down a parent, who is complaining about his son’s math 
teacher for not grading homework] 
 
 y-aʕrif-u  ðaalika  l-muʕallim-u   masʔuuliyyaat-i-hi  
 3-know-Nom that  the-teacher-Nom responsibilities-Acc-his  
 (That teacher knows his responsibilities) 
 
b. [A father asking his daughter about what she likes most about the new dog he brought her as 
birthday present] 
 
haaðaa   al-kalb-u ðakiyy 
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this   the-dog-Nom intelligent 
(This dog is intelligent)   
 
c. [A father explaining to his friend why he decided to give full custody of his only daughter to 
her mother] 
 
t-uħibb-u  haaðihi  l-bint-u  ʔumm-a-haa 
3.f-love-Nom this.f  the-girl-Nom mother-Acc-her 
(This girl loves her mother) 
 
d. [A woman whispering to her friend while attending an opening ceremony of the 32
nd
  
International Arab Youth Conference in the rose-red city of Petra  under the patronage of queen 
Noor] 
 
haaðihi  al-malika-t-u   maɣruur-a 
this.f  the-queen-f-Nom arrogant-f 
(This queen is arrogant) 
 
However, inserting demonstratives in the sentences in (37) with the same contexts provided would 
not only change the meaning radically, but also render these sentences infelicitous. Consider (40). 
(40) a. [In a press conference on the Teacher Day in Jordan, The minister of education expresses his 
trust in teachers, and that they know their job duties and responsibilities] 
 
?y-aʕrif-u   haaða/ ðaalika  l-muʕallim-u   masʔuuliyyaat-i-hi  
  3.know-Nom    this/that  the-teacher-Nom responsibilities-Acc-his  
  (This/that teacher knows his responsibilities) 
 
b. [A father is asking his little daughter about which pet she wants as a birthday present and 
why. The girl says she wants an intelligent animal, and] 
 
?haaðaa al-kalb-u ðakiyy 
  this  the-dog-Nom intelligent 
  (This dog is intelligent)   
 
     c. [A professor discussing why girls are so close to their mothers] 
 
?t-uħibb-u   haaðihi/tilka  l-bint-u  ʔumm-a-haa 
  3.f-love-Nom  this.f/that.f  the-girl-Nom mother-Acc-her 
  (This/that girl loves her mother) 
 
d. [In a psychology class in an Egyptian school, students are discussing the effect of power on 
people’s personalities; they are listing what they think general attributes of a queen. One 
student says] 
 
?haaðihi/tilka  al-malika-t-u   maɣruur-a 
  this.f/that.f the-queen-f-Nom arrogant-f 
  (This/that queen is arrogant) 
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e. [In a sociology class, A professor is telling her students that unlike unmarried girls in the 
west who often leave their parents’ house at 18, in Jordan] 
 
?t-aʕiiʃ-u haaðihi   l-bint-u  maʕa  ʕaaʔila-t-i-haa   fi   l-ʔurdunn 
  3.f-live-Nom this          the-girl-Nom with    family-f-Gen-her  in   the-Jordan 
  (This (unmarried) girl lives with her family in Jordan)    
  
In chapter 3, a clear distinction between the syntactic status of definite NPs and their 
semantic denotation was made. Syntactically speaking, the definite article al does not mark 
definiteness exclusively, but serves, among other functions, as a syntactic marker to license NPs to 
occur in argument position, a characteristic MSA shares with many other languages which prohibit 
bare NPs from being arguments
36
, like Spanish (Laca 1990). The semantic denotation of the definite 
NP in MSA, however, is ambiguous between a definite reading, object/kind-referring NP, and an 
definite reading, quantificational NP. More to the point, the definite article in MSA may be used with 
semantically indefinite NPs. This explains the English translations given in (35). Disambiguating 
these three readings depends mainly on the context and other constituents of the sentence such as the 
predicate.  
In sum, it seems that associating an S-level predicate with a definite NP avails an existential 
reading of the NP, and hence an episodic interpretation of the sentence as the only acceptable 
interpretation. Incorporating an l-level predicate in the same syntactic environment, however, yields 
in an ambiguous interpretation between generic and nongeneric readings. This ambiguity can be 
explicated if the right denotation of the grammatically definite NP used is obtained. More precisely, if 
the definite NP is semantically indefinite, the only reading that the sentence avails is generic, in 
which a generalization is reported about an individual-variable supplied by the semantically indefinite 
NP. If the grammatically definite NP, however, is semantically definite, the only reading the sentence 
avails is existential, in which an isolated property is true of a particular, contextually salient 
individual.  
                                                          
36
 This generalization needs some refinement since in MSA bare NPs can occur as arguments in a number of 
syntactic structures, (see section 6). 
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This analysis clearly shows that the semantic representation of characterizing sentences in 
MSA is not language peculiar, but rather complies with the semantic architecture of a characterizing 
sentence in natural languages. According to this architecture, a characterizing sentence reports 
regularity over individuals through an individual variable provided by a semantically indefinite NP 
(see e.g. Diesing 1992, Heim 1982, Krifka et al.1995, among others), regardless of the grammatical 
definiteness status of that NP which can be realized variably in different languages (Lyons 1999). 
5 Reference to a Kind and the Definite NP in MSA  
Prasada (2012) argues that a remarkable fact about human cognition is that though we see a 
limited number of particular individuals, we are able to generalize, characterize, and speak about 
kinds or species based on these individuals. We are able to use nominal phrases to talk systematically 
about kinds and specimens of kinds. This furnishes important syntactic and semantic questions 
pertaining to the peculiarities of nominal phrases that allow us to do so. More precisely, what is it that 
a nominal expression exhibits that gives rise to this double faceted use? What is the role of the other 
sentence constituents, the predicate in particular, which help both the speaker and the hearer pick out 
the intended meaning of the nominal expression used? Languages seem to syntactically encode kind-
denoting nominal expressions, but they do so variably. A characteristic property of the genericity 
phenomenon, both characterizing sentences and reference to kind sentences, is that realizing 
genericity linguistically is often not straightforward. Put differently, natural languages do not seem to 
employ specific expressions to unequivocally mark generic sentences
37
. In English, for example, the 
linguistic realization of kind-denoting NPs takes more than one nominal form, like the definite 
singular count nouns, bare plural count nouns, and bare mass nouns (Krifka et al. 1995). Spanish, 
unlike English, does not allow bare plural NPs to be generic, and restricts kind-referring expressions 
to definite NPs, singular and plural. Russian, Japanese, Chinese, and Turkish do not grammaticalize 
definiteness since they have no article system, and instead employ bare NPs to realize kind reference 
(Borik and Espinal 2012; Snape et al. 2009). In these languages, the bare NP is ambiguous in four 
                                                          
37
 See Chierchia (1998) for a detailed study of cross-linguistic variation in realizing reference to kind. 
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ways. It can be interpreted as definite, indefinite, kind-referring, or object-referring. To determine the 
exact denotation of a bare NP, speakers resort to pragmatics, or other morphosyntactic tools, like 
position in the sentence, number, morphemes with article-like functions as demonstratives, and 
quantifiers. 
 Though it is well-known that MSA does not allow bare NPs to be generic since it restricts 
their distribution in argument position, MSA like many other languages, does not seem to dedicate a 
specific NP form to formally encode kind reference.  The grammatically definite NP, singular and 
plural, can be used as kind-denoting nominal expression. 
(41) a. ad-daynaasˤuur-u   ħayawaan-un  munqaridˤ 
             the-dinosaur-Nom     animal-Nom    extinct  
          (The dinosaur is extinct) 
 
        b. ad-daynaasˤuuraat-u     ħayawaanaat-u-n  munqaridˤa 
        the-dinosaurs-Nom        animals-Nom-N      extinct  
        (Dinosaurs are extinct) 
 
(42) [In a class about the history of elephants in the United states, the professor  asks students about 
the date elephants arrived in USA, one students answered (a), and another (b)] 
 
a. wasˤal-a   l-fiil-u     ʔilaa  ʔamriikaa  ʕaam-a  1796 
               arrived-3     the-elephant-Nom  to  America year-Acc 1796 
             (The elephant arrived in the Unites States in 1796) 
 
          b. wasˤal-at      l-fiyala-t-u    ʔilaa  ʔamriikaa   ʕaam-a  1796 
               arrived-3.f the-elephants-f-Nom  to   America   year-Acc  1796 
              (Elephants arrived in the Unites States in 1796) 
 
The NP subjects in (41&42) are generic NPs; they do not denote an individual or groups of 
individuals, but rather a species or genus. This can be explicated if we examine the predicates 
incorporated in the sentences. In (41) the predicate associated, munqaridˤ ‘extinct’, is unanimously 
classified as K-level predicate. It is semantically and logically implausible to construe it holding for 
an individual or groups of individuals; only a species becomes extinct, not a specimen of that species. 
This type of predicates report properties which are true of a species or a kind only, hence s-selecting 
kind-denoting NPs. Since many semanticists use these predicates as a diagnostic test for the 
classification of generics into reference to a kind genericity and characterizing sentences (see Borik 
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and Espinal 2012, Carlson 1995, Krifka 1987, Krifka et al. 1995, among others), it is plausible to 
interpret the NP subjects in (41) as kind-referring NPs. The predicate in (42), wasˤal ‘arrived’, 
however, is not a K-level predicate. In fact, it is an S-level predicate. Therefore, what makes speakers 
of the language under examination interpret the subject definite NPs in these sentences as kind-
denoting. An answer might be related to the definite NP itself, being idiosyncratic in the language; 
i.e., MSA invariably uses this NP form as a generic NP. This claim, however, can be easily countered 
by noticing that the definite NP, singular and plural, can be used in sentences that unambiguously 
express episodic propositions (43). 
(43) a. haaða    l-fiil-u    y-abduu  mutʕab 
     this    the-elephant-Nom 3-seem   tired 
    (This elephant seems tired) 
 
     b. tilka l-fiyalat-u   t-aqtarib-u   min-naa 
    those the-elephants-Nom 3.f-approach-Nom from-us 
    (Those elephants are approaching us) 
  
A more plausible answer can be constructed if we look at the tense used in the sentences in 
(42). The tense of these sentences is past. This becomes highly significant if we observe that in MSA 
all characterizing sentences, with object-referring subjects, are stated in the present tense, and using 
the past tense invalidates the generic interpretation and forces an episodic interpretation instead 
(44)
38
. In reference to kind generics and characterizing sentences incorporating kind-referring NP 
subjcts, however, both present and past tenses can be used with no effect on the genericity expressed. 
It is worth noticing that both sentences in (42) can receive an episodic reading, where a particular, 
contextually salient elephant in (a), and elephants in (b), arrived in the United States in 1796. 
However, the scenario provided excludes the object denotation of the NP subjects, and entertains kind 
denotation as the only acceptable interpretation.  
(44) a. an-numuur-u   t-aʔkul-u/*ʔakal-at  l-laħm 
  the-tigers-Nom 3.f-eat-Nom/ate-3.f the-meat 
   (Tigers eat/ate meat) 
 
                                                          
38
 The asterisk in the given examples indicates that the sentence no longer expresses a generalization, and can 
only receive an episodic interpretation. 
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        b. tamʃii/*maʃ-at   manaal-u       ʔilaa  l-madrasat-i       fi sˤ- sˤabaaħ 
3.f-walk/walked-3.f     Manal-Nom    to    the-school-Gen  in  the-morning 
  (Manal walks/walked to school in the morning) 
 
In addition to past tense being compatible with reference to a kind genericity in MSA, 
reference to kind generics and habituals seem compatible with S-level predicates. Characterizing 
sentences, however, do not allow S-level predicates. This can be explained if we observe that 
reference to  kind sentences are intended to establish the NP as denoting a kind or species, and thus 
such sentences can tolerate S-level predicates as long as the NP used is generic. In other words, the 
role played by the predicate is peripheral compared to the NP. Habitual sentences, however, 
generalize over sums of events that can be extracted from S-level predicates that have been changed 
into stative predicates through the regularity expressed, and hence such predicates function in a way 
similar to I-level predicates. Therefore, it seems that S-level predicates block genericity in 
characterizing sentences, but allow it in both reference to kind sentences and habituals. These 
asymmetries confirm a claim made in Krifka et al. (1995: 63) that unlike characteristic genericity, 
which is gleaned from the collaboration of all constituents in a sentence, reference to a kind genericity 
is a phenomenon “tied to the NPs in question and not to the sentences as a whole.”  
Although MSA refrains from using bare NPs as generic NPs, and employs definite in form 
NPs as a medium to express reference to a kind genericity, not any definite NP is qualified to do so. 
The syntactic status must be coupled with a special semantic privilege for a definite NP to be kind-
referring expression. Semantically speaking, natural languages appear to establish kind reading of a 
nominal expression only if there is an inherent characteristic property obtained by the referent 
denoted by the nominal expression; “the noun or complex nominal constituent must be semantically 
connected with a “well-established kind” to which the noun phrase then can refer.” (Krifka et al. 
1995: 11) 
This crucial criterion is based on a connection between a kind and a characteristic property. 
In the literature, two connection types have been observed: non-accidental statistical connection, and 
non-accidental non-statistical connection (Prasada 2012). While the former is established statistically 
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by observing a number of specimens, and based on this observation a generalizing property is 
inductively attributed, the latter seems more essential, inherent, and definitional (Burton-Roberts, 
1977; Carlson, 1977, 1995; Krifka et al., 1995; Greenberg, 2012, Pelletier, 2010b). This semantic 
distinction explains speakers’ intuitions pertaining to the semantic status of the definite NP subject 
arguments in (45) and (46), where only the latter is construed to denote a kind. 
(45) al-wuruud-u  al-muhdaat-u  fii   ʕiid-i  l-ħubb-i  ħamraaʔ 
      the-roses-Nom the-gift-Nom in  Eid-Gen the-love-Gen  red 
  (Valentine-gift roses are red) 
 
(46) an-namir-u muxatˤatˤ 
      the-tiger-Nom striped 
  (The tiger is striped) 
  
The connection between the NP and the predicate determines whether this NP denotes a kind or not. 
In (45), the connection between ‘valentine-gift roses’ and the property attributed ‘be red’ is not 
accidental since almost all roses presented on that day are red. However, this connection is statistical 
in nature; in the sense that it has been established inductively by observing a number of roses, being 
presented on valentine day and based on this limited observation a generalization is expressed. Except 
for this, there is no inherent or essential redness property of these roses that would establish them as a 
kind. In (46), however, the connection is different; being striped is an essential property of being a 
tiger. This analysis is bolstered by the significantly variable truth judgments of these two sentences 
when initiated by the phrase haða n-nawʕ min ‘this kind of’ which is taken as a canonical expression 
that forces kind reference reading of the following nominal expression (see Carlson 1977). If 
someone points to a tiger and a valentine-gift rose and utters the sentences in (47) and (48), the 
former will be invariably true, but the latter false. 
(47) haaða  n-nawʕ-u  mina  l-qitˤatˤ-i  muxatˤatˤ 
           this the-kind-Nom from the-cats-Gen striped 
  (This kind of cats is striped) 
 
(48) ?haaða  n-nawʕ-u  mina l-wuruud-i ʔaħmar 
          this the-kind-Nom from the-roses-Gen red 
 (This kind of roses is red) 
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The sentence in (48) is judged false because it tries to establish the roses presented on valentine day 
as a kind based on their connection with statistically computed redness property. This contradicts our 
intuition, and the way we construe and encode kinds. 
Prasada (2010; 2012) and Prasada & Dillingham (2006) seek to present a logical explanation 
for this problematic connection issue holding between kinds and properties. They argue that in order 
to dig deep in these two connection types, reference must be made to the notion of non-
accidentalness, rather than to parasitic assimilations to properties designed essentially to serve other 
semantic structures like essence, definition, and analyticity. They distinguish between two types of 
nonaccidental connections; namely, special connection that exhibits principled properties which 
specimens of a kind obtain in virtue of being the kind or kinds of things they are, and statistical 
connection which involves properties holding for instances of a kind in general. Properties with a 
principled connection to a kind were dubbed k-properties, while those with statistical connection were 
dubbed t-properties. K-properties, but not t-properties, are characterized as having explanatory, 
definitional, and analytical dimensions. The distinction can be explicated in that only sentences with 
t-properties
39
can be rephrased with a sentence combining the adverbial phrase biʃakl-i-n ʕaam ‘in 
general’, with almost no change in meaning: 
(49) a. al-ʔusuud-u   mina  θ-θadiyyaat  
the-lions-Nom  from the-mammals 
   (Lions are mammals) 
 
     b.? biʃakl-i-n   ʕaam  al-usuud-u  mina  θ-θadiyyaat 
   in-form-Gen-N general  the-lions-Nom from the-mammals 
     (In general, lions are mammals) 
 
(50) a. fustan-u   l-ʕaruus-i  ʔabyadˤ 
  gown-Nom the-bride-Gen white 
          (A bridal gown is white) 
 
      b. biʃakl-i-n   ʕaam  fustan-u  l-ʕaruus-i  ʔabyadˤ 
               in-form-Gen-N    general     gown-Nom the-bride-Gen white 
    (In general, a bridal gown is white) 
                                                          
39
 In certain cases, Kind-referring expressions associated with k-properties can be modified by the adverb in 
general, but still other asymmetries can be shown to distinguish k-properties from t-properties and their relation 
to the two connection types, see Prasada (2012) for convincing arguments in favor of this distinction. 
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In statistical connection, Prasada (2012) argues, the strength of the association is established 
based on the degree of prevalence of a property among instances of a kind. In other words, statistical 
connections are mathematical in nature, and hence promiscuous and susceptible to hold between any 
two things. However, “principled connections are formal connections that are limited to holding 
between conceptual representations of kinds and properties” (P.53). In such association, an instance 
of a given kind is judged to hold a property just in virtue of being the kind of thing it is. This 
representation explains why principled connections are normative, analytical, and definitional in 
nature. 
In sum, MSA employs both grammatically definite singular and grammatically definite plural 
nouns as kind-referring expression. However, on par with reference to a kind genericity in many other 
natural languages (such as English, Indonesian, Hindi, and German), only nominal expressions that 
denote semantically well-established kinds can function as kind-denoting NPs. Although reference to 
kind sentences, but not characterizing sentences, can use past tense and S-level predicates, this cannot 
be taken as a necessary and suficient condition for encoding reference to a kind genericity because the 
present tense can be used also, and S-level predicates can be used in episodic sentences. In order to 
accurately identify reference to a kind genericity in MSA, the semantic status of the nominal subject 
argument - being connected to a well-established kind, other constituents in the sentence - including 
tense and predicate level, and the context must be investigated.   
6. Genericity in the Construct State  
The interaction between genericity phenomenon and nominal expressions in MSA is not 
exclusive to simple NPs. Genericity manifests itself in another complex nominal expression termed 
the construct state. However, manifestations of genericity in the construct state are significantly 
different from its manifestations in simple NPs. In particular, unlike bare nouns which are allowed in 
episodic sentences only, bare construct state phrases can be used in characterizing sentences, and 
more interestingly,  sentences combining bare construct state phrases and I-level predicates express a 
generic reading only, a peculiar characteristic which sets them apart from both bare nouns and al-Ns, 
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see 6.2. The semantic nature of kinds or species denoted by kind-referring construct state expressions 
is also different from kinds or species denoted by al-Ns when used as kind-referring nominal 
expressions. While the latter denote whole kinds or species, the former denote sub-kinds or sub-
species; see 6.3 below. 
Before investigating genericity in construct state phrases, I present a brief syntactic overview 
of construct state in (6.1) below. 
6.1 A Syntactic Overview 
The construct state (CS) is the peculiar Arabic, and probably Semitic, syntactic construction 
par excellence (Hoyt 2008). Due to its interesting properties, it has attracted much attention 
particularly within the modern syntactic theories (e.g. Benmamoun 2000, 2006; Fassi Fehri 1993; 
Kaplan 1993; LeTourneau 1995; Mohammad 1999; Shlonsky 2004). CS is a type of annexation 
consisting of at least two members, most often nouns
40
. CS incorporates two nominal expressions and 
collapses them into one constituent. The first noun is the head of the phrase, and is traditionally called 
possessee noun; the last noun, the complement, is termed the possessor. In principle, there is no upper 
limit on the number of the construct state’s members as long as all the pre-final members are 
grammatically indefinite. In fact, CS is closed and no further embedding is possible once a 
grammatically definite noun is used (Mohammad 1999).The possessed noun is never overtly marked 
for in/definiteness. By in/definiteness here I mean grammatical in/definiteness. Semantic 
in/definiteness is determined based on the definiteness criteria, as in simple NPs.  In/definiteness 
marking is restricted to the last member of the construct state. More precisely, the in/definiteness of 
CS members is determined solely by the last member; if in/definite, other members will inherit this 
value, and hence being in/definite accordingly. The first member always carries the main case of the 
phrase, which varies according to its position and syntactic function in the sentence. However, the last 
                                                          
40
 The first member in a construct state does not have to be always a noun; adjectives, verbal nominals, 
quantifiers, and other expressions can occur as the first member of a construct state; see Mohammad (1999), 
and Benmamoun (2006) for a detailed discussion. 
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and the other members, if any, are invariably assigned genitive case. The examples in (51) illustrate 
these properties. 
(51) a. maktab-u/a/i  l-ʕamiid-i  
     office-Nom/Acc/Gen the-dean-Gen 
  (the dean’s office) 
 
      b. maktab- u/a/i  bn-i    ʕamm-i tˤaalib-i  l-ʕamiid-i 
          office- Nom/Acc/Gen son-Gen   uncle-Gen student-Gen the-dean-Gen 
          (the office of the son of the paternal uncle of the dean’s student)  
 
In MSA, the construct state expresses a diverse range of possessive and partitive 
relationships. These include material and inalienable possession (a&b), location (c), part-whole 
relationships (d), measure or quantity (e), and comparison (f) (Mohammad 1999; Hoyt 2008).  
(52) a. sayyaara-t- u/a/i muʕallim-i-n 
    car-f- Nom/Acc/Gen teacher-Gen-N 
  (a teacher’s car) 
 
     b. ibn- u/a/i  l-waziir-i 
            son- Nom/Acc/Gen the-minister-Gen 
  (the son of the minister) 
 
     c. ɣurfa-t- u/a/i   n-nawm-i 
    room-f- Nom/Acc/Gen  the-sleep-Gen 
 (the bedroom) 
 
     d. baab- u/a/i  s-sayyaara-t-i 
    door- Nom/Acc/Gen the-car-f-Gen 
 (the car’s door) 
 
     e. kaʔs- u/a/i  maaʔ-i-n 
   glass- Nom/Acc/Gen water-Gen-N 
  (a glass of water) 
 
     f. ʔaqdam- u/a/i   l-mudun-i 
        oldest- Nom/Acc/Gen  the-cities-Gen 
(the oldest (city) of cities) 
 
It is worth mentioning that no modification is permitted to intervene between the members of 
a construct state; all modifiers must follow the construct state phrase. Mohammad (1999: 29) claims 
that modification being placed outside the CS in observance of the strict adjacency constraint makes it 
applicable to any member in the CS; that is the CS is ambiguous in this regard. He cites the following 
example arguing that it has four different readings: 
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(53) ibn- u/a/i    xaal-i   ʔab-i     l-walad-i  tˤ-tˤawiil-i 
      son- Nom/Acc/Gen   uncle-Gen  father-Gen     the-boy-Gen the-tall-Gen 
 
1. The tall son of the maternal uncle of the father of the boy 
2. The son of the tall maternal uncle of the father of the boy 
3. The son of the maternal uncle of the tall father of the boy 
4. The son of the maternal uncle of the father of the tall boy 
 
However, it should be emphasized that the above flexibility is controlled by noun-adjective 
agreement. If there is concord mismatch between a modifier and any member in the CS, this 
mismatch forces an interpretation where no modification of that member holds. 
After this brief syntactic overview of the construct state in MSA, I turn to discuss 
manifestations of genericity in sentences incorporating construct state phrases. In (6.2) I investigate 
characterizing sentences which associate construct state phrases as arguments. Reference to a kind 
genericity in sentences incorporating construct state phrases is investigated in (6.3). 
6.2 Generics Associating Construct State Phrases 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, MSA does not put restrictions on nominals 
used in generic sentences, particularly characterizing sentences, unless a nominal expression is 
grammatically indefinite. Therefore, one would intuitively expect to find generic sentences which use 
construct state phrases as arguments, provided that the CS phrases are definite in form. Consider the 
data in (54)
41
. 
(54) a. ʕaamil-u  l-matˤʕam-i   y-astayqiðˤ-u  mubakkiran 
  worker-Nom the-restaurant-Gen 3-wake-Nom early 
   (The/A restaurant worker wakes up early) 
 
     b. ʔustaað-u  l-ʤaamiʕat-i         y-aħðˤaa  bil-iħtiraam 
    teacher-Nom the-university-Gen  3-enjoy  with-the-respect 
      (The/A professor is well respected) 
 
          c. t-uɣlaq-u   bawwaabat-u  l-madrasat-i       fi    l-ʕutˤali                 
   3.f-close.Pass-Nom door-Nom  the-school-Gen    in      the-holidays-Gen 
   r-rasmiyy-a 
   the-official-f 
          (School doors close on official holidays) 
 
                                                          
41
 The habitual reading of these sentences is irrelevant to this discussion. Both the episodic and lexically 
characterizing readings are investigated based on the semantic definiteness status of the CS subjects.  
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     d. rabb-u          l-ʔusrat-i              masʔuul-u-n        ʕan   iħtiyaaʤaat-i   ʔabnaaʔ-i-h 
              head-Nom   the-family-Gen   responsible-Nom-N   for    needs-Gen  children-Gen-his 
           (The/Head of the family is responsible for his children’s needs) 
The NPs used in (54) as subject arguments are definite in form CS phrases.  As the behavior of simple 
definite NPs used in sentences combining I-level predicates, or in habitual sentences, the sentences 
here are ambiguous between two interpretations: an episodic reading in which an accidental property 
or event is reported of a salient individual, and a generic interpretation. The sentence in (a), for 
instance, can be either interpreted  existentially as reporting that there is a familiar or unique, 
contextually salient restaurant worker who happens to wake up early at a specific time and location
42
,  
or it can receive a generic interpretation; in the sense that  restaurant workers in general wake up 
early. The exact semantic status of the al-N member, and hence the maximal CS phrase, in terms of 
definiteness is decisive in determining which reading the sentence avails, generic or episodic. The 
context and other pragmatic tools play a crucial role in teasing apart the definiteness status of the CS. 
Similarly, (b) can be interpreted as ‘there exists a contextually prominent professor who is well 
respected’, or ‘professors in general are well respected’. The sentence in (c) does not use an I-level 
predicate; tuɣlaq ‘is closed’ is in fact an S-level predicate, but still this sentence can entertain a 
habitually generic interpretation that can be verbalized as follows: ‘situations of official holidays are 
such that school doors close in these situations’. It is worth mentioning that (c) can also receive an 
episodic interpretation with a semantically definite individual school.  
Therefore, if we provide contexts that limit the denotation of CS phrases in (54) to 
semantically definite referents, the only interpretation the sentences express is episodic. However, 
providing contexts which limit the denotation of CS phrases to variable individuals; i.e., semantically 
indefinite referents, enforces a generic reading of the sentences in (54) as the only available reading. 
Put differently, sentences with grammatically definite CS and I-level predicates behave exactly like 
the sentences with simple grammatically definite nouns and I-level predicates discussed in (4.3). To 
see this, and to save ink, sentence (54.d) is repeated in (55.a) with a context limiting the denotation of 
                                                          
42
 Even in this context, the sentence can still receive a generic interpretation, in particular a habitual one. 
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CS to a definite referent, and in (55.b) with a context enforcing a semantically indefinite denotation of 
CS. 
(55) a. [A girl is arguing with her mother about buying new clothes. The mother told her not to 
argue with her, but talk to her father because] 
 
      rabb-u        l-ʔusrat-i           masʔuul-u-n      ʕan  iħtiyaaʤaat-i  ʔabnaaʔ-i-h 
           head-Nom   the-family-Gen   responsible-Nom-N   for needs-Gen children-Gen-his 
      (The head of the family is responsible for his children’s needs) 
   b. [A teacher discussing with his senior students responsibilities of head of the family in the       
Arab world] 
      rabb-u        l-ʔusrat-i          masʔuul-u-n      ʕan  iħtiaaɮaat-i  ʔabnaaʔ-i-h 
           head-Nom   the-family-Gen   responsible-Nom-N   for needs-Gen children-Gen-his 
      (Head of the family is responsible for his children’s needs) 
As expected, (a) is a particular sentence reporting a random fact about a particular head of the family 
father known to both interlocutors from shared knowledge familiarity as being responsible for his 
children’s needs; no generalization is expressed. The sentence in (b), however, where the CS denotes 
a variable individual head of the family, avails a generic interpretation as the only available reading. It 
says that in the Arab world situation, head of families in general are responsible for their children’s 
needs. The latter is a characterizing sentence, but the former is a particular sentence. The crucial 
difference in both sentences is brought by the different semantic denotations entertained by the same 
CS in different contexts. The same rational holds for the other sentences in (54) and any similar 
sentences with the same structure.  
However, unlike simple nominal expressions that promote only episodic readings when are 
grammatically indefinite, grammatically indefinite CS phrases can be used in characterizing 
sentences, as illustrated in the following sentences. 
(56) a. kalb-u        ħiraasat-i-n    xayr-u-n     min   ʤihaaz-i  ʔinðaar 
 dog-Nom  guard-Gen-N    better-Nom-N  than   system-Gen  alarm 
    (A guard dog is better than a security alarm system) 
 
      b. kalb-u     sˤayd-i-n ʔfdˤal-u  min  bunduqiyyat-i sˤayd 
     dog-Nom  hunt-Gen-N  better-Nom  than gun-Gen-N      hunt 
                 (A hunting dog is better than a hunting gun) 
 
      c. ʃaʤarat-u  zaytuun-i-n  t-utˤʕim-u  ʔusrat-a-n kaamila 
    tree-Nom olive-Gen-N  3.f-feed-Nom family-Acc-N whole 
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      (An olive tree is enough to feed a whole family) 
 
      d. nuur-u  misˤbaaħ-i-n y-ubaddid-u ðˤ-ðˤulma 
     light-Nom lamp-Gen-N 3-dispel-Nom the-darknes 
       (The light of a lamp dispels the darkness) 
 
      e. t-udxil-u   kalimat-u ħaqq-i-n al-ʤanna 
     3.f-enter-Nom  word-Nom truth-Gen-N the-heaven 
       (A word of truth leads to entering Heaven) 
 
      f. t-uɣnii  ʃabakat-u  sˤayyd-i-n ʕan qaarib 
    3.f-substitute   net-Nom fishing-Gen-N for boat 
                 (A fishing net substitutes for a boat) 
 
           g. t-uħyii  zaxxat-u matˤar-i-n   l-ʔardˤ-a  l-mayta 
               3.f-revive shower-Nom rain-Gen-N  the-land-Acc  the-dead 
                 (A shower of rain revives a dead land)  
 
These examples are true characterizing sentences, though their subject arguments are grammatically 
indefinite CS phrases. Intriguingly, these sentences can only be interpreted as expressing generic 
readings, and existential interpretations seem to be completely unavailable.  The sentence in (a), for 
example, expresses a generalization about guard dogs, stating that  in general, a guard dog is better 
than a home security alarm system. The sentence does not have another interpretation where an 
existential guard dog referent is accidentally reported to be better than an alarm system; the property 
of being better than a security alarm is predicated to guard dogs in general. Similarly, (b) expresses a 
generalization about hunting dogs in general being better than hunting guns. In (c) a generalization is 
reported about olive trees in general, not an existential olive tree. (d) does not report a property of 
light of a certain lamp, it is about light of lamps in general. The rest of the sentences are generically 
interpreted in the same fashion.  
It is worth mentioning that the position of the indefinite CS does not affect the interpretation 
of the sentence. Sentences (a-d) are SV(O), whereas sentences (f-g) are VS(O).  What is puzzling is 
that in these sentences the generic reading is the only reading available; while their minimal 
counterparts with definite CS phrases can have both generic and existential readings, as mentioned 
above. More precisely, I am comparing the sentences in (56) with their minimally counterparts with 
grammatically definite CS uttered out of the blue; i.e., with little explicit contextual support. In this 
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case, the latter are ambiguous between generic and non-generic readings depending on the semantic 
definiteness status of the grammatically definite CS subject. Sentences with grammatically indefinite 
CS, however, are not ambiguous, and only express a generic interpretation. This can be clearly shown 
by inserting a demonstrative pronoun like haaða ‘this’ or haaðihi ‘this.f’, which forces an existential 
reading of the sentence as the only reading possible. The demonstrative haaða ‘this’ seems 
compatible with sentences incorporating grammatically definite CS phrases; in this case the generic 
reading is excluded, and the episodic reading with a contextually salient referent is promoted instead. 
However, haaða is incompatible with any of the sentences in (56). This becomes clear if we notice 
that these sentences can only be interpreted generically. The pair in (57) illustrates this point. 
(57) a. t-uɣnii        ʃabakat-u  sˤ-sˤayyd-i     haaðihi  ʕan qaarib 
    3.f-substitute net-Nom the-fishing-Gen  this.f   for boat 
    (This fishing net substitutes for a boat) 
 
          b. *t-uɣnii  ʃabakat-u  sˤayyd-i-n  haaðihi   ʕan qaarib 
   3.f-substitute     net-Nom fishing-Gen-N this.f for boat 
   (This fishing net substitutes for a boat) 
 
An interesting question relevant to the semantic status of indefinite in form CS compared to 
both indefinite simple nouns and definite CS is to be addressed here. More precisely, what semantic 
privilege does bare CS exhibit that renders it behaving differently from both bare simple nouns which 
relatively cannot be inserted in characterizing sentences, and definite in form CS phrases which 
render their sentences ambiguous between generic/nongeneric readings? If we examine the internal 
structure of bare CS, we can get a helpful insight. The essence of a CS is that it contains two nouns in 
which the last seems to indirectly modify the first head noun. This indirect modification cancels the 
existential interpretation that bare nouns entertain, and promotes an indefinite denotation of the noun 
in the real sense. The head noun becomes non-specific in the sense that it no longer denotes 
individual(s) existentially. Modification of the noun in a grammatically indefinite CS renders it 
denoting a content-descriptive frame upon which a set of individuals to which this description applies 
is picked. Therefore, this noun no longer denotes existentially computed individual(s), as simple bare 
nouns do. In (56.a) kalb-u  ħiraasat-i-n ‘a guard dog’ is not an existential dog; it is a dog with a 
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specific property. Similarly, ʃaʤarat-u  zaytuun-i-n ‘olive tree’ is not an existentially calculated tree; 
it refers to any individual that satisfies the descriptive content of the CS. Modification in bare CS 
changes the semantics of the head noun from denoting existentially computed individuals in a specific 
situation to denoting a set of individuals or objects that satisfy the properties provided by the head 
noun and the complement in all relevant situations. This explains the difference in denotation between 
bare CS and simple bare nouns, and their asymmetrical behavior with regard to characterizing 
sentences. It is noteworthy that unlike sentences combining grammatically simple indefinite subjects, 
sentences with indefinite in form CS subjects are incompatible with time adverbials which enforce an 
episodic reading of the sentence like al-ʔaan ‘now’, al-yawm ‘today’, haaðaa l-ʔusbuuʕ ‘this week’, 
or haaðihi l-ʔayyaam ‘these days’, which supports the claim that a bare CS does not denote an 
existential individual or individuals. Consider the examples below.  
(58) a. y-alʕab-u     walad-u-n  fi  ʃ-ʃaariʕ  
    3-play-Nom  boy-Nom-N  in  the-street 
(A boy is playing on the street) 
 
   b. y-alʕab-u     walad-u-n  fi  ʃ-ʃaariʕ   al-ʔaan 
  3-play-Nom  boy-Nom-N  in  the-street  the-now   
    (A boy playing on the street now) 
 
(59)  a. nuur-u  misˤbaaħ-i-n y-ubaddid-u ðˤ-ðˤulma    
         light-Nom lamp-Gen-N 3-dispel-Nom the-darkness 
    (The light of a lamp dispels the darkness) 
 
  b.* nuur-u  misˤbaaħ-i-n y-ubaddid-u ðˤ-ðˤulmat-a  al-ʔaan 
    light-Nom lamp-Gen-N 3-dispel-Nom the-darkness-Acc the-now 
    (A light of a lamp is dispelling the darkness now) 
 
Both sentences in (58) are acceptable and interpretable since they express an existential reading, 
brought by the indefinite NP in (a), and the existential time adverbial al-ʔaan ‘now’ in (b). Both 
sentences express the same proposition that in a particular situation in the actual world, an 
existentially computed boy individual is involved in an episodic playing event at a particular place 
and time. The pair in (59), however, is not congruent. While (a) is a characterizing sentence reporting 
a generalization about light of  lamps in general as holding the property of dispelling darkness, the 
sentence in (b) is completely ungrammatical. Its ungrammaticality is due to the presence of al-ʔaan 
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‘now’ which forces an existential reading of the CS subject, and the sentence as a whole. As the 
indefinite CS nuur-u misˤbaaħ-i-n ‘a light of a lamp’ does not denote an existentially computed 
specific object, it is naturally incompatible with existential constructions like al-ʔaan ‘now’, hence 
the ungrammaticality of (59.b). 
As for the asymmetry between definite and indefinite in form CS phrases, the indefinite CS, 
unlike its definite counterpart, avails only a generic reading of the sentence, contributed, in part, by 
the variable individual denoted by the indefinite in form and sense CS. The other episodic reading, 
which a sentence with a definite CS can also express when the grammatically definite CS is 
semantically definite, is not available in sentences combining indefinite CS because an indefinite in 
form CS, as well as simple bare nouns, cannot be semantically definite in MSA. Indefinite CS is on 
par with semantically indefinite al-N, but not with semantically definite al-N.  The semantically 
definite CS can be interpreted as denoting a particular, salient or unique individual. The indefinite CS, 
however, provides a descriptive frame upon which a set of individuals is picked. Therefore, as 
expected sentences incorporating grammatically definite subjects CS phrases are compatible with 
existential time adverbials like al-ʔaan ‘now’, but their minimally contrasting sentences with 
grammatically indefinite CS phrases are not.  
(60) a. nuur-u  l-misˤbaaħ-i y-ubaddid-u ðˤ-ðˤulma    
   light-Nom the-lamp-Gen 3-dispel-Nom the-darkness 
  (The light of a/the lamp dispels the darkness) 
 
   a'.nuur-u   l-misˤbaaħ-i y-ubaddid-u ðˤ-ðˤulmat-a  al-ʔaan 
   light-Nom the-lamp-Gen 3-dispel-Nom the-darkness-Acc the-now 
  (The light of the lamp is dispelling the darkness now) 
          
b. nuur-u  misˤbaaħ-i-n y-ubaddid-u ðˤ-ðˤulma    
   light-Nom lamp-Gen-N 3-dispel-Nom the-darkness 
  (The light of a lamp dispels the darkness) 
 
    b'.* nuur-u  misˤbaaħ-i-n y-ubaddid-u ðˤ-ðˤulmat-a  al-ʔaan 
       light-Nom lamp-Gen-N 3-dispel-Nom the-darkness-Acc the-now 
      (A light of a lamp is dispelling the darkness now) 
 
The only difference in meaning between (a&a') is that (a') no longer avails a generic reading; it can 
only be interpreted existentially.This explains why sentences that incorporate the indefinite CS can 
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only express generic readings, and refrain from expressing existential readings similar to their 
minimally contrasting counterparts with definite CS phrases.  
6.3 Construct State and Reference to a Kind Genericity 
Indefinite CS cannot be used as kind-denoting expressions. This becomes intuitively 
explicable if we remember that the indefinite CS denotes variable individuals to which the descriptive 
content of the CS applies; it cannot be used as a referential expression referring to a unique entity or 
kind. More precisely, a kind is definite by default as it is unique, and hence any nominal expression 
that denotes an indefinite entity is naturally incompatible with reference to a kind genericity. The 
indefinite CS behaves semantically as a predicate that picks out groups of individuals that satisfy the 
description content provided by the head and complement nouns in the phrase. Kind-referring NPs, 
however, behave in a way similar to that of proper names in rigidly referring to a specific definite 
kind or species (Krifka et al. 1995), and thus the indefinite CS is incompatible with this semantic 
rigidity.   
 The semantically definite CS, however, obtains the privilege of being referential, and thus 
can be used as object or kind-denoting expression. The data in (61) lay this point out. 
(61) a. dub-u l-baandaa ʕalaa waʃak-i  l-inqiraadˤ 
        bear-Nom the-panda  at close-Gen the-extinction 
 (The panda bear is almost extinct) 
 
   b. ʃaʤarat-u  z-zaytuun-i        muntaʃirat-u-n  fi   ʃ-ʃarq-i           l-ʔawsatˤ 
  tree-Nom   the-olive-Gen   common-Nom-N   in   the-east-Gen   the-middle 
   (The olive tree is common in the Middle East) 
 
        c. y-aʔkul-u  faʔr-u   l-ħaql-i  l-ħubuub 
            3-eat-Nom mouse-Nom  the-field-Gen the-grains 
               (The field mouse eats grains) 
 
        d. y-uwaaʤih-u  ʔatˤfaal-u       l-ʔanaabiib-i  maʃaakil-a sˤiħħiyya 
            3-face-Nom babies-Nom  the-tube-Gen  problems-Acc   health 
              (IVF babies face health problems) 
  
The sentences (a&b) and (c&d) represent reference to a kind genericity and characteristic 
genericity, respectively. The pair in (a&b) uses K-level predicates, ʕalaa waʃak-i l-inqiraadˤ ‘almost 
extinct’ and muntaʃir ‘common’, which are compatible with kind-referring NPs or CS phrases only. 
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These sentences express reference to a kind genericity. The statement in (a) talks about the species 
dub-u l-baandaa ‘The Panda’ by predicating a property that can only be true of a kind, rather than an 
individual; no individual panda can be almost extinct. The sentence in (b) also represents a reference 
to a kind sentence; in the sense that the property attributed muntaʃir ‘common’ can only be predicated 
to a kind, but never to an individual or groups of individuals. The genericity of the sentence in (b), for 
instance, can be informally verbalized as follows: ‘The kind Olive Tree exhibits the property of being 
common’. The sentences in (c&b) do not represent reference to a kind genericity; rather both 
sentences are characterizing sentences. This becomes clear if we notice that the whole sentence, 
rather than the generic CS per se, expresses genericity. Nonetheless, the incorporated CS subjects in 
both sentences are generic nominal expressions. Put differently, both sentences are characterizing 
sentences that express a generalization true not of an individual or a group of individuals, but rather 
of the kind itself. 
That an indefinite CS cannot be used as a kind-referring expression can be supported by 
substituting indefinite CS for each minimally contrasting definite CS in each sentence in (61). 
Changing the definiteness status of CS in (a&b) renders both sentences syntactically unacceptable and 
semantically odd. An explanation for this is that the associated predicates are K-level predicates; 
therefore, the incompatibility of an indefinite CS with these predicates proves that they are not kind-
referring expressions. It seems that the indefinite CS fails a major diagnostic test for identifying 
generic NPs, or CS phrases in this case, as set forward in Krifka et al. (1995). The sentences in (c&d) 
do not use K-level predicates; nevertheless, replacing the definite CS phrases with indefinite ones 
significantly changes the meaning of both sentences. More precisely, both sentences that express a 
generic interpretation will entertain an episodic reading as the only reading available. While (c) 
expresses a generalization about field mice in general, reporting that they eat grains, its indefinite CS 
counterpart reports an isolated event true of existential field mice being involved in eating grains 
event. Similarly, (d) expresses a generalization true of IVF babies in general, that they face health 
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problems, but its indefinite CS counterpart reports a non-generic proposition about existential IVF 
babies being involved in health problems at a particular time and place. 
As mentioned in (section 5), kind-referring NPs exhibit two peculiar characteristics that 
distinguish them from other nominal expressions in the language under investigation. Kind-referring 
NPs can associate with S-level predicates, and can occur in sentences in past tense form; nonetheless, 
they can remain generic. These two points are used as a diagnostic test for identifying kind-denoting 
expressions in MSA, as well as English and other languages. This indicates that if definite CS phrases 
can be inserted in past tense sentences with S-level predicates without affecting their genericity, 
definite CS phrases receive further support to be established as kind-denoting expressions. This is 
explicated in (62). 
(62) a. sˤawwar-naa dubb-a     l-baandaa   fi l-ħadiiqat-i  ʔams 
      filmed-1.Pl bear-Acc  the-panda   in  the-zoo-Gen yesterday 
       (We filmed the Panda at the zoo yesterday) 
 
  b. ʃaahad-tu waθaaʔiqiyy-a-n ʕan tays-i   l-ʤabal 
              watched-1 documentary-Acc-N on goat-Gen the-mountain 
       (I watched a documentary on the ibex)  
 
The predicates in (62) are S-level, and both sentences are in the past tense. However, it is clear that 
both sentences do not express episodic propositions true of specimens of a kind. In fact, the CS 
phrases in (62) are generic in that they do not refer to a particular individual panda or goat, but rather 
to the species Panda and Capra Ibex, respectively, being realized through indirect kind reference 
(Pelletier 2010b)
43
. 
I turn to address a question relevant to the type of kind reference that the definite CS 
expresses. It is known that in a CS phrase, the complement noun modifies the head noun, resulting in 
the head noun being more specific. This is realized in the type of kinds referred to in the sentences 
above. In all examples, the kinds referred to denote not whole species or kinds, but rather sub-kinds 
or sub-species. In (61), CS phrases are used as sub-kind-referring expressions; they denote sub-
                                                          
43
 See (chapter 2, section 2.1), for a discussion of indirect kind reference through representative object 
interpretation.  
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classes of kinds. In (a) for instance, reference is not made to the kind Bear, but to a sub-kind Panda. 
Similarly, in (b) reference is made not to the kind Tree, but to sub-kind Olive Tree. In (c) the kind 
Mouse is not the intended referent, but rather a sub-kind or class, namely the Field Mouse. The same 
rationale holds for IVF babies in (61.d), which is a true sub-kind of the naturally born Human Baby 
kind, and the Ibex in (62.b), which is a sub-kind of the kind Capra. Thus, it is plausible to suggest 
that definite CS phrases can be used as sub-kind-referring expressions due to the modification relation 
that holds between the head noun and its modifying complement, which yields in a more specific sub-
kind-referring noun. 
7. On Genericity in Bare NPs   
The traditional Arab grammarians’ view of dividing nouns into two categories based on the 
presence/absence of the definite article al ‘the’ indicates that the restricted use of bare nouns in 
subject argument position is a grammatical by-product of the fact that unlike al-Ns, bare Ns in subject 
argument position are exclusively existential, see (section 3) above. This indicates that bare NPs are 
only allowed in subject argument position if and only if they denote existential entities. A direct 
repercussion of this insight is that bare NPs in MSA cannot be incorporated in characterizing 
sentences. This section argues against this claim, and shows that in certain syntactic and semantic 
environments bare NPs can be subject arguments in characterizing sentences. In particular, modified 
bare NPs, whose meaning is changed from existential denotation to quantificational denotation 
through the semantic interaction between the modifier and the head noun, are allowed in 
characterizing sentences. Interestingly, in such environment, the generic reading, rather than the 
existential, episodic reading entertained by unmodified bare NPs, is the more natural and intuitive 
reading. Another environment in which bare NPs can be used in characterizing sentences is habituals; 
sentences which generalize over variable situations, not variable individuals. After presenting some 
relevant syntactic facts about bare NPs in MSA (7.1), this - contra traditional’s - claim is furnished in 
(7.2). 
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7.1 The Grammatically Indefinite NP: Syntactic Facts 
Traditional Arab grammarians, as well as modern Arab and non-Arab linguists, share a 
consensus that in general bare NPs in MSA are not permitted in subject position in both equational 
sentences or subject-predicate sentences, and SV verbal sentences. Bare NPs, however, are allowed in 
V/P-S order only - where P stands for a predicate of any syntactic form (e.g. Al-haramii 2005, d. 
1302; Al-saamirraaʔii 2011; Al-wardii 2008 , d.1348; Al-ɣalaaliinii 1993; Buckley 2004; Haywood 
and Nahmad 1962; ; Sibawayh 1988, d. 796; Wright 1898) . The examples in (63) lay this out. 
(63) *a. raʤul-u-n   fii  d-daar 
    man-Nom-N  in the-house 
     (A man is in the house) 
 
            a'. fii d-daar-i  raʤul 
                in the-house-Gen  man 
                   (A man is in the house) 
 
          *b. raʤul-u-n   ʤaaʔa 
                 man-Nom-N  came.3 
                  (A man came) 
 
           b'. ʤaaʔa  raʤul 
                came.3  man 
                  (A man came) 
 
         *c. kalb-u-n  xayr-u-n  min  ʔasad 
               dog-Nom-N better  from lion 
                 (A dog is better than a lion) 
 
           c'. θammata kalb-u-n  xayr-u-n  min  ʔasad 
                there   dog-Nom-N better  from lion 
                 (There is a dog (which) is better than a lion) 
 
However, Arab grammarians cited more than forty different environments which permit bare 
NPs in subject position (Hassan 1980). In the majority of such environments, the bare NP subject 
does not introduce the sentence in a way or another- the order of the subject and predicate is reversed, 
or a question particle, preposition, existential there, etc.
44
 are inserted in the outset of the sentence. 
                                                          
44
 This observation raises an important question about whether Arabic disallows bare NP subject from 
introducing a sentence, i.e., being the first word in the sentence, or as the traditional view claims, a bare NP 
subject is not permitted in Arabic regardless of its position in the sentence except for these exceptional 
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Environments that permit bare NP subjects to introduce a sentence are those in which bare NP 
subjects are modified either by an adjective, or by a nominal expression in the construct state. 
Consider (64) below. 
(64) a. zawʤat-u-n   tˤayyib-at-u-n   tuʕiin-u  ʕalaa  sˤ-sˤiʕaab 
            wife-Nom-N  good-f-Nom-N  help-Nom  on the-hardships 
  (A good wife helps in (alleviating) hardships) 
 
        b. dawlat-u  salaam-i-n  xayr-u-n  min  dawalat-i  ħarb 
state-Nom peace-Gen-N better-Nom-N from state-Gen war 
  (A state of peace is better than a state of war) 
 
The sentences in (64) incorporate bare NP subjects, which also introduce the sentences, yet the two 
sentences are grammatical because the two bare NP subjects are modified. This fact has strong 
bearing on the claim presented in (7.2) that bare NP subjects can be associated in characterizing 
sentences. 
7.1.1 The Grammatically Indefinite NP: True or Pseudo Bare Noun  
It has been emphasized above that the grammatical definiteness status of noun phrases in 
MSA is determined by the presence/absence of the definite article al ‘the’, where al-Ns are 
grammatically definite, and Ø-Ns are grammatically indefinite
45
. However, there is a strong debate 
going on about the exact description of grammatically indefinite noun phrases in MSA. In particular, 
this debate touches on the issue of the morphological status of indefinite nouns as to whether they are 
described as true bare nouns, where no indefiniteness marker appears, or pseudo bare nouns, where 
indefinite nouns are morphologically marked for indefiniteness by a suffix like –n, traditionally 
termed nunation or mimation (Fassi Fehri 2012). Indefiniteness asymmetry emerges from the fact that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
environments. Providing an answer to this interesting question falls out of the scope of this dissertation, though 
some insights will be given in section (7.2), which can be further developed into a complete answer to such an 
interesting question in the future. 
 
45
 Remember that semantic definiteness is determined based on the definiteness criteria though all simple 
definites are al-Ns, but not the other way around, see (chapter 3, section 4). 
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when a definite article is absent, a morpheme -n is suffixed to the stem, and this morpheme appears to 
be in complementary distribution with the definite article. The data in (65) explains this asymmetry. 
(65)  
al-qalam         ‘the pen’ qalam-u-n   ‘a pen-Case-N’ *al-qalam-u-n    ‘the pen-Case-N’ 
al-bint             ‘the girl’ bint-u-n      ‘a girl-Case-N’ *al-bint-u-n     ‘the girl-Case-N’ 
al-banaat         ‘the girls’ banaat-u-n  ‘girls-Case-N’ *al-banaat-u-n   ‘the girls-Case-N’ 
al-ħiʤaara(t)   ‘the    
stones’ 
ħiʤaarat-u-n   ‘stones-Case-
N’ 
*al- ħiʤaarat-u-n   ‘the stones-Case-  
N’ 
 
Fassi Fehri (2012) summarized the three competing views regarding the status of nunation in 
Arabic. The view of old traditional Arab grammarians suggests that the –n on nouns is devoid of any 
syntactic or semantic function regarding definiteness/indefiniteness. Moscati (1964: 100) echoes this 
viewpoint; in his words, it is “impossible to identify any Proto-Semitic means of expressing 
definiteness or indefiniteness …there existed a mimation of nouns independent of any semantic 
function as regards definiteness or indefiniteness.” Brockelmann (1910), on the other hand, argues in 
favor of an indetermination view. A third view is posited by Kurylowicz (1950), in which he defends 
an idea that nunation expresses a general form of determination. However, a number of 
considerations have made some linguists argue against considering the morpheme -n an indefinite 
marker (e.g. Fassi Fehri 1993, 2012; Hallman 1999; Hoyt 2008). First, this morpheme appears on 
proper names that do not take the definite article (66). Second, the definite and indefinite markers are 
not in complementary distribution on the sound plural and the dual form since they can co-occur on 
the same noun (67). Third, as observed by Fassi Fehri (1993), the sound plural suffix -na shares some 
properties with -n morpheme in singular indefinite nouns, and singular definite nouns. Particularly, 
the final -n(a) and the definite article in all these forms disappear in the construct state (68).  
(66) ʤaaʔ-a  zayd-u-n 
      came-3  Zayd-Nom-N 
        (Zayd came) 
 
(67) a. al-muslim-uu-n   b. as-sabbaaħ-aa-n 
  the-Muslim-Nom.Pl-N       the-swimmer-Nom.D-N 
   (the Muslims)                     (the two swimmers) 
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(68) a. muslim-uu      l-ʔurdunn-i  vs. * (al)-muslim-uu-n           l-ʔurdunn-i 
  muslim-Nom.P       the-Jordan-Gen      (the)-muslim-Nom.Pl-N    the-Jordan-Gen 
 (Jordan’s Muslims)              (Jordan’s Muslims) 
 
   b. raʔay-tu   baab-a       d-daar-i           vs.*raʔay-tu  (al)-baab-a-n          d-daar-i 
  saw-1  door-Acc    the-house-Gen       saw-1 (the)-door-Acc-N    the-house-Gen 
 (I saw the door of the house)                  (I saw the door of the house) 
 
However, there is a limitation on singular common nouns pertaining to the distribution of al- 
and -n.  Fassi Fehri (2012) claims that such an asymmetry cannot be explicated if definite article al- is 
taken to express uniqueness/familiarity, while indefinite -n expresses non-uniqueness/novelty, simply 
because this characterization will exclude the co-occurrence of both markers on plural nouns, which 
is grammatical. This supports treating the indefinite marker as not the counterpart of the definite 
marker. It is a morpheme that represents different syntactic and semantic features, just like un- in 
Spanish, which is compatible with different values of number and gender
46
. Thus, nunation cannot be 
taken as an indefinite marker, but it might be conditioned by indefiniteness. Therefore, the nunation 
marker will be treated as a type of declension that marks the majority of declinable nouns lacking al 
‘the’ in MSA47. 
7.2 Genericity and Bare NPs in MSA Revisited  
In MSA the canonical interpretation of bare nouns, both singular and plural, is existential, and 
thus their presence in a sentence forces an episodic reading. Consider the examples in (69). 
(69) a. y-alhuu  tˤifl-u-n  maʕa qitˤtˤ-at-i-hi 
            3-play.Nom child-Nom-N  with cat-f-Gen-his 
   (A child is playing with his cat) 
 
        b. t-uʃaahid-u  niswat-u-n  t-tilfaaz 
       3.f-watch-Nom  women-Nom-N  the-television 
   (Some women are watching TV) 
 
The only interpretation the sentences in (69) avail is episodic. This is enforced by the presence of the 
bare NPs in subject argument position, tˤifl ‘child’ and niswa ‘women’. Therefore, it seems that bare 
                                                          
46
 See Muth (2008) for a discussion of the different functions of nunation in Arabic. 
 
47
See Edzard (2006) for a brief exposition of declension in Arabic and other Semitic languages. 
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nouns in MSA block any probable generic reading of a sentence, and promote an existential reading 
as the only available reading. It is worth noting that replacing the bare nouns in (69) with their 
grammatically definite counterparts would change the semantics of both sentences, rendering them 
ambiguous between generic, habitual in particular, and nongeneric readings (see section 4.1 above). 
Since both bare Ns and al-Ns occurring in the same syntactic and semantic environment bring about a 
clear distinction in interpretation, it is plausible to assume that bare nouns in MSA do not observe the 
other constituents of the sentence, particularly the predicate, and give rise to an episodic interpretation 
to any sentence in which they occur. 
The generalization above is inaccurate since it is possible in MSA to use bare NPs subjects in 
true characterizing sentences. Consider the data in (70). 
(70) a. muʔmin-u-n       qawiyy-u-n        xayr-u-n  min   muʔmin-i-n          dˤaʕiif 
     believer-Nom-N     strong-Nom-N  better-Nom-N  than  believer-Gen-N    weak 
   (A strong believer is better than a weak believer) 
 
   b. kalb-u-n  ħayy-u-n ʔafdˤal-u min    ʔasad-i-n mayyit 
      dog-Nom-N living-Nom-N better-Nom than   lion-Gen-N   dead 
     (A living dog is better off than a dead lion) 
   c. kalb-u-n           qawiyy-u-n ʔkθar-u  faaʕiliyyat-i-n  min 
    dog-Nom-N strong-Nom-N  more-Nom   effectiveness-Gen-N  than 
     ʤihaaz-i  ʔinðaar 
     system-Gen  alarm 
  (A strong dog is more effective than a security alarm system) 
 
   d. zuhuur-u-n   ʤamiilat-u-n   tuʃʕir-u-naa  bi-s-saʕaada 
 roses-Nom-N  beautiful-Nom-N feel-Nom-us with-the-happiness 
    (Beautiful roses make us feel happy) 
 
   e. ħaakim-u-n  ðˤaalim-u-n       ʔaʃaddu   ʕalaa   ʃ-ʃaʕb-i   min      l-ʔaʕdaaʔ 
        ruler-Nom-N    unjust-Nom-N   tougher    on  the-people-Gen    than     the-enemies 
    (An unjust ruler causes more harm to (his) people than enemies) 
 
   f. taʕliim-u-n   ʤayyid-u-n  yanhadˤ-u  bi-l-ʔumam 
education-Nom-N good-Nom-N empower-Nom  with-the-nations 
  (Quality education empowers nations) 
 
The sentences in (70) can only express generic readings, and the bare NPs used as subject 
arguments do not entertain existential denotation. (a) reports a generalization about any individual in 
the set of ‘strong believers’ stating that  individual strong believers  in general are attributed a 
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property of being better than individuals in the set of ‘weak believers’. Similarly, (b) expresses a 
generalization about living dogs and dead lions in general. In (c), the generalization holds for strong 
dogs in general, not any existentially quantified individual dog(s). The other sentences are interpreted 
in the same fashion. These bare NPs do not exhibit the canonical existential denotation. This can be 
demonstrated if we try to insert a sense verb like ʔaraa ‘I see’ in the sentences in (70), which seem 
incompatible with such a verb. However, inserting ʔaraa in the sentences in (69) renders both 
sentences felicitous. This is a puzzling insight because it stands in stark contrast to the traditional 
conceived interpretation of bare NPs in MSA, set forth at the outset of this section.    
However, astute readers must have noticed that the two predicates used in (69) are S-level 
predicates, and hence the emergence of the episodic interpretation. The sentences in (70), however, 
use I-level predicates. A plausible explanation for the intriguing behavior of bare NPs in (70) might 
be attributed to their interaction with the predicates used, which are I-level predicates. More precisely, 
the use of I-level predicates, like more effective and better, changes the meaning of bare NPs in MSA 
from existential denotation into quantificational denotation. However, this claim seems untenable if 
we observe that bare NPs can associate with I-level predicates, and nonetheless maintain their 
existential denotation, which blocks the generic reading of the sentence. The sentences in (71) can 
only be interpreted existentially, though the predicates incorporated are I-level predicates. 
(71) a. y-uħibb-u ʃaabb-u-n  fataah 
         3-love-Nom young man-Nom-N girl 
 ((There is) a young man (who) loves a girl) 
 
           b. y-aʕrif-u  saaʔiq-u-n  l-faransiyya 
               3-know-Nom driver-Nom-N  the-French 
  ((There is) a driver (who) knows French) 
 
           c. ya-tˤiir-u tˤaʔir-u-n fii  s-samaaʔ 
               3-fly-Nom bird-Nom-N in the-sky 
  (A bird is flying in the sky) 
 
           d. ya-ʔkul-u  nimar-u-n  laħm 
               3-eat-Nom tiger-Nom-N meat 
  (A tiger is eating meat) 
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The data in (71)
48
 nullifies the claim that the asymmetrical behavior of bare NPs in (70) is attributed 
to the associated predicates, where S-level predicates give rise to existential interpretation of bare 
nouns, and I-level predicates promote a generic denotation. This claim can be further shown to be 
void when we consider sentences with S-level predicates that nevertheless entertain generic 
interpretation. 
(72) a. ya-ʤuuʕ-u  ʔunaas-u-n    min muxtalaf-i  l-ʔaʕmaar-i    
        3-starve-Nom    people-Nom-N   from     different-Gen the-ages-Gen       
      fi  sˤ-sˤuumaal 
     in  the-Somalia 
  (People of different ages starve in Somalia) 
 
    b. y-usˤaab-u  ʔaʃxaasˤ-u-n   ʔabriyaaʔ-u     fii    ħawaadiθ-i     
     3- injure.Pass-Nom persons-Nom-N     innocent.Pl-Nom    in    accidents-Gen 
     s-sayyr 
     the-traffic 
 (Innocent persons are injured in traffic accidents) 
 
     c. ʔatˤfaal-u-n  mina  l-ʤinsayn-i  y-amradˤ-uu-na  fii  
      children-Nom-N     from the-genders.D-Gen  3-get sick-Pl.Nom-N   at  
  sinn-i   l-xadaaʤ 
       age-Gen  the-prematurity 
   (Premature babies of both genders get sick) 
 
The sentences in (72) are true characterizing sentences though they use bare NPs as subject arguments 
and intriguingly S-level predicates - yaʤuuʕ ‘starve’, yusˤaab ‘get injured’, yamradˤ ‘get sick’. Each 
sentence obtains a generic reading to the exclusion of an episodic reading. This gives further support 
to refuting the claim that such sentences entertain non-existential interpretation in virtue of the 
predicate incorporated per se, particularly I-level predicates. In a nutshell, the predicate’s level per se 
does not seem to have significant bearing on the kind of interpretation assigned to certain 
constructions similar to those in (69&71). Thus, it seems that the question about this puzzling 
behavior of bare NPs in such constructions needs a different kind of explanation.  
                                                          
48
 It is noteworthy that sentences (c&d) can express a generic reading if the bare NP subjects are changed to al-
N subjects. This supports the claim proposed here that the existential denotation entertained by the bare NP 
subjects in such sentences is not a product of their interaction with the predicates associated. 
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A more plausible explanation can be arrived at if we investigate the internal structure of the 
bare NPs in (70&72). It is obvious that all the bare NPs are modified in one way or another
49
. In 
(70.a), for instance, we are not talking about a believer, but rather a special type of believer - one who 
is physically and spiritually strong or weak. Similarly, (b) does not report about a dog and a lion, but 
a dog with a specific property, being alive, and a lion being dead. The same holds for the bare subject 
argument dog in (c) which is modified as being strong. The other NPs in (70) and those in the 
sentences in (72) are analyzed in the same fashion. Nevertheless, what bearing does modification 
have on the denotation of bare nouns in MSA? The answer to this question is not different from the 
answer proposed to a similar one raised above (section 6.2) about the indefinite in form CS. 
Modification changes the denotation of bare nouns from denoting relevant  individuals existentially to 
denoting  intensional sets of individuals to which the descriptive content of the noun and the modifier 
applies
50
. Therefore, instead of muʔmin ‘a believer’ being existentially calculated, the NP muʔmin 
qawiyy ‘a strong believer’ denotes the set of ‘individual strong believers’. Put differently, modified 
bare NPs are semantically indefinite in the real sense; while unmodified bare NPs are existential. This 
means that modified bare NPs, unlike their unmodified counterparts, are not tied to a particular 
individual or a group of individuals, but rather a modified bare NP denotes variable individuals. This 
is a crucial requirement for any nominal expression to be allowed as a subject argument in a 
characterizing sentence.  
This analysis can be bolstered by the fact that removing modification from the sentences in 
(70&72) renders them either ungrammatical – in particular those in which bare NPs introduce the 
sentences, or significantly changes their meanings – particularly sentences in which bare NPs do not 
introduce the sentences- from expressing a generic reading to expressing an episodic reading. The 
                                                          
49
 It is worth mentioning that Fassi Fehri (2012) mentioned that bare NPs in MSA can be used in generic 
sentences when modified. However, he did not provide an explanation for this insightful observation. Providing 
an explanation for this observation is an important goal of this section. 
 
50
 This dissertation will not explore why and how modification changes the denotation of bare NPs. These 
questions are very interesting and need thorough investigation.  
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ungrammaticality of such sentences with unmodified bare NP subject arguments can be explicated if 
we notice that they denote existentially calculated individuals, and are in SV sentences. MSA, as 
mentioned in (7.1), does not allow bare nouns denoting existential referents in SV order. To allow 
them in subject argument position, these NPs must fulfil two conditions. First, a syntactic condition 
enforces VS word order of the sentence for such NPs to be incorporated. Second, a semantic 
condition restricts their denotation to existentially calculated referents. Therefore, it appears that bare 
NPs in MSA can only be allowed in characterizing sentences if the head noun is modified. The 
grammaticality of incorporating modified bare NPs in SV structure, unlike their unmodified bare 
nouns, shows that they no longer denote existential individuals, hence can be used in characterizing 
sentences. 
However, there are sentences which associate unmodified indefinite NPs, and still entertain 
generic readings exclusively. Such sentences pose some problems to the analysis proposed above. 
The sentences in (73) lay this point out. 
(73) a. maa         marr-a    walad-u-n fii haaða   l-ħayy-i       ʔillaa   
    whenever   passed-3  boy-Nom-N in  this       the-neighborhood-Gen   but 
     raʔaa  ʔawlaad-a-n  y-alʕab-uu-na  fi ʃ-ʃaariʕ 
     saw-3  boys-Acc-N 3-play-Pl.Nom-N in the-street 
    (Whenever a boy passes by this neighborhood, he sees boys playing on the street) 
 
     b. ʕindamaa y-azʔar-u ʔasad-u-n t-afirr-u z-zaraafat-u  
  when  3-rooar-Nom lion-Nom-N 3.f-run-Nom the-giraffes-Nom 
  haariba 
  escaping 
    (When a lion roars, giraffes run away) 
 
     c. ʔaynamaa wallaa  naaðˤir-u-n   waʤh-a-hu      raʔaa ʔaʃʤaar 
    wherever turned-3 beholder-Nom-N face-Acc-his saw-1 trees 
    (Wherever a beholder turns his face, he sees trees) 
 
The sentences in (73) use unmodified bare NPs in subject arguments and S-level predicates; 
nevertheless, they can only be interpreted generically. More accurately, the bare NPs in these 
sentences do not denote existentially calculated individuals, but rather intensional sets of individuals 
compatible with generic sentences. The sentence in (a) reports a generalization about situations which 
have a boy and boys in them, stating that if s is a situation of a boy passing by, s is a situation of that 
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boy seeing boys playing on the street. Similarly, (b) expresses a fact that if s is a situation of a lion 
roaring, then s is a situation of giraffes running away. As well, (c) generalizes over situations in 
which a beholder turns his face, saying that these situations are such that the beholder sees trees. It is 
clear that these sentences are habituals; they generically quantify over situations not entities. They 
include the so-called temporal when-clause, which quantifies over situation variables that must not be 
tied to a particular event (Krifka et al. 1995). Since habituals quantify over intensional sets of 
situations, it is reasonable to deduce that the individuals involved in these situations cannot be 
existentially calculated, simply because the very situations in habituals are not existentially 
calculated, but rather intensionally quantified. Situation entities in habituals are picked according to 
certain properties which decide whether a certain situation satisfies or obtains these properties or not, 
hence being in or out of the set. It is worth mentioning that habituals change the meaning of S-level 
predicates into I-level predicates by changing the eventive episodic verbal predicate into a stative 
predicate
51
. This explains why the habituals in (73) use S-level eventive predicates.  
In sum, bare NPs in MSA dominantly receive existential interpretation with both S-level and 
I-level predicates, and thus cannot be employed in characterizing sentences unless the denotation of 
these NPs is changed by modification from denoting existentially calculated, particular referents to 
referring to variable individuals.  Another construction that allows bare nouns in generic sentences is 
habitual sentences, which generalize over situations. In other words, bare nouns in MSA can be only 
used in generic sentences when are quantificational, rather than referential. 
8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the syntactic intricacies of nominal phrases in MSA, a morphologically rich 
language, were discussed. It has been shown that almost all noun forms can be used in generic 
sentences. No noun form, however, has been proved to be used as an exclusive generic marker. All 
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 See Krifka et al. (1995) for a detailed discussion of the semantic interaction between habituals and stative 
predicates. 
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the nominal expressions compatible with generic sentences were shown to be compatible with other 
constructions, like episodic sentences.  
The grammatically definite NP in particular appears semantically complicated in MSA. It is 
ambiguous among three competing denotations: denoting an existentially unique individual, an 
intensional set of individuals, and a kind or genus. The first two competing denotations were shown 
to be a reflection of the exact definiteness status of al-Ns in MSA. The former is compatible with an 
al-N being definite in the real sense, where an al-N refers to a familiar, identifiable, or unique 
individual. The latter, where an al-N denotes a set of individuals to which the descriptive content of 
the noun applies, is compatible with determining the al-N as semantically indefinite based on the 
definiteness criteria. An interesting consequence of this crucial distinction between definite in form 
and sense al-Ns and indefinite in sense al-Ns is refuting the two semantic repercussions of the 
traditional grammarians’ view of determining definites/indefinites based on the presence/absence of 
al ‘the’.  According to the traditional view of definiteness in MSA, every al-N phrase is 
grammatically and semantically definite. Therefore, characterizing sentences, the bulk of genericity 
phenomenon in natural languages, are either completely absent in MSA, or the semantic architecture 
of characterizing sentences in MSA is idiosyncratic and language particular.  This indicates that, 
contra to the structure of a characterizing sentence in other natural languages, it does not require a 
subject argument nominal expression that denotes variable individuals, but rather is tied to a 
particular individual. These two outcomes are awkward and sound unnatural to native speakers who 
overwhelmingly use characterizing sentences to express facts and generalizations about the world in a 
way similar to that used in other natural languages. Discriminating between al-Ns in terms of 
semantic definiteness excludes these two odd consequences. According to the claim elaborated in this 
chapter, characterizing sentences are not only ubiquitous in the language under investigation, but also 
conform to the semantic structure of characterizing sentences; in the sense that a generalization over 
variable individuals provided by an indefinite in sense al-N is expressed. The predicate used, along 
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with other syntactic and contextual clues, helps determine the exact denotation of the definite NP in a 
sentence, and the reading expressed, generic/non-generic.  
It has been shown that both definite singular and definite plural NPs can be associated with 
kind level predicates, and thus both constructions appear equivalent in their use as kind-referring NPs. 
However, kind-referring nominal expressions in MSA, on par with those in other languages, must 
denote well-established kinds to be recognized as kind-referring NPs. 
The construct state was shown to be compatible with generic sentences. The grammatically 
indefinite construct state can be used in characterizing sentences, whereas the grammatically definite 
construct state can be used in both characterizing sentences and reference to kind sentences. In the 
latter, the definite construct state denotes not a kind but a sub-kind. This is due to the indirect 
modification that holds between the head noun and its complement, giving rise to a nominal 
expression denoting a more specific sub-kind or sub-species.  
Contrary to the traditional view, which dominantly identifies bare NPs as denoting 
individuals existentially, bare NPs have been shown compatible with generic sentences – 
characterizing sentences in particular - if modified, and with existential sentences if unmodified. It 
has been argued that modification changes the semantics of bare nouns in MSA from being 
existential, denoting existentially particular individuals, to be quantificational, denoting intensional 
sets of individuals. This semantic change qualifies bare nouns to be used in characterizing sentences, 
but not in reference to kind sentences because they become quantificational rather than referential.  
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CHAPTER 5: ON GENERICITY IN THE VERBLESS SENTENCE IN MSA  
1. Introduction 
The present tense verbless sentence in MSA exhibits a syntactic asymmetry in that copula  
ya-kuun ‘Pres-be’52 is obligatorily null in some sentences (1), optionally expressed in others (2), and 
obligatorily expressed in still other sentences (3). 
(1) a. *ya-kuunu/Ø  al-walad-u  ʤaaʔiʕ  
   Pres-be/Ø  the-boy-Nom-N hungry 
    (The boy is hungry) 
 
b. *ya-kuunu/Ø  al-ʔasad-u   ħayawaan-u-n  muftaris 
  Pres-be/Ø the-lion-Nom  animal-Nom-N  fierce 
     (The lion is a fierce animal) 
 
c. *ya-kuunu/Ø  ʔaħmad-u  fi  l-bayt 
    Pres-be/Ø Ahmad-Nom in the-house 
    (Ahmad is home) 
 
(2) a. ta-kuunu/Ø  as-samaaʔ-u  sˤaafiyat-a/u-n  fi sˤ-sˤayf 
            Pres.f-be/Ø the-sky-Nom  clear-Acc/Nom-N in the-summer 
   (The sky is clear in summer) 
 
b. ta-kuunu/Ø al-madaaris-u   muɣlaqat-a/u-n   fi sˤ-sˤayf 
    Pres.f-be/Ø the-schools-Nom closed-Acc/Nom-N in the-summer 
   (Schools are closed in summer) 
 
        c. ta-kuunu/Ø  aʃ-ʃawaariʕ-u   muzdaħimat-a/u-n  fi  l-mudun 
  Pres.f-be/Ø the-streets-Nom  busy-Acc/Nom-N in the-cities 
   (Streets are busy in cities) 
 
(3) a. ta-kuunu/*Ø  l-bint-u   fi  l-bayt-i  ʔawqaat-a ðˤ-ðˤahiira 
    Pres.f-be/Ø the-girl-Nom in the-house-Gen   times-Acc the-noon 
                                                          
52
 In MSA, ya-kuun and its past and future forms are not treated as full verbs. They are treated as degenerate 
(not full verbs), functional verbs. Their presence, for instance, does not change a nominal sentence into a 
verbal one like other vebs. Subject-predicate sentences with or without them are treated as nominal 
sentences. This definition of a verbless sentence is shared by many traditional and modern Arab grammarians 
(e.g. Bakir 1980; Sibawayh 1988, d. 796; Fassi Fehri 1993, Benmamoun 2000). Following this tradition, this 
project treats any sentence with no full verb as a verbless sentence. 
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   (The girl is home at noon times) 
        
        b. ya-kuunu/*Ø  muħammad-u-n          sahraan-a-n           mina  l-ʕaaʃirat-i   ħattaa  l- faʤr 
            Pres-be/Ø       Muhammad-Nom-N  staying up-Acc-N  from   the-ten-Gen  until    the-dawn 
             (Muhammad stays up late from ten to dawn) 
 
c. ya-kuunu/?Ø  l-ʕariis-u             muħraʤ-a-n           fii  laylat-i  z-zafaaf 
    Pres-be          the-groom-Nom   embarrassed-Acc-N    in   night-Gen the-wedding 
(The groom is embarrassed on the wedding night) 
This asymmetry, this chapter emphasizes, reflects a semantic disinction between generic and 
nongeneric readings of the sentences in question. The claim is that sentences which prohibit an overt 
ya-kuun (1) vary in the kind of interpretation they express on par with a variation in the incorporated 
predicate, and the definiteness status of the NP subject. More precisely, sentences with S-level 
predicates give rise to an episodic interpretation only. Sentences with I-level predicates, however, are 
ambiguous between generic/non-generic interpretations based on the context which provides the 
correct denotation of the al-N subject used (see chapter 4, section 4.3.1). Sentences with K-level 
predicates admit reference to a kind genericity only. In contrast to sentences that prohibit the marker, 
sentences which optionally allow overt copula ya-kuun (2) obtain an important additional syntactic-
semantic ingredient. This ingredient is an adverbial adjunct. These sentences are ambiguous between 
generic-habitual in particular- and nongeneric readings when copula ya-kuun is null. However, if ya-
kuun is overtly realized only a generic reading can be obtained. Put differently, the overt presence of 
copula ya-kuun forces a generic interpretation as the only acceptable reading of the present tense 
verbless sentence in MSA. Sentences in which ya-kuun is obligatorily expressed (3) are compatible 
with a generic interpretation only. Their counterparts with unexpressed copula are either highly odd 
and unnatural, or require complex pragmatic machinery to validate them. In this case, they can 
express episodicity only. 
In addition to this short introduction, the chapter incorporates another four sections. Section 2 
briefly presents the syntactic facts of the verbless sentence in MSA, shedding some light on 
permissible and impermissible constructions, which in turn allows investigation of the semantic facts 
associated with these syntactic restrictions on the structure of the verbless sentence in MSA, the 
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presence/absence of copula ya-kuun in particular. The focus of section 3 is to analyze and account for 
the syntactic facts presented in section 2 in semantic terms. A generic interpretation is attributed to 
those present tense verbless sentences with an overt copula ya-kuun, but not to those without one. 
This meaning difference might suggest that those sentences that do not show an overt copula do not 
have one underlyingly. Section 4 investigates the negative verbless sentence. It will be shown that the 
two negative particles employed to negate the verbless sentences are in complementary distribution 
with regard to the presence/absence of copula ya-kuun in the sentence. This distribution supports the 
semantic analysis proposed for the asymmetries of the verbless sentence based on generic/non-
generic distinction. Finally, a brief conclusion is given in section 5.   
2. The Verbless Sentence in MSA: Asymmetrical Behavior of the Copula 
The verbless sentence in Arabic syntax has been a topic of discussion and debate since the 
time of Sibawaih (c.800 AD), the great traditional grammarian (Al-Horais 2006). It is defined as a 
sentence that lacks an overt copula ‘ya-kuun ’ (Pres-be) in the present tense. It only selects an initial 
NP, traditionally termed ‘almubtadaʔ’ (topic), and a predicate ‘alxabar’ (comment), which can be 
NP, PP, AP, or AdP. These two constituents are termed the copula subject and copula complement in 
the modern literature on copula constructions (Curnow 2000; Dixon 2002; McKay 2010). These 
points are illustrated in (4) below. 
(4) a. al-ʤaww-u              ʤamiil-u-n    haaðihi  l-ʔayyaam 
    the-weather-Nom   nice-Nom-N  these  the-days 
   (The weather is nice these days) 
 
  b. al-bint-u fi  l-bayt 
      the-girl-Nom    in  the-house 
        (The girl is at home) 
 
     c. Zayd-u-n      tˤaalib 
         Zayd-Nom-N    student 
          (Zayd is a student) 
 
  d. ʔaħmad-u         hunaa 
      Ahmad-Nom here 
       (Ahmad is here) 
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The sentences in (4) clearly show the absence of a copula in present tense. (4.a) has an initial NP and 
an AP that reports something about the initial NP; (4.b-d) are similar to (4.a) in having an initial NP, 
but differ in the type of predicate each sentence has, PP,NP, and AdP are predicated to the  initial NPs 
in (4b-d), respectively. 
Inserting copula ya-kuun to any of the sentences in (4) will render it ungrammatical. 
(5) a. * ya-kuunu  l-ʤaww-u               ʤamiil-a-n    haaðihi  l-ʔayyaam   
          Pres-be     the-weather-Nom   nice-Acc-N    these  the-days 
      (The weather is nice these days) 
 
b. * ta-kuunu l-bint-u           fi   l-bayt 
 Pres.f-be  the-girl-Nom   in  the-house 
     (The girl is at home) 
 
c. * ya-kuunu       Zayd-u-n      tˤaalib 
 Pres-be   Zayd-Nom-N    student 
    (Zayd is a student) 
 
d. * ya-kuunu     ʔaħmad-u   hunaa 
Pres-be       Ahmad-Nom    here 
    (Ahmad is here) 
 
The only difference between the grammatical sentences in (4) and their ungrammatical counterparts 
in (5) is the presence of copula ya-kuun. It is worth mentioning that the present and future forms of 
copula ya-kuun, (kanna & sa-yakuun), are obligatorily expressed in present and future tense verbless 
sentences. The data in (6) and (7) give examples of both the past and the future tenses, respectively. 
(6) a. kaana      l-ʤaww-u               ʤamiil-a-n    l-baariħa 
            be.past  the-weather-Nom    nice-Acc-N      the-yesterday 
  (The weather was nice yesterday) 
 
b. kaana-t    l-bint-u            fi   l-bayt-i              qabla     saaʕa 
    be.past-f      the-girl-Nom   in  the-house-Gen  before  hour 
 (The girl was at home an hour ago) 
 
c. kaana            Zayd-u-n       tˤaalib-a-n       fi    s-sanat-i        l-maadˤiya 
    be.past         Zayd-Nom-N    student-Acc-N   in  the-year-Gen the-last 
 (Zayd was a student last year) 
 
d. kaana         ʔaħmad-u        hunaa    ʔams 
    be-past       Ahmad-Nom    here     yesterday 
 (Ahmad was here yesterday) 
 
(7) a. sa-yakuunu l-ʤaww-u                 ʤamiil-a-n    ɣadan 
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         Fut-be         the-weather-Nom     nice-Acc-N     tomorrow 
 (The weather will be nice tomorrow) 
 
b. sa-takuunu l-bint-u             fi   l-bayt-i              baʕda    saaʕa 
Fut-f.be     the-girl-Nom    in  the-house-Gen  after       hour 
  (The girl will be at home in an hour) 
 
c. sa-yakuunu      Zayd-u-n     tˤaalib-a-n  fi  s-sanat-i          l-qaadima 
    Fut-be  Zayd-Nom-N    student-Acc-N    in  the-year-Gen   the-coming 
  (Zayd will be a student next year) 
 
        d. sa-yakuunu  ʔaħmad-u          hunaa    ɣadan  
            Fut-be      Ahmad-Nom     here      tomorrow 
  (Ahmad will be here tomorrow) 
 
The data in (6) and (7) make it clear that in the past and future tenses, the copula must be 
phonologically overt if such sentences are to be grammatical. In fact, deleting the copula in any 
sentence in (6) or (7) automatically renders that sentence unacceptable. 
(8) a.*al-ʤaww-u  ʤamiil-u-n l-baariħa 
   the-weather-Nom    nice-Nom-N the-yesterday 
    (The weather was nice yesterday) 
 
   b.*al-bint-u            fi   l-bayt-i              qabla     saaʕa 
    the-girl-Nom   in  the-house-Gen  before     hour 
     (The girl was at home an hour ago) 
 
   c.* al-ʤaww-u           ʤamiil-u-n     ɣadan 
    the-weather-Nom      nice-Nom-N       tomorrow 
      (The weather will be nice tomorrow) 
 
   d.*ʔaħmad-u         hunaa    ɣadan  
            Ahmad-Nom    here      tomorrow 
   (Ahmad will be here tomorrow) 
 
As evident from the data presented so far, it can be observed that there is a kind of asymmetry 
in the surface structure of the verbless sentence in the present tense on one hand, and its past and 
future counterparts on the other. In general, no copula is allowed in the present tense; whereas, the 
copula seems obligatory in both the past and future tenses. This asymmetry is not peculiar to the 
verbless sentence in MSA. It is a relatively common crosslinguistic phenomenon in languages 
entertaining verbless constructions.  Dixon (2002:17), in his typological study of over than 250 
Australian languages, notes that “a copula is likely to be omitted if reference is to present time, but 
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included – with the appropriate tense suffix – for past or future reference.”  Nordlinger and Sadler 
(2007) also claim that in a large number of languages, the absence of present tense copula is 
correlated with the use of overt non-present tense copula forms.  
However, investigating more data from MSA reveals that in certain constructions copula ya-
kuun presents itself as a phonologically optional constituent in present-tense verbless sentences. 
Consider the data in (9) below. 
(9) a. al-ʤaww-u  baarid-u-n   fi  ʃ-ʃitaaʔ 
     the-weather-Nom cold-Nom-N  in  the-winter 
   (The weather is cold in winter) 
 
         a'. ya-kuunu        l-ʤaww-u     baarid-a-n   fi   ʃ-ʃitaaʔ 
      Pres-be  the-weather-Nom     cold-Acc-N   in  the-winter 
        (The weather is cold in winter) 
 
  b. al-muslimuuna  kuramaaʔ-u       fii  ramadˤaan 
      the-muslims.Nom     generous.Pl-Nom  in  Ramadan 
        (Muslims are generous in (the month of) Ramadan) 
 
  b'. ya-kuunu    l-muslimuuna    kuramaa?-a    fii   ramadˤaan 
       Pres-be   the-muslims.Nom     generous.Pl-Acc  in  Ramadan 
         (Muslims are generous in (the month of) Ramadan) 
 
  c. at-tanaqul-u   sˤaʕb-u-n fi   sˤ-sˤabaaħ 
       the-moving-Nom  hard-Nom-N   in   the-morning 
         (Commuting is hard in the morning) 
 
  c'. ya-kuunu     at-tanaqul-u   sˤaʕb-u-n fi   sˤ-sˤabaaħ 
      Pres-be the-moving-Nom  hard-Nom-N   in   the-morning 
         (Commuting is hard in the morning) 
 
 (9.a,b&c) and their minimal pairs in (9.a',b'&c') employ the present tense to express  
propositions whose truth or falsity is evaluated in the present, past, and future; they express 
generalizations over a group of situations. In such a construction, the phonological realization of 
copula ya-kuun is optional. This optionality of the overt presence of copula ya-kuun is interesting, and 
calls for a thorough investigation to construct a plausible account that would explain the asymmetric 
behavior of copula ya-kuun in verbless sentences. The optionality raises the question of whether or 
not there is an underlying, “silent” ya-kuun in sentences where ya-kunn in not expressed.  
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The asymmetrical behavior of copula ya-kuun is further explicated in sentences in which its 
overt presence is obligatory. This is explained in (10). 
(10) a. ya-kuunu  kalb-ii   ʤaaʔiʕ-a-n   fi  l-masaaʔ 
            Pres-be dog-my  hungry-Acc-N  in the-evening 
    (My dog is hungry in the evening) 
 
   a'. ?kalb-ii   ʤaaʔiʕ-u-n   fi  l-masaaʔ 
 dog-my hungry-Nom-N  in the-evening 
   (My dog is hungry in the evening) 
 
   b. ya-kuunu  l-muʕallim-u   saʕiid-a-n fi l-ʔiʤaazaat 
  Pres-be the-teacher-Nom happy-Acc-N in the-holidays 
  (A teacher is delighted in holidays) 
 
   b'. *al-muʕallim-u saʕiid-a-n fi l-ʔiʤaazaat 
     the-teacher-Nom happy-Acc-N in the-holidays 
   (A teacher delighted in holidays) 
 
           c. ta-kuunu l-marʔat-u   ʕasˤabiyyat-a-n  waqt-a      
              Pres.f-be     the-woman-Nom nervous-Acc-N  time-Acc   
 d-dawrat-i   ʃ-ʃahriyya 
 the-cycle-Gen    the-monthly 
   (A woman is nervous during the menstrual cycle) 
 
           c'. ?l-marʔat-u   ʕasˤabiyyat-u-n   waqt-a      d-dawrat-i        ʃ-ʃahriyya 
    the-woman-Nom nervous-Nom-N  time-Acc  the-cycle-Gen  the-monthly 
  (A woman is nervous during the menstrual cycle) 
  
The presence of copula ya-kuun in (10.a-c) is the preferred structure as their ‘copula-less’ minimal 
pairs in (10. a'-c') are only good under special pragmatic circumstances that well be discussed in 
section (3) below. 
After presenting relevant syntactic facts about verbless sentences in MSA, I turn to discuss 
these intricacies from a semantic perspective.  
3 The Semantics of the Verbless Sentence in MSA  
This section restricts itself to discuss the semantics of the present tense verbless sentence in 
MSA. It proposes a semantic account for the syntactic distribution of copula ya-kuun based on a 
generic/nongeneric distinction. To be more specific, I propose the generalization in (11) to account 
for the correlation between the overt realization of copula ya-kuun and the generic/nongeneric 
interpretation.  
172 
 
(11) The distribution of copula ya-kuun in present tense verbless sentence 
 
a. Copula yakuun must be licensed by a spatio/temporal adverbial.  
b. Present tense verbless sentences with such an adverbial come in two kinds: 
 
1. Copula yakuun is optional, with a generic-nongeneric meaning difference based on      
the choice of the predicate and the definiteness status of the copula subject.  
 
2. Copula yakuun is required based on the choice of the predicate and its interaction with 
the adverbial. 
 
c. The presence of a spatio/temporal adverbial does not guarantee the presence of yakuun. 
 
d. Present tense verbless sentences without adverbial licensors, and therefore without 
copula   yakuun can receive varied generic/nongeneric interpretations based on the 
predicate used as copula complement and the nominal form used as copula subject. 
 
In order to illustrate how this generalization about the syntactic-semantic correlation of 
copula ya-kuun and the generic/nongeneric interpretation works, three sections are presented below. 
Section (3.1) will be dedicated to investigate the semantic intricacies of verbless sentences with 
obligatorily absent copula ya-kuun. Section (3.2) will investigate the semantics of verbless sentences 
with optionally expressed/unexpressed copula. Section (3.3) will probe the semantics of verbless 
sentences with obligatory overt copula. 
3.1 Obligatorily-Absent Copula 
The canonical structure of the present tense verbless sentence in MSA is that it does not allow 
copula ya-kuun in its Phonetic Form (PF), as opposed to its past and future tense counterparts in 
which the copula is obligatory. Therefore, the exact semantics of the present tense verbless sentence 
depends on the nominal form of the copula subject and the copula complement. There is a correlation 
between the predicate’s level, S-level, I-level, or K-level predicates, and the NP subject, semantically 
definite/indefinite, object-referring NP, or kind-referring NP, on the one hand; and the overall 
interpretation of the sentence, generic or episodic, on the other hand. The data in (12) illustrate the 
correlation between the use of S-level predicates and the presence of an episodic interpretation of the 
sentence as the only available interpretation. Copula ya-kuun is incompatible with these sentences. 
(12) a. laylaa ɣadˤbaan-a  l-yawm 
  Laila angry-f  the-day 
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  (Laila is angry today) 
 
  b. al-ʕusˤfuur-u  ʕalaa ʃ-ʃaʤara  fii bayt-i-naa 
 the-sparrow-Nom on the-tree  in  house-Gen-our 
   (The sparrow is in the tree in our house) 
 
  c. kalb-u-n sˤaɣiir-u-n ʔamaam-a bayt-i-naa 
      dog-Nom-N small-Nom-N front-Acc house-Gen-our 
   (A small dog is in front of our house) 
 
  d. ar-riiħ-u  qawiyy-at-u-n   haaða l-massaʔ 
  the-wind-Nom   strong-f-Nom-N this the-evening 
   (The wind is strong this evening)  
 
The only reading available for the sentences in (12) is episodic. The truth of the propositions 
depends on reference to some interim situations and contextual clues; thus, these propositions cannot 
be construed generically. Episodicity is contributed by the use of S-level predicates, “highly 
temporary states or events” (Carlson 2005:16), and the use of proper nouns or existentially calculated 
NP subjects
53
. The sentence in (a), according to Carlson’s account of S-level/I-level predicate 
distinction, reports an isolated fact about Laila being angry at a particular time and location. This 
property is ephemeral, and thus applies to a spatio-temporal slice of the individual Laila. Similarly, 
(b) reports an accidental fact about an existentially unique sparrow as being in a specific tree on a 
specific time. The sentences in (c&d) give similar episodic interpretations
54
 in that both sentences 
refer to particular, existentially calculated individuals on specific situations.  Therefore, it seems 
plausible to claim that the insertion of S-level predicates enforces unequivocal episodic reading of a 
sentence. 
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 Individual-level predicates are treated as part of the family of generics. However, at least three different 
views on the distinction of I-level and S-level predicates are argued for in the literature. For Carlson (1977, 
2005), genericity of I-level predicates is triggered by their interaction with the NP subjects, whethere they are 
existential or generic. Kratzer (1995), however, accounts for the distinction by positing that stage-level (but 
not individual-level) predicates have an extra eventuality/occasion argument. A third view is argued for in 
Cherchia (1995). Cherchia’s view is that all predicates, stage-level and individual-level, have eventuality 
argument, but what makes an individual-level predicate individual-level is that the argument must be bound 
by a generic operator. For Chierchia, all sentences that make use of individual-level predicates are generics of 
a type, hence his term inherently generics. 
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It is worth noting that verbless sentences in MSA disallow bare indefinite nouns in copula subject position 
unless modified. 
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However, MSA entertains present tense verbless sentences which do not tolerate an overt 
copula ya-kuun, and still receive ambiguous readings. In fact, incorporating I-level predicates brings 
about ambiguous sentences. In particular, a verbless sentence with I-level predicate is ambiguous 
between a more prominent generic reading and a less salient episodic reading. The context gives the 
required clues to tease these two readings apart based on the correct denotation of the al-N subject, 
definite or indefinite (see chapter 3, section 5). The examples in (13) illustrate this point further. 
(13) a. al-layl-u   ħaalik 
      the-night-Nom  dark 
  (The night is dark) 
 
b. al-faakihat-u      mufiidat-u-n   li-sˤiħħat-i          l-ʔinsaan 
the-fruits-Nom   useful-Nom-N   for-health-Gen   the-human 
  (Fruit is good for human health) 
 
 c. a ʃ-ʃitaaʔ-u  baarid 
     the-winter-Nom cold 
       (Winter is cold) 
 d. al-buum-u        ʃuʔm 
       the-owls-Nom   ominous 
   (Owls are ominous) 
 
The sentences in (13) do not accept an overt copula ya-kuun, and any attempt to insert it in 
any of these sentences will render the sentence ungrammatical. The asymmetry that these sentences 
create is that not tolerating a copula ya-kuun notwithstanding, these sentences, on their more salient 
readings, do not express temporal episodic propositions. They all express atemporal regularities about 
groups of individuals or objects. These sentences are dubbed lexical characterizing sentences in 
Krifka et al. (1995); who emphasize that lexical sentences do not generalize over events, but rather 
over “characterizing properties of individuals” (p.17); and are dubbed inherently-generic sentences in 
Chierchia (1995). 
Each sentence in (13) is ambiguous between generic/nongeneric interpretations, though the 
generic reading is more natural and salient. As has been discussed in chapter 4, the ambiguity of 
sentences incorporating I-level predicates and al-N subjects emerge from the alternate denotation of 
the al-N subject. If the al-N subject is semantically definite, the sentence expresses an episodic, 
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isolated fact about that particular referent of the subject NP. If the al-N, however, is shown to be 
indefinite, the sentence is generic. The context helps determining the in/definiteness of the al-N based 
on the definiteness criteria. If the sentence is uttered out of the blue, as the case with the sentences in 
(13), the episodic interpretation is highly unnatural and requires complex pragmatic machinery to be 
validated. This is because the al-N subjects in these sentences are more naturally interpreted to denote 
any individual, rather than a particular, definite individual, which satisfies the descriptive content of 
the noun. This ambiguity is likely due also to the lack of explicit morpho-syntactic generic markers. It 
is worth mentioning that in the absence of a generic marker; every generic sentence has an episodic 
interpretation that can be gleaned based on some pragmatic machinery. More accurately, every 
generic sentence, in the absence of a generic marker, is derived from an episodic sentence that can be 
promoted contextually, and based on other pragmatic tools.  In brief, in MSA, and many other 
languages, every generic sentence that lacks a generic marker can be interpreted episodically, but no 
episodic sentence entertains an alternative generic interpretation. This explains why most generic 
sentences in MSA are ambiguous between generic/nongeneric readings in the absence of an explicit 
context which can limit the denotation of the al-N subject to a particular individual, or to any 
individual to which the descriptive context of the noun applies.  
Careful scrutiny of the above sentences shows that the predicates used are all essential I-level 
predicates, rather than temporal S-level predicates. In fact, these sentences, on their generic readings, 
express laws or regulations that are not gleaned statistically as the inductive approach devises, but 
rather are seen as reflecting a causal rule or regulation that represents a certain structure out in the 
world (Carlson 1995). Such inherently generic sentences are better explained by the rules-and-
regulations approach as some scholars have observed (Greenberg 1998, Cohen 2002, to name but 
two). The sentence in (a), for example, provides two alternative readings. On one reading, which is 
more prominent, the sentence reports a property of nights in general being dark; it says that the 
property of ‘be dark’ is an inherent characteristic of night. This sentence can be plausibly restated as 
follows: To be night is to be dark. This is the generic reading. The other reading is episodic; it reports 
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an isolated fact about an existentially unique night salient in the context domain as being ‘dark’. 
Similarly, (b) can be interpreted either generically as reporting usefulness-to-human-health property 
of fruit in general, or as existentially, on which particular fruit is described as being useful to humans. 
The sentences in (c&d) can be interpreted in the same fashion. The context and other pragmatic 
machinery determine the exact denotation of the al-N subject, hence the interpretation of the verbless 
sentence with I-level predicate
55
.        
However, this does not explain the obligatory absence of copula ya-kuun in such sentences. A 
plausible explanation for this asymmetry is attested in Carlson’s (1995) claim that sentences that 
establish their genericity on a rule or regulation out in the world do not entertain a quantificational 
semantic structure. The truth and falsity of these statements are not statistical or quantificational. 
According to Krifka et al. (1995), these lexically characterizing sentences entertain the generic 
operator GEN, however, GEN does not generalize over situations, but rather over individuals to 
which the predicated properties are attributed. Copula ya-kuun, however, either allows for or 
grammatically marks genericity in sentences that express generalizations over events, situations, or 
cases. It can only surface in habituals, and is deemed absent in lexically characterizing sentences, see 
(3.2) below. In other words, copula ya-kuun functions as a morphosyntactic marker of habituality in 
MSA. This analysis also explains why ya-kuun is absent in verbless sentences with episodic readings. 
There is no generalization over situations in these sentences; rather there is reference to a particular 
situation.  
As the case with verbal sentences that incorporate K-level predicates (see chapter 4, section 
5), verbless sentences incorporating K-level predicates promote reference to a kind genericity as well. 
The sentences in (14) flesh this out. 
(14) a. an-namir-u mina θ-θadiyyaa  
  the-tiger-Nom from the-mammals 
  (The tiger is a mammal) 
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See chapter 4, section 4.3, for a discussion of the semantics of sentences with I-level predicates, for which 
verbless sentences with the same predicate level is no different.  
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  b. al-fiil-u  ħayawaan-u-n ʕalaa wa ʃak-i l-inqiraadˤ 
      the-elephant-Nom animal-Nom-N on verge-Gen the-extinction 
               (The elephant is on the verge of extinction) 
 
         c. ʤawz-u  l-hind-i    muntaʃir-u-n      fi l-manaatˤiq  l-ʔistiwaaʔiyya 
             nut-Nom the-India-Gen common-Nom-N   in the-areas  the-tropical 
      (The cocoanut is common in tropical areas) 
 
  d. al-faʔr-u  mina  l-qawaaridˤ 
 the-mouse   from  the-rodents 
  (The mouse is a rodent) 
 
            e. al-fiyalat-u   ħayawaanaat-u-n  ʕaaʃiba 
                the-elephants-Nom animal.Pl-Nom-N herbivore 
    (Elephant are herbivores) 
 
The sentences in (14) represent reference to kind generics. In (a), for example, the K-level predicate 
mina θ-θadiyyaat ‘be a mammal’ can only select a generic NP an-namir ‘the tiger’ which denotes the 
species itself. Similarly, (b) uses another K-level predicate ʕalaa wa ʃak-i l-inqiraadˤ  ‘on the verge of 
extinction’, which can only apply to a kind or subkind; no single elephant or a group of elephants can 
be on the verge of extinction, only the kind itself can hold this property. The sentences in (c-e) 
receive the same reference to a kind interpretation, and this is clear from the K-level predicates used. 
In sum, the semantics of the verbless sentence with obligatorily null copula is in general 
determined by the predicate level and the noun phrase incorporated. According to this analysis, there 
are unequivocal correlations between S-level predicates and episodic interpretation, I-level predicates 
and ambiguous generic/nongeneric interpretation, and K-level predicates and reference to a kind 
interpretation. All the examples discussed in this section disallow copula ya-kuun to surface. In fact, 
inserting the copula in any of the examples will render it ungrammatical. Copula ya-kuun cannot 
surface in both episodic sentences and lexically characterizing sentences that represent laws, rules, or 
regulations.  
However, some verbless sentences of a certain structure optionally allow copula ya-kuun to 
surface, creating a semantically more complex structure that will be investigated in (3.2) below. It 
will be shown that ya-kuun can only mark genericity in quantificationally generic sentences, habituals 
in particular. 
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3.2 Optionally-Present Copula  
Sentences where copula ya-kuun can optionally surface are slightly more complicated than 
those discussed in (3.1) above, where ya-kuun is deemed phonologically null for those sentences to be 
acceptable. In these sentences, however,  copula ya-kuun can be either realized overtly, where only a 
generic interpretation could be obtained, or remain unpronounced, rendering the sentence ambiguous 
between a generic/nongeneric interpretation depending on the predicate, NP subject, and other 
pragmatic considerations. Some of the sentences in (9), repeated in (15) for convenience, lay this 
point out. 
(15) a. al-ʤaww-u  baarid-u-n   fi  ʃ-ʃitaaʔ 
     the-weather-Nom cold-Nom-N  in  the-winter 
   (The weather is cold in winter) 
 
          a'. ya-kuunu l-ʤaww-u                 baarid-a-n  fi   ʃ-ʃitaaʔ 
       Pres-be the-weather-Nom     cold-Acc-N  in  the-winter 
          (The weather is cold in winter) 
 
  b. al-muslimuuna  kuramaaʔ-u       fii  ramadˤaan 
       the-muslims.Nom     generous.Pl-Nom  in  Ramadan 
          (Muslims are generous in (the month of) Ramadan) 
 
  b'. ya-kuunu    l-muslimuuna    kuramaa?-a    fii   ramadˤaan 
       Pres-be   the-muslims.Nom     generous.Pl-Acc  in  Ramadan 
         (Muslims are generous in (the month of) Ramadan) 
 
  c. at-tanaqul-u   sˤaʕb-u-n fi   l-mudun 
      the-moving-Nom  hard-Nom-N   in   the-cities 
        (Commuting is hard in cities) 
 
  c'. ya-kuunu     at-tanaqul-u   sˤaʕb-a-n fi   sˤ-sˤabaaħ 
       Pres-be the-moving-Nom  hard-Acc-N   in   the-morning 
         (Commuting is hard in the morning) 
 
The sentences in (15)
56
 have additional ingredient, time/place reference adverbials, which 
might function as a situations provider
57
. Therefore, these sentences do not quantify over individuals, 
                                                          
56
 Astute readers must have noticed that the case of the predicate is nominative in the absence of copula and 
accusative when expressed. This syntactic asymmetry has no semantic bearing on the ultimate interpretation 
of the verbless sentence, hence will not be probed here.  This issue has been studied widely in the literature of 
the verbless sentence in MSA (e.g. (Bakir 1980; Fassi Fehri 1993; Benmamoun 2000). 
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but rather over situations provided contextually by the time/place reference adverbials
58
. In other 
words, these are true habituals, rather than lexically characterizing sentences. The first pair (a&a') 
gives a generalization about winter situations, rather than about weather individuals. Similarly, the 
pair in (b&b') generalizes over Ramadan situations, not over Muslim individuals. The pair in (c&c') 
express a generalization about morning situations which have commuting events saying that these 
situations are such that commuting is hard in them. Before delving in the semantic intricacies of these 
problematic structures, I briefly investigate the semantics of habitual sentences, focusing on the 
approach that will be adopted to account for the semantic intricacies of these structures. 
3.2. 1 Habituals: Two Contrasting Views  
Habituals are sentences that give generalizations about events or situations. The truth 
conditions of a habitual sentence are tied to the regularity of occurrence that is asserted in the 
sentence, rather than to the occurrence of an event at a particular place and time. This regularity is not 
established iteratively since in habituals the event does not need to occur several times in succession 
to be true. This is a condition for another class of sentences known as iteratives in the literature 
(Carlson 2006). Iteratives refer to a closed sequence of events, whereas habituals denote a potentially 
unlimited set of events (Lenci 1995). The major difference that sets habituals apart from other 
characterizing sentences, dispositional sentences for examples, is that for a habitual sentence to be 
true there must be some instance events that have already occurred or observed. The sentence ‘Mary 
takes the bus to school’ would be false if no single instance of Mary-taking-the-bus-to-school has 
occurred. Dispositional sentences, however, do not entertain such a provision; they do not require a 
single instantiation of the eventuality to be true. A dispositional sentence like ‘This printer prints 100 
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 By situation, I mean some event-like structure. Events, situations, and eventualities are not differentiated 
here. Treating the adverbial adjuncts as situations provider is one way of accounting for habituality meaning in 
verbless sentences modified by adverbials. Another way is to take the copula as the one that contributes a set 
of eventualities for the habitual operator to quantify over. 
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 In the absence of spatio-temporal adverbials, these sentences, with expressed yakkun in particular, are 
incompatible with adverbs of quantification like ‘always’. Those with unexpressed ya-kuun, however, sound 
odd with such adverbs, and need complex pragmatic machinery to validate them.  
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copies per minute’ would be unequivocally true even if that printer has not been used yet.  Mari, 
Beyssade, and Del Prete (2013b:56) emphasize that “Generics - at least their habitual subvariety…- 
seem to involve reference to plural events…to have already occurred and another plurality of such 
events to be expected to occur in the future.” Habituals in general share two basic properties: an 
extensional property realized through recurrence of events, and an intensional property of 
generalization associated with stativization (Vogeleer 2012).  
In the literature, two competing approaches have been elaborated to account for habituals: the 
quantificational approach (Krifka et al. 1995), which explicitly considers habituals a subvariety of 
generics, and the non-quantificational analysis proposed in (Boneh & Doron 2008, 2010, 2013; 
Kratzer 2007; Lenci 1995), which treats habituals, at least a certain class of habituals, as a distinct 
linguistic phenomenon.  
The quantificational analysis assumes that habituals are a subvariety of generics, in the sense 
that they share the same tripartite semantic structure, which incorporates an unexpressed modal 
generic operator, but instead of quantifying over a set of individuals, GEN in habituals quantifies over 
a set of situations provided by context. This operator has quasi-universal force, something like usually 
(Krifka et al. 1995). Habituality is taken as a subvariety of genericity based on its rule-like nature. 
This analysis accounts for the exception tolerance of habituals, a benchmark characteristic which they 
share with other generic types. In other words, the predicate does not need to hold in all situations for 
the habitual sentence to be true.  
A quantificational habitual is argued for, Vogeleer (2012) claims, when the sentence provides 
the ingredients of a tripartite quantificational structure. She claims that in quantificational habituals, 
the tripartite structure is triggered by an adverbial adjunct: a manner adverbial, a locative PP, or an 
instrumental PP, which she dubbed a phrase with cyclic iteration like after dinner, in summer, on 
Thursdays, etc. Most proponents of the quantificational analysis of habituals believe that the modal 
quantifier in quantificational habituals is GEN itself, the generic operator. Therefore, a 
quantificational habitual like (16) can be formally represented as follows: 
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(16) Aziz eats an apple after dinner. 
(17) GEN s [after dinner(s) & Aziz in s; ∃x [apple (x) & eat (s, Aziz, x)] 
 
The sentence in (16) is felicitous because it provides a restrictor for the generic operator to 
quantify over. When this restrictor is not explicitly provided, the sentence is rendered ungrammatical. 
Consider (18). 
(18) *Aziz eats an apple. 
  GEN s [-------- & Aziz in s; ∃x [apple (x) & eat (s, Aziz, x)] 
 
(16) entertains a tripartite structure where GEN restricts to the situation, and the nuclear scope can fall 
under GEN. Therefore, (16) is felicitous since GEN restricts to Aziz-after-dinner situations, and an 
apple takes a narrow scope, hence falling under GEN. This allows for a different apple per Aziz-after-
dinner-eating situation. However, (18) is infelicitous since no restrictor for GEN is provided. This 
sentence can be only interpreted with the existential quantifier having scope over the generic operator, 
which is infelicitous because the same apple cannot be eaten habitually. However, if we replace the 
singular apple with the plural form apples, the sentence can be felicitous since apples can be eaten 
habitually. 
The non-quantificational analysis, however, assumes that the basic ingredient of habituality, 
plurality of events, is not provided by a covert quantifier, but rather by the lexical verbs themselves, 
which “are born as plurals” (Kratzer 2007: 269)59. The verb fall, Kratzer claims, could relate plural 
individuals to plural events. On this view, verbs denote sums of events. Vogeleer (2012) argues that 
unlike quantificational sentences, which provide a restrictor for a quantifier over situations, non-
quantificational habituals lack such restrictor. This is bolstered by the fact the in quantificational 
sentences, the reading does not change drastically if the covert quantifier is made overt: ‘Mary eats 
breakfast with a fork= Mary usually eats breakfast with a fork’. The only change is that the latter 
loses the episodic reading. However, with non-quantificational sentences like ‘*Mary eats an apple 
vs. Mary usually eats an apple’, adding an overt adverbial cancels the ban on telic predicates like eat, 
and renders the sentence acceptable.  
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This claim has first been suggested in Krifka, M. (1992). 
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Lenci (1995) claims that quantificational and non-quantificational habituals are not one 
homogenous class. He presents four contexts that reveal the asymmetric behavior of the two types, 
and proposes based on these asymmetries that “these classes are really two well-distinguished 
semantic types, that act very differently in some relevant contexts” (P. 144). These contexts include: 
a. Perceptual reports:  
Unlike quantificational habituals (19), non-quantificational habituals (20) lose their habitual meaning 
when embedded in a perceptual report. Consider the examples below which are based on Lenci’s 
(1995) examples. 
(19) a. John often smokes.  
b. The lawyer saw John often smokes. 
(20) a. John smokes.  
        b. The lawyer saw John smokes. 
(19.b) preserves its habitual interpretation, whereas (20.b) can only receive an episodic interpretation. 
It is noteworthy that the argument is somewhat complicated by the fact that the eventuality requires a 
change in Tense/Aspect morphology.  ‘The lawyer saw John smokes’ does not report the direct 
perception of smoking event in which John took part. Rather, it can be paraphrased as ‘The lawyer 
saw that John smokes’, where the lawyer perceived something that indicates that John is indeed a 
smoker. 
b. Singular indefinite object NPs:   
Quantificational habituals with indefinite object NPs entertain two alternative readings: one with an 
indefinite NP taking wide scope over the quantifier, and another with a narrow scope. Consider (21): 
(21) a. Mike often repairs a car. 
        b. Mike repairs a car. 
The sentence in (a) is ambiguous between two readings. On the first reading, the indefinite NP is non-
specific. This indicates that there is a different car repaired by Mike. The second reading, the wide 
scope reading, the same car is repaired. However, non-quantificational sentences with indefinite NP 
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objects are not ambiguous. The only reading that (b) can receive is episodic; it is anomalous on a 
habitual reading. 
c. Impossible habituals: 
With respect to the predicate level, quantificational habituals are possible with any predicate, whereas 
non-quantificational habituals are not. If all habituals are one class, in which a generic operator splits 
the sentence into two parts, which is often associated with tense-aspectual markers, Lenci argues, why 
some sentences with exactly the same structure do not promote a habitual reading. This is illustrated 
in (22). 
(22) a. Mike sings. 
b. Mike sleeps. 
c. Mike wakes up. 
 
While (a) is perfectly acceptable as a non-quantificational habitual, it is not clear why (b&c) are not. 
Notice that providing (b&c) with an adverbial renders them correct on a habitual reading. 
(23) a. Mike sleeps after dinner. 
   b. Mike wakes up early. 
d. Negation:  
Quantificational habituals give rise to two alternative readings under negation. This is due to the 
scope effect of negation on the quantifier. 
(24) a. Mike does not often smoke. 
b. Mike does not smoke. 
Sentence (a) is ambiguous between two readings: (1) ‘It is not true that John smokes most of the 
time’, (wide scope of negation), (2) ‘It is often the case that John is not smoking’, (narrow scope of 
negation). However, scope ambiguity is not attested in non-quantificational sentences; (b) simply 
means that ‘John is not a smoker’. 
Proponents of the non-quantificational account reject analyzing habituality as a subtype of 
genericity, and instead propose treating it by means of Hab operator, which is distinct from the 
generic operator GEN. Hab is an intensional summation of events. It is “a modalized existential 
quantifier over sums of events” (Boneh and Doron 2013:177). However, Non-quantificational 
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approach advocates do not treat all habituals in the same way; they seem to distinguish between 
habitual sentences based on the syntactic ingredients incorporated, and whether a situations provider 
ingredient is available or not. In habituals which place explicit restrictions over events, GEN can be 
used; whereas, habituals that do not have explicit restrictor, another operator, Hab, is involved (Boneh 
and Doron 2013). Vogeleer (2012) claims that neither approach is successful in accounting for both 
habitual types. She proposes that labor be divided between the two approaches instead. 
Quantificational approach deals with quantificational habituals, and non-quantificational approach 
deals with non-quantificational habituals or “verbal-plural” habituals.  
Since the verbless structure we are dealing with is quantificational, in the sense that it 
involves a phrase with cyclic iteration that provides the required restrictor for a tripartite-structure 
analysis, the semantic account that will be provided will adopt the quantificational account presented 
in Krifka et al. (1995). 
3.2. 2 The Semantics of Verbless Sentences with Optionally Null Copula  
Verbless sentences with optionally unexpressed copula (25) are ambiguous between 
habitually generic reading and episodic reading based on the context and other pragmatic clues which 
determine the definiteness status of the al-N subjects and objects. These sentences provide the 
time/place reference ingredient functioning as a restrictor in a tripartite quantificational structure. In 
MSA, this additional ingredient can take different syntactic forms, which share one significant 
characteristic in that they provide situations. 
(25) a. al-ʔardˤ-u         zaahiya-t-u-n    fi   r-rabiiʕ 
  the-land-Nom   bright-f-Nom-N   in   the-spring 
    (The land is bright in spring) 
 
   b. al-ʤaww-u  baarid-u-n   fi    ʃ-ʃitaaʔ 
the-weather-Nom       cold-Nom-N  in  the-winter 
 (The weather is cold in winter) 
 
   c. al-ʤaww-u  ħaar-u-n ʕinda ðˤ-ðˤahiira 
   the-weather-Nom hot-Nom-N at the-noon 
    (The weather is hot at noon) 
 
   d. al-layl-u  ʃadiidu    ðˤ-ðˤulmat-i fi     ʃ-ʃitaaʔ 
185 
 
  the-night-Nom extremely-Nom  the-dark-Gen in the-winter 
   (The night is very dark in winter) 
 
   e. al-muθallaʤaat-u  matˤluubat-u-n   fi  l-ħarr 
the-ice cream  demanded-Nom-N in the-heat 
    (In hot (weather) ice cream is in demand) 
 
   f. al-ħaqaaʔib-u  dˤaruuriyyat-u-n  fi  s-safar 
the-bags-Nom  necessary-Nom-N in the-travel 
    (Bags are necessary while traveling) 
 
The sentences in (25) are ambiguous. On one reading, the sentence in (a), for instance, reports 
a habitual generalization, stating that all relevant spring situations are such that the land is bright in 
them. This reading can be formally represented using a tripartite structure as in (26). The other 
reading, though less salient and requires complex pragmatic machinery to be validated, is episodic. 
On this reading, the sentence reports an isolated fact about a certain land being bright at a particular 
spring situation.  
(26) GEN s [spring (s) ∃x [land (x) & bright (s, x)] 
 
Informally, (26) says that usually, whenever it is spring, the land is bright. Notice that this formula 
allows different lands on par with different spring situations. This is because the generic operator 
takes scope over the existential variable.  This structure represents the canonical quantificational 
habitual sentence. As for (b), the sentence also entertains two readings. The first reading, which 
sounds more plausible and neutral to pick by native speakers unless some pragmatic considerations 
push towards ignoring it, renders the sentence generically habitual.  It expresses a generalization over 
winter situations pertaining to how the weather regularly looks in these situations. The second 
interpretation allows for an episodic reading of the proposition where that sentence refers to a 
situation, rather than generalizes over situations. It says that a particular contextually salient 
individual weather, in a particular contextually prominent winter situation, is cold. Likewise, the 
sentence in (c) quantifies over noon situations, rather than over weather individuals. On its habitual 
reading, the sentence reports a generalization over noon situations, stating that in these situations the 
weather is hot. The second interpretation allows for an episodic reading of the sentence, where that 
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sentence refers to a particular temporal situation. This less salient reading reports an accidental fact 
about a specific noon situation, where the weather is hot. (d) is not a lexically characterizing sentence 
about nights in general, but rather a habitual sentence that generalizes over winter situations, 
summing up these situations as  involving nights which are habitually extremely dark. The other 
episodic reading of (d) is no different from those of (a-c). The sentences in (e&f) receive the same 
ambiguous interpretations between habitual/episodic readings.  
An interesting question pertaining to the classification of these sentences as habituals may 
arise. More precisely, why do we consider these sentences habituals, rather than lexically 
characterizing sentences? Is the presence of reference to time adjuncts sufficient to treat such 
sentences as habituals? The answer to this question is twofold. First, as mentioned in chapter 4, 
section 5, only reference to kind generics and habituals are compatible with S-level predicates. Other 
characterizing sentences are compatible with I-level predicates only. Close scrutiny of the predicates 
used in (25) reveals that all the predicates are S-level; bright, cold, hot, extremely dark, in demand, 
and necessary are S-level predicates, and nonetheless the sentences entertain generic readings.  In 
fact, replacing these predicates with I-level predicates renders verbless sentences with exactly the 
same structure ungrammatical. This is illustrated in (27). 
(27) a. *az-zaraafat-u  tˤawiil-at-u-n fi ʃ-ʃitaaʔ 
     the-giraffe-Nom-N tall-Nom-N in the-winter 
      (The/A giraffe is tall in winter) 
 
   b. *an-namir-u  ħayawaan-u-n  muxatˤtˤatˤu-n  fi   l-mudun  
     the-tiger-Nom animal-Nom-N  striped-Nom-N in the-cities 
     (The tiger is striped in cities) 
 
   c. *alkalb-u  ðakiyy-u-n   ʕinda ðˤ-ðˤahiira 
     the-dog-Nom  intelligent-Nom-N at the-noon 
     (The dog is intelligent at noon) 
 
   d. *al-fiyalat-u   ħayawaanaat-u-n  ʕaaʃibat-u-n  fi s-safar 
        the-elephants-Nom animal.Pl-Nom-N herbivore-Nom-N in the-travel 
      (elephants are herbivores while traveling) 
 
What the sentences in (27) show is that I-level and K-level predicates are incompatible with this 
structure where quantification is not over individuals, but over situations. Being tall, striped, 
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herbivore, and intelligent are incompatible with habitual readings, where sentences generalize over 
sums of situations. These predicates denote inherent properties essential for the characterization of the 
individuals/kinds they describe; they cannot hold only in certain situations. They hold in all situations 
that have the individuals to which these properties are attributed. Since the sentences in (27) use S-
level predicates, and nonetheless entertain a generic reading, we can plausibly argue that these 
sentences are habituals, rather than lexically characterizing sentences. 
Another piece of evidence comes from deleting the adjuncts in both (25&27). Deleting the 
adverbial adjuncts in (27) not only changes the sentences’ grammatical status rendering them all 
acceptable, but also affects their semantics, in that they become characterizing sentences. ‘The giraffe 
is tall’, ‘The tiger is striped’, ‘The dog is intelligent’, and ‘Elephants are herbivores’ are all true 
characterizing sentences in both MSA and English. However, deleting the adjuncts in (25) brings 
about drastic change in meaning. Consider some of the sentences in (25), repeated below without 
adjuncts in (28). 
(28) a. al-ʔardˤ-u         zaahiya  
  the-earth-Nom  bright    
    (The land is bright) 
 
   b. al-ʤaww-u  ħaar   
   the-weather-Nom hot  
     (The weather is hot) 
 
   c. al-ħaqaaʔib-u  dˤaruuriyya    
the-bags-Nom  necessary   
     (Bags are necessary) 
 
   d. al-muθallaʤaat-u  matˤluuba   
the-ice cream  demanded   
     (Ice cream is in demand) 
 
The sentences in (28) are good on episodic readings only. The generic reading is not available. (a) 
reports an accidental fact about a certain piece of land being bright at a particular location and time. 
The sentence no longer entertains a generic reading as its minimal counterpart with time reference 
adjunct does. Similarly, (b) gives an isolated fact about the weather being hot at a particular place and 
time. (c) expresses a fact about particular bags being necessary. The sentence in (d) reports an 
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accidental fact about particular ice cream being in high demand at specific time and location. It is 
clear that deleting the situations provider adjuncts in such construction brings about significant 
change in meaning, in the sense that the habitual reading is blocked and only the episodic 
interpretation is available. This is due to the S-level predicates incorporated which are compatible 
with an episodic interpretation only, see (3.1) above. This indicates that the sentences in (25), on their 
more salient reading, are habituals that require restrictors to be felicitous. It is noteworthy that the 
sentences in (28) are compatible with adverbs that force an existential interpretation like haaðihi l-
ʔayyaam ‘these days’.  
In sum, verbless sentences with optionally null copula are ambiguous between a habitual 
reading, which is more intuitive and salient, and an episodic reading, which requires complicated 
pragmatic machinery to be validated. The adverbial adjuncts provide restrictors for such 
quantificational habituals, without which the semantics of these sentences show dramatic change in 
acceptability and meaning.   
3.2. 3 The Semantics of Verbless Sentences with Optionally Overt Copula  
Verbless sentences in MSA have counterparts that optionally incorporate a copular verb. 
However, the semantics of verbless sentences with overt copula is different from that of verbless 
sentences with unexpressed copula. This explains why MSA entertains two different structures to 
express what inaccurately appears to be the same meaning. If both structures express the same 
meaning, then economy would rather give rise to one structure over the other, which by the course of 
time tends to disappear, or change its function. It is noteworthy that although the two structures are 
distinct in the type of semantics they express, verbless sentences with phonologically expressed 
copula are less frequent than those with phonologically silent copula. This conforms to Curnow 
(2000) observation that if there are two or more constructions encoding relatively the same 
information and speakers feel that one adds more information not found in the other, the one adding 
additional meaning is considered less basic and the other most basic. To investigate the type of 
information conveyed by verbless sentences with overt copula, and how different it is from that 
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expressed by their minimally contrasting sentences with null copula, the sentences in (25) are 
repeated below in (29) with expressed copula.  
(29) a. ta-kuunu al-ʔardˤ-u         zaahiya-t-a-n    fi   r-rabiiʕ 
     Pres.f-be the-land-Nom   bright-f-Acc-N   in   the-spring 
  (The land is bright in spring) 
 
   b. ya-kuunu al-ʤaww-u  baarid-a-n   fi    ʃ-ʃitaaʔ 
        Pres-be the-weather-Nom    cold-Acc-N  in  the-winter 
   (The weather is cold in winter) 
   c. ya-kuunu  al-ʤaww-u  ħaar-a-n ʕinda ðˤ-ðˤahiira 
       Pres-be  the-weather-Nom hot-Acc-N at the-noon 
   (The weather is hot at noon) 
   d. ya-kuunu  al-layl-u ʃadiid-a  ðˤ-ðˤulmat-i fi    ʃ-ʃitaaʔ 
       Pres-be  the-night-Nom extremely-Acc the-dark-Gen in the-winter 
 (The night is very dark in winter) 
 
   e. ta-kuunu  al-muθallaʤaat-u  matˤluubat-a-n   fi  l-ħarr 
       Pres.f-be  the-ice cream  demanded-Acc-N in the-heat 
  (In hot (weather) ice cream is in demand) 
 
   f. ta-kuunu  al-ħaqaaʔib-u  dˤaruuriyyat-a-n  fi  s-safar 
       Pres.f-be  the-bags-Nom  necessary-Acc-N in the-travel 
  (Bags are necessary while traveling) 
 
The main semantic difference the sentences in (29) entertain is that the episodic reading is 
completely blocked. The only reading available is generic, habitual in particular. This indicates that 
copula ya-kuun functions as a formal, habitual marker, in the sense that it can only live in the shade of 
a habitual sentence. More precisely, its overt presence gives rise to a habitual reading of the sentence, 
and simultaneously excludes the episodic reading that the verbless sentence with unexpressed copula 
has along with the habitual reading. The sentence in (a), for example, can only be interpreted as 
generalizing over sums of groups of spring situations, not reporting  an isolated  fact about a 
particular spring situation. Similarly, (b) does not entertain an episodic interpretation, where an 
accidental fact about a particular noon situation is expressed, but rather quantifies over noon 
situations in general. Similarly, (c) abstracts away from expressing an episodic interpretation, and 
avails the generically habitual reading as the only reading possible. The sentences (d-f) are analyzed 
in the same fashion. 
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In sum, verbless sentences with time/place reference ingredient seem more complex than 
those lacking such an ingredient. In the former, this ingredient provides the required situation 
restrictor for a tripartite, quantificational structure, which gives rise to a habitual reading of the 
sentence, rather than a lexically characteristic reading, which the latter entertains. However, verbless 
sentences with time reference ingredient are not completely homogeneous. This is because two 
minimal counterparts, with/without overt copula, are used in the language to encode roughly the same 
information. Nonetheless, these two versions appear not identical, but rather one structure- the one 
with null copula- is pragmatically ambiguous between habitual/episodic interpretations. Whereas, the 
one with overt copula does not show this ambiguity and gives rise to an unequivocal habitual reading 
at the expense of the episodic reading, which is excluded.  This explicit exclusion of the episodic 
reading of the sentence is the additional semantic ingredient that a verbless sentence with overt copula 
obtains over its minimally contrasting counterpart with unexpressed copula.  Put differently, when 
copula ya-kuun is overtly realized, it functions as a habitual marker that restricts the interpretations of 
the sentence to a generic one, just like other genericity markers that have been observed in other 
languages (e.g. Carlson 1989; Krifka et al. 1995; Greenberg 2002).  
3.3 The Semantics of the Verbless Sentence with Obligatorily Overt Copula  
Some verbless sentences in MSA require an overt copula to be acceptable (30.a-d), or to be 
able to express habituality (30.e&f).  Copula ya-kuun in these sentences is obligatorily expressed. 
Consider the sentences in (30)
60
. 
(30) a. ya-kuunu/*∅  xaalid-u-n  naaʔim-a-n  min l-ʕiʃaaʔ-i    ʔilaa   l-faʤr 
              Pres-be/∅ Khalid-Nom-N  asleep-Acc-N from the-evening-Gen  to        the-dawn 
    (Khalid is asleep from evening to dawn) 
 
   b. ya-kuun/*Ø sˤadiiq-ii  fi  bayt-i-hi  ʔayyaam-a l-ʕutˤal 
          Pres-be/Ø friend-my in house-Gen-his days-Acc the-holidays 
     (My friend is at his house on holidays) 
   
   c. ta-kuunu/*∅  ʔummi  fi  l-ʕamal-i  mina  s-saabiʕat-i 
   Pres.f-be/Ø mother-my at the-work-gen from the-seven-Gen 
                                                          
60
 The question mark (?) indicates that the sentence without copula is odd on habitual reading, and needs 
complex pragmatic machinery to validate its episodic reading. 
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   ʔilaa  θaaliθat-i  ðuhraa 
    to the-three-Gen noon 
      (My mother is at work from seven to three p.m.) 
 
          d. ya-kuunu/*∅  yazan-u   masruur-a-n        ʕinda  intihaaʔ-i  s-sanat-i                 
  Pre-be/∅ Yazan-Nom  delighted-Nom-N   at         end-Gen  the-year-Gen 
               d-diraasiyya 
   the- school 
    (Yazan is delighted at the end of a school year) 
 
         e. ya-kuunu/?∅  l-ʕiʤl-u dˤaxm-a-n  fi    θ-θaaniyat-i         min   ʕumr-ih 
 Pres.be/∅ the-calf-Nom large-Acc-N in    the-second-Gen   of       age-its 
    (A calf is large on its second year) 
 
          f. ya-kuunu/?Ø     l-ʕariis-u        muħraʤ-a-n   fii  laylat-i        z-zafaaf 
 Pres-be the-groom-Nom    embarrassed-Acc-N in   night-Gen   the-wedding 
   (The groom is embarrassed on the wedding night) 
 
The sentences in (30) are true habitual sentences in that they report generalizations about situations. 
In (a), for instance, a generalization is reported about from-evening-to-dawn situations stating that 
these situations are such that Khalid is asleep in them.  The sentences in (b&c) are habituals in that 
they express generalizations about holiday and seven-to-three situations, respectively. In the former, it 
is reported that these situations are such that the speaker’s friend is usually home, and in the latter, the 
speaker’s mother is usually at work. Similarly, the sentence in (d) expresses a habitual generalization 
about end of school year situations; these situations are such that Yazan is delighted in them. The 
sentence in (e) expresses a generalization about calves’ two-year-old situations, saying that usually 
calves are large in such situations. The sentence in (f) quantifies over wedding night situations, 
reporting that in general a groom feels embarrassed in these situations.  
Therefore, it seems that the overt presence of copula ya-kuun unequivocally marks habituality 
in verbless sentences. This function of copula ya-kuun is not different from its function discussed in 
(3.2.3) above. The only major difference is that the overt presence of copula ya-kuun there is optional, 
i.e., verbless sentences without ya-kuun are grammatically acceptable and semantically interpretable. 
The sentences in (30), however, do not easily allow null copula ya-kuun, and when ya-kuun is null a 
sentence is rendered somewhat odd and can express episodicity only. Deleting the copula in (30.a-d), 
marked with an asterisk (*), renders them semantically uninterpretable, and somewhat 
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ungrammatical. For those in (e&f), marked with a question mark (?), deleting the copula 
excludes the habitual reading and provides an episodic reading only. This indicates that the 
copula in these sentences has to be overt for such sentences to express habituality meaning. 
This adds to the distinction between these sentences and those with optional 
expressed/unexpressed copula. 
This is an interesting asymmetry. Precisely, what s it that renders ya-kuun optional in 
the sentences in (29) discussed in (3.2.3) and obligatory in the sentences in (30)? An answer 
to this question can draw on the predicates used in both verbless structures. Put differently, 
the predicates used in the sentences in (29) are different from those used in (30), (a-d) in 
particular. This answer, however, is unsatisfactory because both structures express 
habituality, and hence both invariably use S-level predicates; I-level predicates are 
incompatible with habituals. Scrutiny of the time reference adverbials and their interaction 
with the predicates, however, can be helpful in accounting for this asymmetry. The time 
reference adverbials used in (30.a-d) are incompatible with the S-level predicates used in the 
absence of copula ya-kuun. Put differently, in these sentences, episodic readings are hard to 
derive because the time reference adverbials are incompatible with the ephemeral predicates 
used. In (a), for example, the time reference adverbial min l-ʕiʃaaʔ-i ʔilaa l-faʤr ‘from 
evening to dawn’ is incompatible with the S-level predicate naaʔim ‘asleep’ on episodic 
reading. More accurately, it is infelicitous to report an episodic fact about Khalid being asleep 
from evening to dawn unless the speaker has been watching Khalid sleeping the whole 
period. In this case, a verbless sentence in the past tense would be used. Expressing an 
episodic sentence about Khalid being ephemerally asleep at the time of expression does not 
require giving a time reference, unless the speaker intends to report that Khalid usually sleeps 
from evening to dawn. In this case, copula ya-kuun has to be phonologically expressed to 
mark this reading. The absence of copula ya-kuun gives the impression that this sentence can 
be interpreted episodically, and this contradicts the interaction between the predicate and the 
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time reference adverbial which does not promote an episodic reading. In the present tense, the 
sentence in (30.a) does not entertain an episodic reading in which an accidental fact is reported about 
Khalid being asleep on a particular from-evening-to-dawn situation. Notice that the episodic reading 
of the sentence would be completely felicitous if the past or future copulas kaan/sa-yakuun ‘was/will-
be’ were used.  It is worth noticing that in such structure, deleting the time reference adverbial (31.a) 
renders the sentence without copula acceptable, and its counterpart with overt copula ungrammatical. 
(31) a. xaalid-u-n   naaʔim 
              Khalid-Nom-N  asleep  
   (Khalid is asleep) 
 
  b. *ya-kuunu/  xaalid-u-n   naaʔim 
                Pres-be/∅  Khalid-Nom-N  asleep 
     (Khalid is asleep) 
 
The asymmetry in (31) is explicable. The sentence in (a) is felicitous as it reports an accidental fact 
about Khalid being asleep on a particular time and location. The sentence in (b), however, is 
ungrammatical because notwithstanding it lacks time reference ingredient necessary for providing 
situations, it incorporates copula ya-kuun which is a habitual marker and requires situations to 
quantify over.  
The sentence in (30.b) requires an obligatorily overt copula for the same reason discussed 
above. The time reference adverbial ʔayyaam-a l-ʕutˤal ‘on holidays’ is incompatible with the S-level 
predicate fi bayt-i-hi ‘in his house’ on an episodic reading. The truth conditions of an episodic reading 
of this sentence require that the speaker’s friend be home on all time slices or sub-situation intervals 
of the particular holiday situation for this sentence to be true. In other words, the sentence on an 
episodic reading is false if the speaker’s friend is not in his house for any period on that holiday. The 
verbless sentence in the present tense with a time reference adverbial cannot express this episodic 
reading because the sentence can only be true of a particular slice of the situation, not the situation as 
a whole. However, the habitual reading of the sentence does not entertain this condition, and can be 
true even though a not-being-home-on-holiday occurs sometimes.  Therefore, the absence of copula 
ya-kuun creates an asymmetry in that the structure of the sentence gives rise to an episodic reading 
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along with the habitual reading, but the incompatibility of the time reference and the S-level 
predicate does not entertain an episodic reading. This asymmetry renders the sentence odd 
and unnatural, hence copula ya-kuun is deemed obligatory to exclude the unwanted episodic 
reading, and promotes the habitual reading as the only available reading. The same analysis is 
applicable to the other sentences in (30.c&d). Deleting the copula in (30.e&f), however, 
changes the meaning of these sentences drasatically, changing them from habitual sentences 
to episodic ones, hence the obligatory presence of the copula.  
Therefore, it seems that the overt presence of copula ya-kuun gives an unequivocal 
habitual interpretation of the verbless sentence in MSA. The absence of copula ya-kuun, 
however, gives rise to a variety of readings summarized in the generalization in (11) above.  
A slightly similar generalization pertaining to the distinction in the phonological 
status of copula in the verbless sentence, and the kind of interpretation expressed, 
generic/episodic, holds in Hebrew. Shlonsky (1997) claims that there is a correlation between 
the presence of copula and the exclusively generic interpretation on the one hand, and the 
absence of copula and the prominence of an episodic interpretation on the other hand. He 
argues that a sentence with absent pronominal copula gives rise to an episodic interpretation, 
while its minimally contrasting counterpart with an expressed pronominal copula forces a 
generic interpretation only. This is demonstrated, according to Shlonsky, by the compatibility 
of null copula with S-level predicates, and overt copula with I-level predicates in the verbless 
sentences in Hebrew. 
The analysis proposed above grounded in generic/non-generic distinction can be drawn to 
account for another syntactic asymmetry in the negative verbless sentence in MSA. This asymmetry 
is discussed below in section 4. 
4. Manifestations of Genericity in the Negative Verbless Sentence in MSA  
Genericity in the verbless sentence in the present tense is not only relevant to the 
presence/absence of copula ya-kuun in the affirmative sentence; it also manifests itself in the negation 
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of this construction. In MSA two negative particles are used to negate a verbless sentence, laa and 
laysa (both roughly mean not). These particles are in complementary distribution. The data in (32) 
flesh this out. 
(32) a. Muħammad-u-n        tˤaalib-u-n         muʤtahid 
     Muhammad-Nom-N    student-Nom-N    diligent  
   (Muhammad is a diligent student) 
 
   a'. Muħammad-u-n        laysa/*laa tˤaalib-a-n        muʤtahid 
  Muhammad-Nom-N    NEG  student-Acc-N    diligent     
    (Muhammad is not a diligent student) 
 
   b. al-bint-u   fii  l-matˤbax 
   the-girl-Nom   in the-kitchen 
    (The girl is in the kitchen) 
 
   b'. al-bint-u   laysa-t/*laa  fii  l-matˤbax 
    the-girl-Nom   NEG -f  in the-kitchen 
     (The girl is not in the kitchen) 
 
   c. al-muʕallim-u   ɣadˤbaan 
       the-teacher-Nom angry 
    (The teacher is angry) 
 
   c'. al-muʕallim-u   laysa/*laa  ɣadˤbaan 
      the-teacher-Nom NEG   angry 
    (The teacher is not angry) 
 
The data in (32) show that the verbless sentence can combine with the negative particle laysa, but 
incorporating laa renders the sentence ungrammatical. It is noteworthy that the sentences in (a-c) and 
their negative counterparts (a'-c') are episodic sentences. This is clear from the predicates used; 
diligent, in the kitchen, and angry are S-level predicates. I turn to investigate negative verbless 
sentences with I-level and K-level predicates, and see whether the same fact holds. This is explained 
in (33). 
(33) a. al-kalb-u  laysa/*laa  ɣabiyy  
the-dog-Nom   NEG   stupid 
(The dog is not stupid) 
 
   b. ar-raʤul-u   laysa/*laa  ʔunθaa 
 the-man-Nom  NEG   female 
 (A man is not female)  
 
   c. an-namir-u  laysa/*laa  mina z-zawaaħif 
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 the-tiger-Nom  NEG   from the-reptiles 
 (The tiger is not a reptile) 
 
   d. al-fiil-u   laysa/*laa  munqaridˤ 
        the-elephant-Nom NEG   extinct 
   (The elephant is not extinct) 
 
The sentences in (33) incorporate both I-level and K-level predicates. It is worth noticing that 
these sentences do not tolerate copula ya-kuun because they lack time reference ingredients necessary 
for habitual marker ya-kuun to quantify over. Therefore, ya-kuun is obligatory absent in these 
sentences. The data in (33) clearly show that laysa, not laa, is compatible with negative verbless 
sentences with obligatorily absent copula. This fact does not observe the predicate’s level; (a-b) 
incorporate I-level predicates, and (c-d) use K-level predicates. 
An interesting question to be addressed here is relevant to the syntactic behavior of negative 
verbless sentences with time reference adjuncts. More precisely, does the verbless sentence with 
optionally expressed/unexpressed copular verb behave syntactically in the same fashion under 
negation, and what are the semantic reflexes? The data in (34&35) lay this down. 
(34) a. al-ʤaww-u              baarid-u-n         fi       ʃ-ʃitaaʔ 
       the-weather-Nom    cold-Nom-N  in      the-winter 
  (The weather is cold in winter) 
 
   a'. al-ʤaww-u             laysa/*laa baarid-a-n  fi       sˤ-sˤaif  
the-weather-Nom    NEG              cold-Acc-N in      the-summer 
   (The weather is not cold in summer) 
 
   b. al-ʔardˤ-u         zaahiya-t-u-n    fi   r-rabiiʕ 
        the-land-Nom  bright-f-Nom-N   in   the-spring 
(The land is bright in spring) 
 
   b'. al-ʔardˤ-u      laysa-t/*laa    zaahiya-t-a-n    fi   ʃ-ʃitaaʔ 
the-land-Nom  NEG -f  bright-f-Acc-N   in   the-winter 
  (The land is not bright in winter) 
 
   c .al-muθallaʤaat-u  matˤluubat-u-n   fi  l-ħarr 
  the-ice cream-Nom demanded-Nom-N in the-heat 
   (In hot (weather) ice cream is in demand) 
 
   c'. al-muθallaʤaat-u  laysa-t/*laa matˤluubat-a-n   fi  l-bard 
the-ice cream  NEG -f  demanded-Acc-N in the-cold 
   (In cold (weather) ice cream is not in demand) 
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(35) a. ya-kuun u l-ʤaww-u           baarid-a-n    fi      ʃ-ʃitaaʔ  
    Pres-be     the-weather-Nom    cold-Acc-N in     the-winter 
 (The weather is cold in winter) 
   a'. laa/*laysa    ya-kuunu l-ʤaww-u           baarid-a-n   fi     sˤ-sˤaif    
NEG      Pres-be    the-weather-Nom    cold-Acc-N    in   the-summer 
   (The weather is not cold in summer) 
 
   b. ta-kuunu l-ʔardˤ-u        zaahiya-t-a-n    fi   r-rabiiʕ 
       Pres-be the-land-Nom  bright-f-Acc-N   in   the-spring 
(The land is bright in spring) 
 
   b'. laa/*laysa   ta-kuunu l-ʔardˤ-u        zaahiya-t-a-n   fi   ʃ-ʃitaaʔ 
        NEG    Pres.f-be the-land-Nom  bright-f-Ac-N   in   the-winter 
       (The land is not bright in winter) 
 
   c. ta-kuunu l-muθallaʤaat-u  matˤluubat-a-n   fi  l-ħarr 
       Pres.f-be the-ice cream  demanded-Ac-N in the-heat 
  (In hot (weather) ice cream is in demand) 
 
   c'. laa/*laysa ta-kuunu l-muθallaʤaat-u  matˤluubat-a-n      fi      l-bard 
        NEG   Pres.f-be the-ice cream  demanded-Ac-N   in the-cold 
   (In cold (weather) ice cream is not in demand) 
 
The data in (34) represent the verbless sentence with optional absence of copula ya-kuun. As 
mentioned above, in a verbless sentence with an optionally null copula, both readings, generic and 
episodic, are available. The negative particle laysa, rather than laa, is compatible with this structure. 
This indicates that laysa is the unmarked negative particle in MSA, which is typically used in the 
absence of copula ya-kuun, a structure taken as more frequent and to a certain extent unmarked.  
The data in (35) show that when copula ya-kuun is phonologically overt, and thus only a 
habitual interpretation is available, the negative particle laa can be used; whereas, the use of the 
negative particle laysa renders the sentence ungrammatical. This same analysis is applicable to 
sentences where ya-kuun is obligatorily expressed. This indicates that the two particles are in 
complementary distribution in terms of the habitual/episodic readings of the verbless sentence when 
the sentence does not express an ambiguity. Put differently, MSA utilizes a specific negative particle 
to mark unequivocal habitual reading of a sentence, and another unmarked particle to mark 
episodicity and generic/nongeneric ambiguity in the verbless sentence construction. However, laa 
negative particle and ya-kuun habitual marker are used in other constructions not relevant to 
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genericity like prohibitive sentences, and modal sentences, respectively. In other words, the use of laa 
and ya-kuun in MSA conforms to a typological classification of linguistic expressions which are used 
mainly to mark genericity and meanwhile can be used to express other functions in different contexts 
(Dahl 1995). Concisely, both laa and ya-kuun are necessary but not sufficient habituality markers in 
the verbless sentence in MSA. 
In sum, the negative verbless sentence in MSA is expressed in three different constructions 
with only two interpretations. A construction without time reference adjunct expresses 
generic/nongeneric interpretation based on the predicate used and the semantic definiteness status of 
the subject NP, (32&33); it can only combine with the negative particle laysa. A construction with 
copula ya-kuun unexpressed, (34), avails the two generic/nongeneric interpretations. In this case, 
negative particle laysa is used to mark the ambiguous interpretation, while negative particle laa is 
incompatible. A construction with copula ya-kuun overtly realized (35), which can receive a generic 
interpretation only, conforms to the exclusive use of the generic negative particle laa 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the semantics of the present tense verbless sentence has been probed. The 
claim this chapter made is that there is a semantic explanation for the syntactic asymmetry 
represented by the obligatory absence of copula ya-kuun in some sentences as opposed to the 
optional/obligatory presence of the copula that other sentences exhibit. It has been shown that this 
syntactic asymmetry can be plausibly explained semantically by positing a generic vs. nongeneric 
interpretation. It has been argued that sentences which do not incorporate adverbial adjuncts of time 
or place do not allow overt ya-kuun. Since these sentences lack adverbial adjuncts, an essential 
ingredient for expressing quantificational habituality, copula ya-kuun is incompatible with these 
sentences, hence deemed obligatorily absent. The exact interpretation of these sentences depends on 
the predicate and the NP subject. Put differently, S-level predicates give rise to an episodic reading of 
the sentences. I-level predicates give rise to an ambiguous generic/non-generic reading based on the 
definiteness status of the subject NP; a semantically definite NP subject promotes a non-generic 
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reading, and an indefinite subject is compatible with a generic reading. K-predicates are compatible 
with reference to a kind genericity. In other words, the semantics of verbless sentences lacking time 
reference adjuncts is similar to their verbal counterparts discussed in chapter 4.  
Sentences in which copula ya-kuun can optionally surface in their PF have been shown to be 
ambiguous between generic and nongeneric readings when ya-kuun is phonologically null. Pragmatic 
considerations along with contextual factors play a pivotal role in favoring one reading over the other. 
However, the overt presence of copula ya-kuun in these sentences and in sentences where it is 
obligatorily overt militates against an episodic reading and admits a generic interpretation only. More 
precisely, copula ya-kuun has been shown to function as a formal habitual marker that gives rise to a 
quantificationally habitual reading only when overt, and to two alternative readings, habitual and 
episodic, when optionally null. However, since this morphosyntactic marker is used in the language to 
encode other functions like its use in modal sentences; this marker is taken to be necessary but not 
sufficient to mark habituality in the verbless sentence in MSA.  
In the negative verbless sentence, the two available negative particles, laa and laysa, have 
been shown to be in complementary distribution. While the negative particle laa can only be used in a 
sentence with an overt copula ya-kuun, negative particle laysa can occur in all other environments. 
This indicates that laysa is the unmarked negative particle in the verbless sentences in MSA, which is 
compatible with a variety of interpretations, episodic, characterizing, and habitual. Negative particle 
laa, however, is only compatible with sentences that admit a habitual reading only. This shows that 
laa encodes habituality in the negative verbless sentence in MSA. However, laa cannot be taken as a 
necessary and sufficient habituality marker in the language, simply because it is used in other 
syntactic structures to encode other functions like its use in prohibitive sentences.  
A related issue that has been tentatively addressed in this chapter is the exact semantic 
meaning of the copula from a compositional viewpoint. As has been emphasized, copula ya-kuun is 
compatible with verbless sentences modified by adverbial adjuncts only. An insightful point 
pertaining to the semantic contribution of copula ya-kuun to such a structure arises.  From a 
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compositional viewpoint, when standardly co-occurent pieces of morphology are found in one 
structure, the division of labor between the two becomes hard to decide. In MSA, the co-occurence of 
copula ya-kuun and spatio/temporal adverbials in habitual verbless sentences makes it hard to tell 
whether habituality meaning is contributed by the adverbials or the copula. More precisely, which 
expression provides a set even-like structures over which a generic or habitual quantifier quantifies?  I 
suggest that the copula, not the adverbials, contributes such a set of eventualities. This suggestion 
needs more investigation when building formal models of genericity manifestations in the verbless 
sentence in MSA. However, this suggestion is bolstered by two observations. First, some verbless 
sentences are modified by adverbial adjuncts (5.a&12.a,b); nonetheless, these sentences do not 
tolerate copula ya-kuun. These sentences can express episodic reading only because they lack 
situation variables necessary for a habitual operator to quantify over. The adverbial adjuncts in these 
sentences do not denote variable situations, but rather refer to particular situations. If eventualities 
were provided by adverbial adjuncts, these sentences would express habituality even if ya-kuun is 
obligatorily absent, but they do not. Second, some verbless sentences are modified by adverbial 
adjuncts; nonetheless they require overt copula to express habituality (30). This indicates that without 
the copula, which supposedly contributes event-like structures, habituality cannot be expressed. 
 Suggesting that copula yakkun contributes these eventualities gives another insight regarding 
the hot debate among modern Arab linguists whether ya-kuun exists in the underlying structure of the 
verbless sentence, the one modified with adverbial adjuncts in particular, or not. This suggestion 
indicates treating ya-kuun as a covert copula in sentences in which its presence is optional.However, 
the exact semantic contribution of the copula to habituality remains to be investigated in a more 
formal approach which will not be pursued in this project.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This dissertation has examined the manifestations of genericity and definiteness in Modern 
Standard Arabic, one of the least studied languages with respect to genericity phenomena. This and 
similar studies are intended to open a window for building reliable formal models that capture both 
the distributional facts and semantic structures of generics not only in MSA, but also in other studied 
and yet to be studied languages. By accurately capturing the semantic structure of generics, such 
models make possible their cross-linguistic study and provide arguments for and against the 
universality of various meaning-making mechanisms.  Many semanticists, for example, argue for a 
universal semantic structure of characterizing sentences (e.g. Cohen 1996; Greenberg 2003, 2012; 
Krifka et al. 1995; Pelletier 2010b). They argue for a tripartite quantificational structure with null 
generic operator. The viability of this structure as a common, if not universal, semantic apparatus 
remains an open question if its efficiency is only tested against limited facts coming from a small set 
of languages like English, Italian, Dutch, and German. This study and similar studies of genericity in 
lesser-studied languages pertaining to this pervasive phenomenon constitute a crucial step towards 
testing such claims. 
The interaction between genericity and definiteness is an important start point for 
investigating genericity in natural languages. This interaction is explicated by the observation made 
by many semanticists (e.g. Krifka 1987; Krifka et a. 1995; Link 1995; Pelletier 2010b) that the 
distinction between the two sub-types of generics, reference to kind generics and characterizing 
sentences is established on the semantic definiteness of the NP subject upon which a generalization is 
made.  Based on data from a number of languages, the former appear to entertain definite NP 
subjects; whereas, the later require indefinite NP subjects. Considering this distinction between 
generics and interaction between genericity and definiteness, this dissertation has argued for 
202 
 
departure point from Arab traditional grammarians’ view of identifying definiteness in MSA. It 
argues that determining definites in MSA should not be done based on morphology alone as the 
traditional view claims. Definiteness, as a semantic phenomenon, needs to be investigated 
semantically based on the semantic concepts of familiarity, identifiability, and uniqueness which first 
triggered its morphological grammaticizations. In MSA, although the definite article al sometimes 
marks the noun it is prefixed to definite, it does not do so invariably. More often than not, al is 
prefixed to a noun whose denotation is not a familiar, identifiable, or unique individual, but the 
opposite. The definite article al has been shown to be inconsistent in its behavior in terms of encoding 
semantic definiteness.  
A direct repercussion of adopting a semantic cluster for determining definites in MSA is 
rejecting the idea that characterizing sentences are either nonexistent in the language, or that their 
semantic structure is peculiar in that it incorporates a definite NP subject, tied to a particular 
individual, to be bound by GEN operator. This dissertation has argued that characterizing sentences in 
MSA entertain the same semantic structure of those in studied languages. Although characterizing 
sentences tolerate al-Ns only in subject position for grammatical reasons not related to genericity, 
these al-Ns are semantically indefinite. Semantically indefinite NPs are required in characterizing 
sentences as they contribute variable individuals over which the GEN operator quantifies. Accurately 
capturing the distributional facts about characterizing sentences in MSA contributes to the 
crosslinguistic endeavor initiated in Carlson (1989, 1995) and Dahl (1995). This project aims at 
investigating whether and how generics are formally marked in natural languages. In other words, it 
aims to investigate how genericity is encoded in natural languages. 
In this dissertation, a semantic analysis for the syntactic asymmetry of copula ya-kuun in 
present tense verbless sentences has been proposed. This analysis has explained the asymmetric 
distribution of copula ya-kuun based on a generic/nongeneric distinction. Sentences where the copula 
is obligatorily unexpressed have been shown to entertain generic or episodic meanings based on the 
predicate and the al-N subject used. Such sentences lack adverbial adjuncts argued to license copula 
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ya-kuun in this structure. It has been argued that sentences in which the copula is obligatorily 
expressed avail a generic reading only. Those with optionally un/expressed copula, however, have 
been shown to differ in the type of reading they avail on par with the phonological status of the 
copula. Sentences with expressed copula avail a generic reading only, while those with unexpressed 
ya-kuun are ambiguous between generic/nongeneric readings. The context and the predicate used help 
teasing the two readings apart. Although this dissertation has not investigated whether or not verbless 
sentences with optionally unexpressed copula have the copula in their underlying structure. It has 
alluded to how interesting this issue is. The analysis proposed in the dissertation has suggested a 
meaning difference between the two sentence types, those with ya-kuun and those without. This, in 
turn, might be developed further.  The sentence types differ by more than just phonology. If they only 
differed by phonology, we would expect the same range of meaning. Since the meanings are 
different, it might indicate that there is no hidden ya-kuun, and that ya-kuun is making a semantic 
contribution of some sort. This insight needs a thorough investigation in the future to be done by the 
writer of this project, or it might inspire other linguists interested in the verbless sentence in MSA. 
The overall goal of this dissertation has been to investigate genericity phenomenon in MSA 
by grammatically describing and semantically analyzing its manifestations in the language. The 
overarching goal for the future is to build upon what has been done in this project, and exploit the 
distributional facts outlined herein to build formal models that capture the semantics of generics in the 
language. The semantic contribution of copula ya-kuun, for instance, needs to be investigated further 
to show whether it actually functions as a habitual marker or not. If yes, the copula might contribute 
eventualities for the GEN operator to quantify over. However, this analysis must reconcile the fact 
that the copula is licensed by adverbial adjuncts. The contribution of such adjuncts and their 
interaction with the copula in verbless sentences need to be investigated and articulated clearly. 
Finally, this dissertation is intended to contribute to a better understanding of generics in 
MSA and in other natural languages by using the results and reasoning of modern semantic theories 
and approaches to investigating the phenomenon.  
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